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INTRODUCrlON
HE U.S. stock market is one of the largest markets in the
world. In 1992, over three trillion dollars in shares changed
hands on the exchanges and in the over-the-counter ("OTC") mar-
ket,' almost twice as much as consumer spending on durable and
nondurable goods combined.2 Trading on such a gargantuan scale
costs investors $100 billion or more annually.3 Despite these costs,
trading volume on the exchanges and in the OTC market has qua-
drupled over the past decade.4 Moreover, investors no longer are
content to trade just stocks; they now trade stock "derivatives,"
complex financial instruments whose values depend on the prices
of publicly traded equities.5
1 National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 1993 Nasdaq Fact Book & Company Directory 7
(1993) (stating that in 1992 $1.75 trillion traded on New York Stock Exchange and $1.31
trillion traded on regional exchanges and in OTC market).
2 See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1993, at 442 tbl. 690 (113th ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Statistical Abstract] (charting
the $480.4 billion and $1290.7 billion spent on durables and nondurables, respectively, in
1992).
3 See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text (noting that mutual funds' expense
ratios suggest investors spend at least $100 billion annually researching, managing, and
trading stock portfolios).
4 See National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that NASDAQ
annual dollar volume rose from $84 billion in 1982 to $891 billion in 1992); 1993 Statistical
Abstract, supra note 2, at 522 tbl. 829 (noting that dollar volume on all exchanges rose
from $476 billion in 1980 to $1612 billion in 1990).
S See infra notes 313-25 and accompanying text (describing aspects of derivatives
trading).
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Why do traders trade? A common assumption is that equities
trading serves both buyers' and sellers' self-interest, as well as the
interest of the larger society.6 In the tradition of classical econom-
ics, exchange between rational actors is equated with mutual bene-
fit and a corresponding increase in social welfare.7 Thus, scholars
and regulators believe that more stock trading is better than less,
that increasing opportunities to trade stocks is desirable, and that
lowering trading costs, including regulatory costs, is an important
policy goal.8 Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
6 The securities literature often assumes that stock trades are mutually beneficial. See,
e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86
Nw. U. L. Rev. 987 (1992) (suggesting that securities regulation is premised on the view
that government should not interfere with investment decisions); Donald W. Kiefer, The
Security Transactions Tax: An Overview of the Issues, 48 Tax Notes 885, 896 (1990)
(arguing against tax that discourages trading as cutting against economic assumption that
activity is valuable if participants are willing to pay for it); Donald C. Langevoort,
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 747,
803 (1985) (noting that information technology that lowers trading costs benefits
investors); Robert W. Vishny, Three Comments on Economic Implications of Alternative
Portfolio Policies of Institutional Investors, in Institutional Investing: Challenges and
Responsibilities of the 21st Century 159, 165-66 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991) (defending
stock trading as activity of "consenting adults"); see also Division of Mkt. Regulation,
SEC, Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market Developments 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Market 2000 Report] (praising U.S. stock markets for "[r]ecord amounts of
trading activity").
In addition to its presumed benefits to trading parties, stock trading also is believed to
provide significant social benefits by contributing to the "liquidity" and "efficiency" of the
market. See infra notes 234-239, 257-258 and accompanying text.
Only a handful of scholars have suggested that stock trading is not socially valuable. See
infra note 10.
7 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 10-11 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that a
basic principle of economics is that voluntary exchange is efficient because it helps move
resources to those who value them most highly, as measured by willingness to pay). The
classic statement of this proposition is, of course, Adam Smith's discussion of the "invisible
hand." See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (1776).
8 For example, the assumption that stock trading is beneficial has played a large role in
recent debates over proposals to reinstate a federal stock transfer tax. See, e.g., G. William
Schwert & Paul J. Seguin, Securities Transaction Taxes: An Overview of Costs, Benefits
and Unresolved Questions 1 (1993) (stating that decreasing trading reduces market
efficiency and liquidity and drives trading overseas); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 896 (arguing
against tax aimed at discouraging stock trading); Myron S. Scholes, Tax Treatment of
Short-Term Trading, in Institutional Investing: Challenges and Responsibilities of the 21st
Century, supra note 6, at 150, 155-56 (arguing that a stock transaction tax is undesirable
because it will "reduce demand for trading" and that tax policy should not discourage stock
trading but should "be directed at increasing the supply of transaction services").
1995] Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 615
sion ("SEC") praise stock markets as paragons of efficiency to be
protected and promoted.9
This Article explores an alternative view of stock trading.10
Using rational choice analysis and information theory, it presents a
The assumption that trading is beneficial also underlies federal authorities' reluctance to
regulate the emerging market for equities derivatives. See, e.g., Division of Mkt.
Regulation, SEC, The Role of Index-Related Trading in the Market Decline on September
11 and 12, 1986, at 17 (1987) (arguing that trading in stock index options and futures offers
"significant benefits to today's capital markets" by adding liquidity and efficiency to equity
markets and allowing investors to control the risk of their portfolios); Hazen, supra note 6,
at 988, 1021 (noting that current regulatory policy, which is based on a model of rational
and socially beneficial trading, has sanctioned and encouraged proliferation of derivative
investments); see also Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 Yale L.J. 1457,
1513 (1993) (arguing that a prohibition of derivatives trading would be "destructive of
social wealth"); Robert Lenzner & William Heuslein, The Age of Digital Capitalism,
Forbes, Mar. 29, 1993, at 62, 64-65 (arguing against regulation of derivatives trading on the
grounds that trading serves "powerful demand" and provides benefits to trading parties);
Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A
Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. Fin. Services Res. 261, 264 (1989)
("Financial innovators and their academic champions argue that the facilitation of trading
necessarily contributes to economic efficiency.").
9 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1983) reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,2294 (noting and adopting SEC's view that U.S. securities markets are
"the best.., the world has ever known" because they are "liquid, efficient, and fair"); U.S.
Equity Market Structure Study, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,587 (1992) (praising the U.S. for having
the "largest, most diverse, and most innovative securities markets in the world," and noting
that their continued strength and vitality are "critical to the economic welfare of all
Americans"); Market 2000 Report, supra note 6, at 1 (describing stock markets as an
"important national asset" and praising U.S. markets as "the most efficient and liquid in
the world" with "[r]ecord amounts of trading activity"); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using
Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. Fin. Services Res. 101, 113 (1989)
("No institution in our capitalist society is as venerable as the stock market.").
10 Stock markets are not without their critics. John Maynard Keynes, who likened stock
markets to casinos, once proposed that society might be significantly better off with less
stock trading. John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
159-60 (1st Harbinger ed. 1964). A handful of contemporary scholars have followed
Keynes' lead by questioning the social benefits of high-volume stock trading. See Louis
Lowenstein, What's Wrong with Wall Street: Short-term Gain and the Absentee
Shareholder 80-86 (1988) (suggesting social costs of high-volume markets exceed their
benefits); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 103 (questioning benefits of stock trading to traders and
suggesting that from a social perspective, it may be desirable to discourage excessive
trading); Summers & Summers, supra note 8, at 262, 271-72 (suggesting that stock market
trading is efficient only "[i]n the narrow sense of permitting trade to take place between
consenting adults" and that excessive costs may be associated with the zero-sum game of
speculation); James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, Lloyds Bank Rev.,
July 1984, at 1, 2, 15 (questioning economic benefits of financial markets and their "casino
aspect"). Most academic economists, however, have given such suggestions a cool
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model of stock trading premised on the observation that, in a world
of costly and imperfect information, rational investors are likely to
form heterogeneous expectations-that is, to make different fore-
casts of stocks' likely future performance. 1 The heterogeneous
expectations ("HE") model predicts that investors' asymmetrical
expectations will inspire them to seek short-term profits by specu-
lating12 on stocks they perceive as mispriced. Thus, John buys
reception. Many are disturbed by the claim that stock markets are "too speculative,"
believing it implies that stock traders are irrational or that stock markets somehow defy the
laws of economics. See, e.g., Donald W. Kiefer, Cong. Res. Serv., Are Pension Funds
Short-Term Investors? 14-15 (1992) (suggesting that if investors do systematically lose
wealth by excessive trading, "inefficient behavior persists on a grand scale in [the stock]
market," and as "a serious reconsideration of some of the most basic principles of
economic theory may be necessary"); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 896 (rejecting suggestion that
stock trading leads to social waste of resources as "conjectural" and as "more a statement
of personal value judgment than the result of rigorous application of standard principles of
economic analysis"); Stephen A. Ross, Commentary: Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative
Short-Term Trading, 3 J. Fin. Services Res. 117, 117-118 (1989) (decrying argument that
stock trading should be discouraged as paternalistic and itself "speculative"); Robert W.
Vishny, supra note 6, at 165-66 (describing argument that stock trading wastes resources as
"dangerous"); see also Stiglitz, supra note 9 at 104 (noting that traditional economic texts
emphasize importance of mutual gains from exchange and do not question source of stock
traders' preferences); Tobin, supra, at 2 (noting that skepticism about social value of
financial markets runs "against current tides," including a "general enthusiasm for
deregulation and unfettered competition" and economists' "intellectual admiration for the
efficiency of financial markets"); cf. J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H.
Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, Noise Trader Risk in Fmancial Markets 98 J. Pol. Econ.
703, 731-32 (1990) [hereinafter De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk] (noting that arguments
considering short-term speculation to be socially destructive have "found little academic
sympathy").
11 In another work, I use the phrase "heterogeneous beliefs" in describing why different
investors might attach differing subjective values to the same securities. Lynn A. Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law,
99 Yale LJ. 1235, 1239 (1990). The more specific phrase "heterogeneous expectations" is
used here because the phrase "heterogeneous beliefs" could include differences in
perfectly informed investors' preferences for risk, liquidity, and so forth. See infra notes
136-144 and accompanying text (discussing nonmistaken differences in preferences as
reasons for trading).
12 Financial theorists have yet to agree on a definition of "speculation." Oliver D. Hart
& David M. Kreps, Price Destabilizing Speculation, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 927, 928 (1986). This
Article defines speculation as the purchase of an item not for consumption, but in the hope
of profiting from resale by predicting future price changes. Cf. Jack Hirshleifer, Tne,
Uncertainty, and Information 186 (1989) (defining speculation as "purchase with the
intention of re-sale, ... where the uncertainty of the future spot price is a source of both
risk and gain"); James R_ Repetti, The Use of Tax Law To Stabilize the Stock Market: The
Efficacy of Holding Period Requirements, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 591, 596 (1989) (defining
speculation as "the purchase of an item with a view to selling it at a higher price within a
short period of time").
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General Motors expecting that GM's share price will soon rise,
whereas Mary sells expecting GM to decline.
The HE model of trading offers important insights into the work-
ings of U.S. equities markets. For example, empirical studies indi-
cating that stock markets do not accurately price securities have
sparked much debate among legal and financial scholars over
whether modem equities markets conform to the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"). 13 The HE model consequently
offers an answer to the controversy by explaining why, when inves-
tors disagree, "efficient" markets that rapidly respond to new infor-
mation can nevertheless produce prices that depart substantially
from best estimates of stocks' fundamental values. 14
Perhaps more important, the HE trading model carries profound
normative implications for the social value of stock markets. Stock
trades motivated by heterogeneous expectations appear mutually
beneficial ex ante but inevitably disappoint at least one party ex
post. After all, when John buys GM hoping to profit from a price
rise and Mary sells expecting to avoid a decline, both cannot be
right. Moreover, trading requires both parties to incur costs,
13 The phrase "efficient stock market" generally alludes to a highly specialized notion of
efficiency associated with the ECMH. See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers,
Principles of Corporate Finance 290-310 (4th ed. 1991); Edwin J. Elton & Martin J.
Gruber, Modem Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis 399-433 (4th ed. 1991); Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fm.
383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient
Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761 (1985). In its
classic form, the ECMH simply predicts that prices in a well-developed stock market
respond so quickly to new information that it is impossible for investors to earn short-run
profits by buying on good news or selling on bad news. See Gordon & Komhauser, supra,
at 771 n.19 (describing market as efficient with respect to an information set if it is
impossible for investors to profit by trading on that information set); see also Gilson &
Kraakman, supra, at 560 (noting that requirement that prices always reflect new
information means that market mechanisms function rapidly enough to foreclose trading
opportunities from new information). Many scholars also believe, however, that
informationally efficient stock markets produce prices that reflect the best possible
estimates of fundamental economic values as measured in terms of likely risk and return.
See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (describing concepts of Capital Asset Pricing
Model and fundamental value efficiency); infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text
(describing controversy surrounding fundamental value efficiency).
14 HE theory suggests that informationally efficient markets may react quickly to new
information, yet still produce prices that depart from fundamental values. See infra notes
120-35 (discussing HE model's implications for market efficiency).
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including but not limited to broker commissions. The HE model
suggests that stock trading may be a form of market failure due to
imperfect information.' 5 Unless HE trading provides social bene-
fits outweighing its costs, such trading reduces society's wealth
along with the wealth of the average HE trader.
That possibility seriously undermines much of the laissez-faire
structure of modem securities law. A fundamental premise of the
current regulatory scheme is that stock trading is socially benefi-
cial. In the interest of reducing trading costs and increasing oppor-
tunities for trading, regulators in recent years have repealed stock
transfer taxes,' 6  eliminated fixed brokerage commissions,1 7
encouraged the development of new trading systems and mar-
kets,'-8 extended the trading hours of existing markets, 9 and sanc-
tioned trading in securities derivatives, including stock index
options and futures.20 If the HE model accurately describes mod-
em stock markets, however, policies that encourage stock trading
may, on the margin, reduce net social welfare. Far from being
engines of efficiency, high-volume stock markets may generate
inefficiency and deadweight social loss.
15 The phrase "market failure" describes instances in which rational, self-interested
individuals pursue courses that ultimately reduce their net welfare. In the case of stock
trading, imperfect information may be the source of market failure. Infra notes 35-45 and
accompanying text.
16 See generally 1 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 329 n.18 (3d ed.
1989) (discussing the repeal of federal transfer tax); Kiefer, supra note 10, at 23 (noting
repeal of federal and New York state transfer taxes).
17 See generally 6 Loss & Seligman, supra note 16, at 2851-80 (laying out the policy
debate over elimination of fixed commissions); infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text
(describing the deregulation of commissions).
18 See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 754 (describing Congress' direction that SEC help
develop "national market system" to ensure more efficient and competitive marketplace);
see also Brandon Becker, Global Securities Markets, 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 242, 249-53
(1988) (describing proposals to develop new trading systems).
19 See Becker, supra note 18, at 250, 253-54 (noting that extending trading hours is
consistent with SEC's goal of facilitating international trading); Stephen Labaton, New
Stock Trading Approved, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1991, at D1 (describing SEC's approval of
early-morning trading in OTC stocks); see also Laura S. Greenstein, The Future of Global
Securities Transactions: Blocking the Success of Market Links, 11 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade
283, 286 (1987) (noting that securities professionals are proposing 24-hour market); cf.
Aulana L. Peters, Overview of International Securities Regulation, 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law.
229, 230 (1988) (providing argument of SEC commissioner that liberalizing access to
securities markets enhances efficiency of those markets).
20 See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text (noting that the benefits of trading are
used to defend derivatives).
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Part I develops the basic HE model of trading by examining
how, when information costs are positive, rational investors form
heterogeneous expectations that induce them to hope ex ante to
profit from speculative transactions that actually reduce their net
wealth ex post. Part I examines the effect of optimistic self-selec-
tion in determining who trades stocks, the importance of genera-
tional factors in ensuring that speculative markets persist despite
evolutionary pressures that "weed out" unsuccessful traders, and
the roles of brokers and institutional investment funds in increasing
the incidence of ]HE trading. Part I also explores the HE model's
controversial implications for the accuracy of stock prices in "effi-
cient" markets.
Part II addresses the empirical validity of the HE model by con-
sidering alternative reasons why investors might trade stocks,
including liquidity, tax benefit, and portfolio balancing concerns.
The available evidence suggests that although such motivations
account for a portion of stock trading, investor disagreement
inspires the lion's share of equities transactions.
Part III explores the policy implications of the HE model by
examining the social costs and benefits of stock speculation
through the lens of HE theory. Investors appear to spend at least
$100 billion annually-approximately twenty percent of the
returns from stock ownership-researching, managing, and trading
corporate equities.2' If most stock trades are HE trades, much of
that $100 billion represents a net loss to investors. Stock specula-
tion also may impose a second, more subtle, form of social cost if
speculators' optimistic hopes of trading profits create "false substi-
tution" and "false valuation" effects that distort investor demand
for corporate equity. Nevertheless, from a social perspective, costs
associated with HE trading would be worthwhile if HE trading
provided even larger social benefits. Two benefits often associated
with speculative stock trading are more liquid markets that
encourage capital formation and more efficient (i.e., accurate)
stock prices. Part III examines the liquidity and efficiency claims
and concludes that the marginal social benefits that flow from spec-
ulative trading likely are significantly outweighed by the marginal
costs. Part III addresses the regulatory implications of this conclu-
21 Infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
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sion by examining three basic policy approaches to reducing dead-
weight losses from HE trading: (1) reducing investor disagreement,
(2) decreasing trading costs, and (3) taxing or prohibiting trading.
Part Ill also discusses the value of each approach in the context of
the modem regulatory scheme of mandatory disclosure accompa-
nied by rules against fraud.
The analysis presented below focuses primarily on trading in
public markets for corporate equities. That choice of emphasis
reflects both the greater availability of data on equities markets
and the relative simplicity of modeling equities trading. But les-
sons learned from stock markets may apply to other markets as
well. The HE model of trading is in essence a model of rational-
but ultimately self-defeating and socially wasteful-speculation.
Part I concludes by briefly considering some of the broader
implications of the HE model for other markets and especially for
the emerging market for financial derivatives.
I. A HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS MODEL
OF STOCK TRADING
Corporations issue stock in the primary market for corporate
equity by selling shares to investors in exchange for additional cap-
ital.2 Most companies issue equity only rarely; after "going pub-
lic," a firm might never peddle stock to outside investors again.23
Once issued, however, a firm's shares will continue to be traded
from investor to investor on secondary markets such as the
exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automatic Quotation ("NASDAQ") over-the-counter system.24
22 See generally Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 339-43 (discussing venture capital
and the public offering); Robert A. Haugen, Modem Investment Theory 25-26 (3d ed.
1993) (describing the difference between primary and secondary markets).
23 See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 646-47 & 647 n. 185
(1988) (noting that public issuances are rare).
24 Commentators who speak of "the stock market" almost invariably are referring to the
secondary markets. Their choice of emphasis reflects the reality that, although secondary
market trades provide no additional capital to corporations, they account for the
overwhelming majority of all stock transactions. For example, in the five-year period from
1988 through 1992, trading on the secondary markets outweighed corporate issues by a
ratio of 50 to one. See Securities Indus. Ass'n, Securities Industry Yearbook 947 (Rosalie
Pepe ed., 1993) (noting that from 1988 through 1992, U.S. firms underwrote annual
average of $40 billion in common stock issues); id. at 948, 949 (noting that from 1978
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Secondary market investors buy and sell eagerly and often. In
1992, nearly half of the shares listed on the NYSE changed hands. 2
In the OTC market, the dollar volume of trading in NASDAQ-
listed stocks amounted to 160% of the total value of shares listed,
implying an average investor holding period of less than eight
months.26
What drives such secondary market turnover? Both scholars
and laymen generally assume that disagreement underlies most
stock trading.27 John buys General Motors predicting its stock will
soon rise, whereas Mary sells, expecting GM to fall. Investors' dif-
fering expectations lead them to perceive opportunities to profit by
buying stocks they believe are underpriced and selling (or selling
short)28 stocks they believe are overpriced. Some individual inves-
tors do their own buying and selling. Many more speculate indi-
rectly by putting money into "actively managed" pension or mutual
funds that trade on their behalf. In either case, trading is moti-
through 1992, investors traded an average of $2.061 trillion in stock annually on the NYSE
and NASDAQ markets alone).
25 In 1992, investors traded 51.8 billion (45%) of the NYSE's 115.8 billion listed shares.
1993 Statistical Abstract, supra note 2, at 524 tbls. 833, 834. In dollar volume terms, NYSE
trading in 1992 amounted to 44% of the value of all shares listed, implying an average
holding period of less than 28 months. Id.; see New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book for
the Year 1992, at 11, 32 (1993) (listing $1.745 trillion trading volume and $4.035 trillion
market value of listed shares).
26 The total dollar volume of trading on NASDAQ was $891 billion in 1992, whereas the
total market value of NASDAQ listed equities was $556 billion. Nasdaq Fact Book 1993,
supra note 1, at 7, 11. The Nasdaq Fact Book does not provide the information needed to
calculate share turnover.
27 See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 895 (1992) (noting the popular
assumption that most investors trade because they believe the market misvalues stocks);
see also William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and
Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 341, 385
(describing stock markets as "built... on differing expectations"); Gordon & Kornhauser,
supra note 13, at 781 n.49 (observing that differences in beliefs are occasions for trade);
Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 102, 104 (stating that stock exchanges are largely motivated by
"differences in judgments" concerning stocks' yields).
28 Short selling is akin to selling "borrowed" stock. A short sale is a bet that the market
price of the shorted shares will fall before the short seller must purchase the shares on the
open market and return them to the "lender." As a practical matter, legal restrictions and
market risks ensure that short selling is extremely rare. Stout, supra note 11, at 1248 n.68.
See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions on Short
Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock
Market Crash, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 799 (1989) (analyzing restrictions on short selling).
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vated by the desire to achieve returns greater than those available
from simply buying and holding a market portfolio. Thus the pop-
ular image of stock markets populated by individual and institu-
tional traders trying to "beat the market" by buying and selling
based on their predictions for companies, industries, and the mar-
ket as a whole.
A. The Puzzle of Speculative Stock Trading
On closer inspection, however, the idea of investors trying to
make money by buying and selling mispriced stocks seems puz-
zling, for stock trading is a zero-sum game.29 Owning stocks is not
zero-sum: if stocks tend to appreciate over time, investors generally
can increase their wealth by buying, and holding, equities. But
trading simply transfers the benefits (or costs) of equity ownership
from one investor to another. If John buys GM from Mary at $100
and GM rises to $105, John is five dollars wealthier, but Mary has
lost the opportunity to enjoy that five dollar gain herself. Similarly,
if GM falls to ninety-five dollars, Mary avoids a five dollar loss,
but only by passing that loss on to John. That stock trading is zero-
sum does not imply that no investor can increase her returns from
stock ownership by trading. For every talented or lucky trader who
earns above-market returns, however, some other trader or traders
must be earning below-market returns.
The idea of a market of traders trying to beat the market seems
even odder when one considers that investors who trade incur bro-
ker fees, research costs, and other expenses. Zero-sum games that
involve playing costs become negative-sum games in which the
average player loses money. Trading costs ensure that investors
who trade earn lower returns on average than investors who do
not, just as the "house cut" ensures that gamblers on average exit
29 See William J. Baumol, Speculation, Profitability, and Stability, 39 Rev. of Econ. &
Stat. 263, 264 (1957) ("Whatever one group of traders gains another must lose."); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
Va. L. Rev. 717, 733 (1984) (explaining that secondary market trading does not create
wealth because one party's gain comes from another's loss); Summers & Summers, supra
note 8, at 272 (recognizing that trading is a zero-sum game); Jack L. Treynor, Types and
Motivations of Market Participants, in Association for Inv. Management & Research,
Execution Techniques, True Trading Costs, and the Microstructure of Markets 35 (Katrina
F. Sherrerd ed., 1993) (noting that trading is a zero-sum game in which every trade has one
winner and one loser).
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casinos poorer than when they entered. The laws of arithmetic
underlie recurrent empirical findings that pension funds and
mutual funds trying to outperform the market by trading earn sig-
nificantly lower mean returns (once trading, research, and manage-
ment costs are taken into account) than index funds following a
buy-and-hold strategy.30
The observation that trading inevitably reduces investors' net
wealth does not preclude the possibility that trading may provide
other benefits to investors. Some investors, for example, may trade
for liquidity reasons, buying stocks when they wish to invest their
accumulated savings and selling when they need to raise cash.
Others may willingly incur trading costs to "rebalance" their port-
folios and to ensure they remain diversified or maintain a certain
level of risk. But liquidity needs and portfolio balancing are weak
explanations for a secondary market where over half of all shares
change hands each year.31 Part II examines the substantial evi-
dence suggesting that most trades are, instead, motivated by inves-
tors' hopes of trading profits.
If most investors trade to make money, how can their subjective
expectations be reconciled with the harsh reality that, on average,
trading makes traders poorer? Scholars often puzzle over why
even sophisticated institutional investors like pension and mutual
funds seem to believe they can earn positive returns from trading
30 See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 710 (stating that index funds outperform most
active managers); Wayne H. Wagner, Defining and Measuring Trading Costs, in
Association for Inv. Management & Research, supra note 29, at 15, 17 (noting that active
management performance falls between 100 and 150 basis points below index fund
performance, i.e., active funds annual earnings' average 1% to 1.5% less, due to greater
management and trading costs); infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text (examining
active and passive management); see also Vanguard Index Trust, Annual Report 1990 at 4
(showing that in the decade ending December 1990, average equity fund saw 10.8% annual
return, whereas S&P 500 and Wilshire 5000 indexes earned 13.7% and 12.4% annual
return, respectively).
31 In 1992, the dollar volume of trading in U.S. equities on the exchanges and OTC
market amounted to nearly 55% of the market value of all equity holdings. See New York
Stock Exchange, Fact Book for the Year 1993, at 89 (1994) (showing total market value of
U.S. equities in 1992 as $5.5406 trillion); National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, supra note 1,
at 7 (showing total dollar volume of trading in U.S. equities in 1992 was $3.051 trillion).
This figure understates actual turnover, as it excludes private sales that take place outside
organized markets.
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despite transaction costs. 32 Some theorists go so far as to suggest
that trading evidences investor irrationality.33 Recently proposed
32 See, e.g., Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 710 (noting that although most active
fund managers underperform market indexes, "investors who hire active managers believe
they can spot the manager who will outperform the index"); Kiefer, supra note 10, at 14-15
(noting an "uncomfortable inconsistency" between financial theory and investor behavior
in that "[i]nvestors and investment managers who try to increase their rate of return by
trading more actively to take advantage of perceived opportunities for higher profit would
discover that, over the longer term, they earn lower rates of return instead"); William F.
Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 7
(reasoning that the idea that active management allows traders to beat the market "can
only be justified by assuming that the laws of arithmetic have been suspended for the
convenience of... active managers").
33 See Hazen, supra note 6, at 992, 1002 (explaining that trying to identify securities that
will outperform the market is irrational and not "consistent with the actions of 'economic
man' "); Kiefer, supra note 10, at 14-15 (suggesting that if investors believe in the ability to
beat the market, inefficient behavior persists on a grand scale, and "a serious
reconsideration of some of the most basic principles of economic theory may be
necessary"); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 106 (suggesting that investors' optimistic belief that
they can beat the market- is "irrationality").
A variant of the irrationality argument holds that speculators recognize that they
dissipate wealth, but trade anyway because they enjoy it. For example, many people seem
to enjoy playing a weekly poker game or watching thoroughbreds race at the track; having
a stake in the outcome of the contest increases their pleasure and interest. Similarly, some
individuals may seek entertainment and involvement in the pages of the Wall Street
Journal. Under this theory, both traders and recreational gamblers play negative-sum
games because they intrinsically enjoy playing, not because they expect to win.
It is difficult to prove or disprove the claim that investors enjoy squandering their money
on trading because that proposition is, in effect, a tautology. It assumes that stock trading
must make investors better off despite its apparent wealth-destroying nature, because
rational actors only pursue activities that make them better off, and investors are presumed
to be rational. As a practical matter, however, recreation seems an unlikely motive for the
dull game of investing through the agency of an institution such as a pension or mutual
fund (as most investors do). Moreover, casual observation suggests that stock traders who
sustain steady losses do not find that process enjoyable. See William Glasgall, The
Market's Revenge, Bus. Wk., Apr. 18, 1994, at 32, 33 (quoting trader who sustained large
losses as saying, "It's no fun."). The notion that investors who speculate willingly accept
trading losses as the price one must pay for the joy of "playing the market" is also
inconsistent with evidence that traders who sustain losses tend to stop trading. See infra
notes 70-79 and accompanying text (describing the "weeding out" process). Finally,
whereas recreational gambling sometimes is explained by risk-preference, the natural
volatility of the stock market ensures that instead of trading, risk-preferring investors can
more cheaply satisfy their tastes by buying and holding high-risk stocks. Thus, although it
is possible that some investors trade for enjoyment despite their recognition that they are
likely to lose money, the "recreational trading" argument seems a weak foundation on
which to build a three trillion-dollar-a-year trading market that is heavily dominated by
institutions. See also infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text (suggesting that some
gambling is not recreational but, like stock trading, is a market failure arising from
heterogeneous expectations).
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"noise trader" models of stock markets, for example, presume that
substantial numbers of those who participate in equities markets
are irrational.34
Such a radical departure from traditional economic analysis may
be unnecessary to explain stock markets. A rational choice model
of stock speculation can be developed that reconciles the phenom-
enon of negative-sum trading with the assumption that investors
are self-interested actors who make the best possible use of the
resources available to them. This "heterogeneous expectations"
model rests on the key premise that investors can rationally differ
in their estimates both of stocks' likely future performance and of
their own relative trading abilities. On this plausible foundation
can be built a model that offers important insights into who trades
stocks, why, and for how long; the relationship between stock
prices and best estimates of values; and the manner in which stock
markets might be regulated to maximize their social benefits while
minimizing their costs.
B. A Simple Model of Heterogeneous Expectations and HE
Trading in a World of Imperfect Information
On average, investors who abandon buy-and-hold strategies and
try to increase their returns through trading find that their expecta-
tions of profits from trading were mistaken. But to say that an
investor may be mistaken does not necessarily imply that she is
irrational. Even the most sensible actor may make mistakes, if she
lacks perfect information.35 Thus, the consumer who does not
know at the time of purchase that a used car needs $200 in repairs
34 See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fn. 529, 531, 534 (noting that because "noise"
traders trade "even though from an objective point of view they would be better off not
trading," their behavior does not fit "into a world where people do things only to maximize
expected utility of wealth, and where people always make the best use of available
information"); De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk, supra note 10, at 735 (noting that noise
theory focuses on irrationality in financial markets); J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer,
Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. waldmann, The Size and Incidence of the Losses from
Noise Trading, 44 J. Fm. 681 (1989) [hereinafter De Long et al., Losses from Noise Trading]
(concluding that noise trading is irrational); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The
Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1990, at 19 (stating that noise
traders are "not fully rational").
35 See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979)
(examining judicial and legislative responses to imperfect information in the market for
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might mistakenly pay $5,000 for a vehicle that she would value at
$4,800 if she had perfect information.
Rational individuals are willing to risk making mistakes by acting
on imperfect information because information is costly. It may be
cheaper for a consumer to bear the risk of buying a car with a $200
defect than to pay a mechanic $300 to inspect the car. Similarly,
investors evaluating the likely future performance of particular
stocks may consider a wide variety of data, including the firm's
annual reports, past price performance, or media accounts of the
company or the general economy. But because gathering and
digesting data takes time and money, at some point the cost of
acquiring additional guidance (by reading another report or hiring
a professional analyst, for instance) outweighs the risk of purchas-
ing an overvalued stock.3 6 Rational investors weigh the potential
price of ignorance against the certain expense of further research
and make the best decisions they can.
Different investors are likely to face different costs in obtaining
and using different subsets of information relevant to stock values.
An accountant may find it easiest to gauge a coffee company's
prospects according to its financial statements, whereas a gour-
mand who hates numbers may judge the firm by the taste of its
product.3 7 Investors who rely on different subsets of information
are likely to form different opinions of the likely risks and returns
consumer goods); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213
(1961) (discussing economic decisions when information is imperfect and costly).
36 Because stock valuation requires investors to predict an inherently uncertain future,
at some point the cost of acquiring all information relevant to stock values becomes
infinite.
37 The taste of Dunkin' Donuts coffee allegedly was one of the factors that induced
legendary mutual fund manager Peter Lynch to invest in that firm's stock. Carolyn Friday,
A Superstar Bids Farewell, Newsweek, Apr. 9, 1990, at 38.
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of particular stocks.3 8 These heterogeneous expectations can easily
motivate the negative-sum game of stock trading.3 9
Consider the following scenario. A Wall Street Journal article
praising General Motors' efforts to trim costs convinces John that
GM's market price will soon rise from $100 to $105 per share.
Mary, a GM shareholder, has different information-her newly
purchased GM car is a lemon, and she expects GM stock to decline
to ninety-five dollars. Even if John and Mary each must pay two
dollars per share in broker commissions to trade, each perceives an
opportunity to profit from trading. John anticipates a quick net
gain of three dollars per share if he buys, whereas Mary expects to
avoid a net three dollars per share loss if she sells. Whether GM
rises or falls, trading costs ensure that one party's wealth loss out-
weighs any wealth gain enjoyed by the other. If GM rises to $105,
John earns his expected net three dollars per share profit, but Mary
loses a net seven dollars per share. Similarly, if GM falls to ninety-
five dollars, Mary saves a net three dollars per share, but John loses
seven dollars per share. Although John's and Mary's asymmetrical
expectations leads each to perceive an ex ante opportunity to gain
three dollars per share (six dollars per share total) from trading,
38 See Black, supra note 34, at 531 ("Differences in beliefs must derive ultimately from
differences in information."). Some commentators have suggested that investors with
access to the same information still reach differing conclusions because each individual has
unique ways of processing information. E.g., Stephen iglewski, Market "Efficiency" in a
Market with Heterogeneous Information, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 581, 584-85 (1978); Milton
Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, 6 Rev. Fin. Stud. 473,
474 (1993) (stating that "disagreements can arise either because speculators have different
private information or because they simply interpret commonly known data differently").
Such arguments make a distinction without a difference. Different individuals may
disagree in their interpretations of the same information because their differing
experiences and training have taught them to extract different meanings. Yet experience
and training inevitably are part of the "information" brought to bear on the problem of
stock valuation.
39 It is important to distinguish heterogeneous expectations from both heterogeneous
preferences and simple uncertainty. If both John and Mary agree that the price of GM
stock has a 25% chance of falling by $1, a 25% chance of rising by $1, and a 50% chance of
remaining the same, then they face uncertainty but share the same expectations.
Alternatively, if John and Mary share these expectations about the future performance of
GM, but John likes risk whereas Mary is risk-averse, then John may want to buy and Mary
to sell, because although they share similar expectations, they have different preferences
for risk. See infra note 142.
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their transaction inevitably reduces their aggregate wealth by four
dollars per share ex post.40
As this example illustrates, a purely speculative market of trad-
ers betting on their differing predictions for the future is, in a sense,
a mistaken market, for traders on average lose money by trading.
Yet such waste is not necessarily due to individual irrationality.
John's and Mary's decisions to trade were quite rational, given
their differing expectations.4' Their net loss can be blamed on
imperfect information. After all, in a world of perfect information
both John and Mary would know whether GM were going to rise
or fall. No sale would occur because, if GM were going to rise,
John would want to buy at market price but Mary would refuse to
sell, whereas if GM were going to fall, Mary would be eager to sell
but John would balk at buying. In a world of imperfect informa-
tion, however, John and Mary can disagree on GM's likely future
and each perceive an opportunity to gain wealth by trading. At
least one will be wrong.42
Economists writing on the economics of information have long
observed that heterogeneous expectations can induce rational,
wealth-seeking actors to pursue activities with negative expected
returns. 43 Contemporary securities scholars, however, have largely
40 See Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 106 (noting that stock trades may appear efficient ex ante
yet actually reduce trader welfare ex post).
41 A body of work in game theory posits that it is irrational to trade on the basis of
heterogeneous expectations. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 Annals
Stat. 1236 (1976); John D. Geanakoplos & Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, We Can't Disagree
Forever, 28 J. Econ. Theory 192 (1982); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade
and Common Knowledge, 26 J. Econ. Theory 17 (1982). The no-speculation theorems do
not account for the phenomenon of learning, however, and also depend on strong
assumptions about common knowledge and investor homogeneity. See Lynn A. Stout,
Agreeing to Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 Va. L. Rev. 751 (1995); see also Jeremy C.
Stein, Informational Externalities and Welfare-reducing Speculation, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 1123,
1125 (1987) (noting that in market with imperfect information, traders who trade on
misinformation are still rational).
42 Indeed, both parties may conclude that their trade was mistaken if prices do not
change enough to let at least one profit despite trading costs. Suppose John buys GM
expecting it to rise by at least $3 per share, so that he can earn at least $1 net after paying
$2 in broker commissions. Mary sells anticipating GM will fall by $3. If GM rises by only
$1, both will be disappointed.
43 For example, the literature on the economics of research and invention has long
recognized the possibility of social waste due to a duplicative "rush to invent" by
competing innovators all of whom expect to be the lucky one to win a patent. See, e.g.,
Hirshleifer, supra note 12, at 187-90 (discussing rush to invent and noting that similar
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overlooked that literature's obvious implications for securities mar-
kets. This may be because orthodox financial theory generally
assumes for convenience that investors are perfectly informed and
share identical expectations.' In the real world, however, inves-
tors labor under conditions of both ignorance and disagreement. A
stock trading model that recognizes this reality yields important
insights into the behavior of markets and the individuals and enti-
ties who participate in them. It also offers a picture of equities
markets that in many respects differs strikingly from the one
painted by conventional theory, which portrays stock markets as
highly efficient capital-allocating machines in which all securities
are accurately priced and all trades serve traders' self-interests.45
HE theory predicts that when investors hold differing opinions
of stock values, some will inevitably disagree with the market price
for a firm's shares.46 An investor's decision to buy or sell because
her personal estimate of a particular stock's value differs from its
problem may exist for stock market research, where social benefits are negligible while
private pecuniary returns are substantial); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1971)
[hereinafter Hirsleifer, Value of Information] (observing that "inhomogeneous beliefs"
regarding the effect of information on the value of their respective speculative positions
might motivate individuals to "willingly cooperate in making expenditures far in excess of
the social value of the information to be acquired"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. ischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev.
669, 682 n21 (1984) (noting similar observations in public choice literature on rent-
seeking).
44 See infra note 117 and accompanying text (citing the homogeneity assumption). The
homogeneity assumption may explain why financial theorists and securities scholars so
often overlook the importance of investor disagreement to understanding secondary stock
markets. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 32-33 (noting that economists are puzzled by
traders' belief that they can beat the market); supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text
(citing scholars puzzled by markets' fundamental value inefficiency).
45 See Summers & Summers, supra note 8, at 263 (contrasting "the Panglossian,
theoretical, efficient markets view of the operation of financial markets" with "the way
they work in practice").
46 When investors hold heterogeneous expectations, a stock's market price is
determined by the price demanded by the most pessimistic of the firm's current
shareholders, i.e., the shareholder willing to accept the lowest price to part with her shares.
See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
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market price can be modeled by a simple formula.47 Suppose
47 FIGURE 1:
DIsPERsED INVESTOR EXPECTATONS AND PosmTvE TRANSACrION COSTS
VX+TX<PX
Vmin - Vmax
P1-Vs I <TX
Subjective Valuation
Investor interest in buying or selling a particular stock also can be depicted graphically.
Figure 1 depicts a dispersion of investor opinion regarding a particular stock's value. The
horizontal axis represents the range of investors' subjective valuations, ranging from the
most pessimistic valuation (V,,,) to the most optimistic (V,.). The vertical axis represents
the number of investors. On any given day, a few investors will believe that the stock is
worth very little, whereas a few will value the stock very highly. The subjective opinion
held by most investors, however, converges on some average value. The dispersion of
opinion is shown as a normal distribution for illustrative purposes only.
P. represents the stock's market price. The shaded area ranging to the left and right of
P. represents the transaction costs (T.) normally associated with selling or buying, respec-
tively. Investors whose subjective valuations fall within the shaded area believe it is
unprofitable to trade because any profit they might expect to gain because of a difference
between market price and subjective valuation is more than offset by transaction costs
( I P. - V. I < Tx). The shaded area thus can be termed the "nontrading area." On either
side of the nontrading area, investors have incentive to trade. To the left of the shaded
area, an investor will sell (or sell short) because the market price is greater than her subjec-
tive valuation and more than makes up for the transaction costs (V, + T. < P.). To the right
of the shaded area, an investor will buy because her subjective valuation, less the transac-
tion costs, is greater than the market price (V - T. > Ps).
Note that market price and average valuation are not identical. The market price has
been placed to the right of the average in recognition of the fact that, for any particular
stock, the set of shareholders is smaller than the set of nonshareholders, suggesting that
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shares in Firm X are currently trading at market price P, per share.
Based on the limited information reasonably available to her, an
investor concludes that P. does not accurately reflect the value of
X's stock, which the investor estimates to be V".48 The estimated
transaction costs of buying or selling one share in X are Tx. The
investor will perceive opportunities to profit by buying X whenever
(V, - T,) > P, or by selling (or selling short) whenever (V, + T,) <
P. More generally, the investor will perceive an opportunity to
make money by trading whenever the differehce between market
price and the investor's estimated value exceeds the estimated cost
of trading, so that IP. - V. I > T.
This modest formula permits two important observations. First,
the more widely dispersed investors' opinions, the more likely it is
that speculative HE trading will occur, other things being equal.49
relatively few investors subjectively value any particular stock more than its market price
plus transaction costs.
48 The market price of a stock is by definition an accurate measure of that stock's value
if it has to be sold immediately. If an investor expects that a particular security will, over
time, either show less risk or provide greater returns in the form of dividends and capital
appreciation than reflected in the current price, however, the investor may be able to profit
by buying the stock and holding it for some period.
49 FIGURE 2:
INCREASING THE DISPERSION OF INVESTOR EXPE CrATIONS
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In other words, investors are more likely to perceive opportunities
to profit despite trading costs when their subjective valuations of
stocks differ greatly from market prices (when I P - Vx I is large).50
Second, even a modest dispersion in investor valuation creates per-
ceived opportunities to profit from speculation when trading costs
(Tx) are low. 51
Figure 2 shows how an increase in the dispersion of investors' subjective estimates will
increase trading activity. As in Figure 1, the darkly shaded area depicts the area in which
no trading will occur because of prohibitive transaction costs ( I P. - V. I < T.).
The areas under curves A and B are equal, reflecting a fixed pool of investors. However,
curve B represents a pool of investors who exhibit a much wider variation in their subjec-
tive valuations than the pool of investors represented by curve A. Again, as in Figure 1, in
both curve A and curve B the area to the right of the darkly shaded area represents the
area where investors regard the stock as a worthwhile purchase. Note that this trading
area is greater under curve B than under curve A; more trading will occur in the pool of
investors with more widely dispersed subjective valuations.' Similarly, the darkly shaded
nontrading area is greater under curve A than under curve B, indicating that transaction
costs deter more trades when investors' expectations are relatively homogeneous.
50 Professors Milton Harris and Arthur Raviv theorize that when traders start with
common beliefs about an asset's expected returns, trading occurs when, and only when,
new information changes their minds. As a result, volume and changes in price are
positively correlated, as are changes in earnings forecasts and volume. Harris & Raviv,
supra note 38, at 474-75; see also id. at 478 (citing and discussing the "fairly abundant"
empirical studies that support these theoretical conclusions).
51 FIGuRE 3:
INCREASING TRANSCATION COSTS
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As a practical matter, modem stock markets exhibit both wide
dispersion in investors' opinions and low transaction costs. The
pages of Business Week and the Wall Street Journal are replete with
anecdotal evidence that people often disagree wildly in their pre-
dictions for stocks and the market as a whole.5 2 Empirical studies
confirm that investors' subjective estimates of stock values vary
greatly. One recent study, for example, found that corporate offers
to repurchase shares from shareholders at prices averaging thirteen
percent over market price induced shareholders on average to
tender only eighteen percent of their outstanding shares,5 3 sug-
gesting that eighty-two percent of shares were held by investors in
whose opinions their stocks' values exceeded the market price by
more than thirteen percent.5 4 Such findings should come as no sur-
prise. Because stocks represent claims to future income in the
form of either dividend payments or capital appreciation, stock val-
ues depend upon an inherently uncertain future.55 Any investor
Figure 3 depicts how increasing trading costs will decrease trading. Increasing trading
costs from range A to range B will expand the nontrading area within which investors
perceive that transaction costs outweigh potential gains from buying or selling a stock they
perceive as mispriced. A difference between subjective valuation and market price that
would have resulted in a trade given initial trading cost A may now be inadequate to
overcome greater trading cost B.
52 See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, One Set of Economic Facts, Two Views: Forecasts of
Growth and Inflation Vary, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1994, at A2 (describing economists'
expectations for growth as "widely divergent"); Jeffrey M. Laderman, Tiptoeing Through
Uncertain Times, Bus. Wk., Dec. 26, 1988, at 92 ("If you're confused about what to do with
your money in 1989, you're in good company. Professional opinion is all over the lot
... ."); Steven E. Levingston, Adherents of the Dow Theory on Stock Trends Disagree
Over When Bull Market Will End, Wall St. J., Feb. 1,1993, at Cl (describing investors who
subscribe to the Dow Theory as unable to agree on when bull market will end).
53 Laurie S. Bagwell, Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder
Heterogeneity, 47 J. Fin. 71, 76 tbl. 1, 97 (1992) (presenting results and arguing that
evidence does not support claim that premium is due to signaling effect of offer but rather
that "[s]hareholders' valuations differ dramatically").
54 The notion that an investor might value stock in a particular firm at 13% over market
price naturally raises the question of why, given reasonably low trading costs, the investor
does not purchase more shares until eventually she drives the market price up to match her
own subjective valuation. The answer is that any single investor's ability to affect market
price is limited by both that investor's wealth and her willingness to tolerate risk from
reduced portfolio diversification. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing
setting market price in market of heterogeneous expectations).
55 Investors usually can profit from stocks only through dividends or capital
appreciation, both of which depend on future events. An exception arises when an
investor seeks to profit by buying a controlling block of shares in an undervalued firm and
then liquidating the firm and selling off its assets. See generally Reinier Kraakman, Taking
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trying to predict that future could consider an almost infinite
number of factors, including the quality of a firm's management, its
competitors, its products, prevailing interest rates, exchange rates,
macroeconomic growth, tax rates, demographic changes, and even
the weather. Given the costliness of any single investor's acquiring
and assimilating more than a small fraction of the vast data rele-
vant to stock price, "the dark forces of time and ignorance"5 6
ensure that investors' subjective estimates of stock values will vary
considerably.
Modern stock markets also offer low transaction costs. For
example, stock traders often pay one percent or less of the value of
their trades in broker commissions. 7 In comparison, the home-
owner who sells a single-family residence may pay seven percent in
real estate agent commissions.58 Trading costs in modern stock
markets are low compared not only to the costs of trading many
other assets but also to historical costs. Before 1968, NYSE-mem-
ber firms enforced a comprehensive scheme of fixed minimum bro-
ker commissions that ensured that investors paid much higher
broker fees than they do today.59 The fixed commission structure
was eliminated gradually between 1968 and 1975.60 Congress also
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition
Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988) (exploring possibility that some corporate
acquisitions are motivated by perception that the market price of a firm's equity is less
than the value of the firm's assets).
56 Keynes, supra note 10, at 155.
57 See Hans R. Stoll, Equity Trading Costs 14 tbl. 4 (1993) (finding from securities firms'
revenue data for 1990 that average investor paid commissions amounting to approximately
0.29% of value of trade on exchanges and 0.43% of value on OTC market); cf. Kiefer,
supra note 10, at 24 (noting that for largest trades by largest institutions, broker
commissions estimated to be between 0.05% to 0.18% of value of shares traded).
Broker commissions are, however, just one of the many costs associated with speculative
trading. An estimate of the total costs of speculative trading to investors based on mutual
funds' expense ratios suggests that in 1992 investors spent $100 billion researching,
managing, and trading equities portfolios, a cost that amounts to approximately three
percent of the total of $3.06 trillion in stocks traded. See infra notes 193-207 and
accompanying text (discussing the $100 billion cost); supra note 1 and accompanying text
(noting $3.06 trillion traded).
58 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 21 (noting seven percent real estate costs).
Not surprisingly, turnover in single-family homes is only a fraction of turnover in stocks.
See Tobin, supra note 10, at 4 (noting the 4.5% annual turnover in single-family homes).
59 See Kiefer, supra note 10, at 22. See generally 6 Loss & Seligman, supra note 16, at
2831-85 (discussing brokerage commission rate regulations).
60 Kiefer, supra note 10, at 22.
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repealed a modest federal stock transfer tax in 1965,61 while New
York state abolished a similar tax in 1981.62 The resulting decline
in stock trading costs63 has been accompanied by dramatic
increases in trading volume: between 1960 and 1987, the turnover
rate of shares on the NYSE increased from about ten percent to
approximately fifty percent annually.'
C. Potential Deterrents to HE Trading: The Roles of Self-
Selection and Successive Generations in Fostering
Speculative Markets
The simple HE model presented above suggests that investors
lacking perfect information form heterogeneous expectations that
make speculative trading a rational, if ultimately self-defeating
behavior. Although HE trading only occurs in favorable circum-
stances-when significant dispersion in investor expectations is
combined with low trading costs-modern stock markets provide
exactly the conditions necessary for HE trading to flourish.
This simple HE model, however, neglects two influences that
should discourage HE trading even when investors hold widely dif-
fering views of stocks' merits and face minimal trading costs. The
first deterrent to HE trading is the rational investor's recognition
that HE trading is, statistically speaking, a loser's game. Investors
who disregard that deterrent and attempt to trade profitably will
eventually be faced with a second deterrent, the lessons of bitter
experience. A persuasive model of stock trading based on hetero-
geneous expectations consequently must explain how speculative
markets can prosper in the face of both speculation's obviously
negative-sum nature and investor learning.65
61 1 Loss & Seligman, supra note 16, at 329 n.18.
62 Kiefer, supra note 10, at 23.
63 As a result of these changes, institutional traders' out-of-pocket trading costs have
declined to less than half of their costs in the mid-1960s and 1970s. See id. at 24.
64 Id. at 6 fig. 1; see also Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 19 (citing studies estimating
that average commission rates fell by 30% from 1975 to 1978, accompanied by 30%
increase in trading volume from 1975 to 1981); Stephen A. Berkowitz & Dennis E. Logue,
7The Portfolio Turnover Explosion Explored, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Spring 1987, at 38, 44
(finding historical increase in turnover to be "closely related to the declining trend in
trading costs").
65 A third deterrent to speculative trading is nearly three decades of financial
theoreticians' warnings that "you can't beat the market." According to one version of
efficient market theory, stock prices should reflect the best possible estimates of values and
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1. Optimistic Self-Selection and the Lake Wobegon Market
Because they lack perfect information concerning stock values,
investors can rationally disagree with market prices and perceive
opportunities to profit from trading in mispriced stocks. Yet
rational investors who stop to think about the negative-sum nature
of stock trading should also readily recognize that traders, on aver-
age, lose wealth by trading. Why would even the most bullish or
bearish investor try her hand at trading once she recognizes that
the odds are stacked against her?
In fact, many do not trade. Many individual and institutional
investors choose a passive buy-and-hold strategy.6 6 But as long as
a subset of investors chooses to trade, a speculative market can
flourish. An important insight of the HE model is that self-selec-
tion can sustain speculative markets even when it is apparent to all
participants that speculation is negative-sum.
When some investors hold high opinions of their own abilities to
"buy low and sell high" whereas others are more pessimistic about
their trading talents, only the optimists trade. Humble John may
perceive General Motors shares to be mispriced but may also hesi-
tate to trade on this perception because he recognizes his analysis
is based on imperfect information and that trading, on average,
erodes investor wealth. In contrast, self-confident Mary may also
know that traders on average lose money but believe that she has
better-than-average ability to pick stocks. John will hew to a buy-
and-hold strategy, whereas Mary will test her stock-picking skills
by buying those stocks she perceives as underpriced and selling
those she perceives as overpriced.
present no opportunities for arbitrage profits. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying
text. The HE model, however, supports market participants' claims that efficient markets
can misprice stocks. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. Self-selection also
helps explain why traders continue to bet on their bullish and bearish beliefs despite
theorists' warnings: even if the vast majority of investors believed the vast majority of
stocks to be accurately priced, so long as a minority believed that a small portion of the
thousands of publicly traded stocks were sufficiently mispriced to justify minimal
transaction costs, HE trading would occur.
66 For example, nearly 20% of all assets held by pension plans are indexed. See infra
note 162. Indexed stock mutual funds also are becoming more popular. See generally
Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 705 ("Funds under passive management have grown
rapidly and reached significant size.").
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Self-selection thus plays a key role in determining who partici-
pates in speculative trading. Speculative markets are "Lake
Wobegon" markets, where all traders believe their trading skills
are above average.' Imperfect information easily reconciles such
mistaken beliefs with rationality;68 although investors may have
perfect information concerning the average trader's negative
returns, they remain ignorant of their likely personal returns until
they try their hands at the trading game. Individuals who have
enjoyed success in other personal and professional endeavors may
reasonably approach the stock market with an optimistic faith in
their own abilities.69 They also necessarily enter the market igno-
rant of their own relative trading talent. Only time and experience
will reveal whether they are winners or washouts.
The HE model of trading thus suggests that speculative markets
reflect two forms of investor mistake: mistakes about stock values
and mistakes about relative trading skills. But as long as investors
face positive information costs in evaluating both stocks and their
own trading talents, self-selection ensures that a subset of inves-
tors-the financially sophisticated, the personally successful, or the
merely hopeful-will try the trading game on the rational but sta-
tistically mistaken belief that they are better, brighter, or luckier
than their fellow traders.
2. A Longitudinal Model of HE Trading: Darwin Meets Barnum
Although self-selection explains why a subset of rational inves-
tors might elect to play a single round of the negative-sum game of
67 Comedian Garrison Keillor described his fictional hometown, Lake Wobegon, as a
place where "all the children are above average." Garrison Keillor, Leaving Home xvii
(1987); see also Ronald C. Lease, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Gary G. Schlarbaum, The
Individual Investor. Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. Fmn. 413, 431 tbl. 7 (1974) (finding that a
study group of investors on average believed itself to be "substantially better informed
than the average investor").
68 Cf. Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 106 ("It is only because each individual believes that he or
she is smarter than other speculators-a proposition that cannot be 'rationally' held by
all-that the market survives at all.").
69 Interestingly, it is the educated and personally successful who most often appear on
brokers' "sucker lists" and who, at least in folklore, are most often the victims of excessive
stock trading. See Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 16 (discussing "sucker lists"); Stiglitz,
supra note 9, at 105 (describing dentists and doctors as classic mistaken "noise traders").
Such individuals have in common both relative wealth and the tendency to be "self-made"
men and women who may be particularly likely to overestimate their own talents and
trading abilities.
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stock trading, repeated plays should create selection pressures that
lead speculative stock markets eventually to evolve into markets
where investors trade only for liquidity or similar non-speculative
reasons.70 In other words, investor learning should provide a sec-
ond deterrent to speculative trading.
Imperfect information about relative game-playing skill allows
each of the self-selected participants in a negative-sum game like
stock trading to believe they are more likely to win than the next
player. Over time, however, actors who play a series of games gain
additional information about their relative skill in playing. Win-
ners learn that they are winners and presumably will continue to
play. But some of those who play negative-sum games learn they
were mistaken in thinking they would win. In the face of mounting
losses, it is only rational for those who lose at negative-sum games
eventually to decide to forgo playing. With whom, then, will the
winners play?
One possible answer is that as the initial losers exit the game, the
initial winners are left to play with each other. On this model,
repeated stock trades should result in smaller and smaller numbers
of willing traders who enjoy higher and higher average levels of
skill. Taken to its logical extreme, this "survival of the fittest"
model predicts that a speculative market should eventually be
dominated by a single trader who is so successful no one is willing
to bet against her.
This model obviously fails to describe modem stock markets,
although Wall Street does have its legendary winners. For exam-
ple, before his early and lamented retirement, renowned mutual
fund manager Peter Lynch parlayed the Magellan Fund from $20
million in assets into a $13 billion leviathan that beat the Standard
& Poor's 500 index in all but two of Lynch's thirteen years at the
70 See infra Part II.A (discussing nonmistaken reasons for trading); cf. Figlewski, supra
note 38, at 596 ("[T]he rationale for strongly efficient markets seems to be some kind of
weeding-out process over time by which those with inferior information gradually lose
money to those whose information is better...."); Keynes, supra note 10, at 154 ("It might
have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment
and knowledge beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of
the ignorant individual .... "); De Long, et. al., Noise Trader Risk, supra note 10, at 704
(noting argument that traders with poor judgments of asset values lose money and
eventually disappear from the market); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 106 (discussing argument
that noise traders will lose money and eventually be "weeded out" of the market).
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helm. 7 1 Yet Peter Lynch in his heyday controlled only a small por-
tion of the market; millions of other individuals and institutions
willingly traded against him. Any theory of HE stock trading must
explain how speculative markets persist when repeated trading
reveals information that should dissuade at least a portion of trad-
ers from continuing to trade. Some process must be inducing indi-
viduals to continue to play even against proven winners.
As P.T. Barnum suggested, demographics provides an answer.72
Stock markets have existed in one form or another for centuries
and have served successive generations of investors. As each gen-
eration ages, it accumulates wealth that it eventually seeks to
invest. Stocks are attractive investments; even with a buy-and-hold
strategy, investors can expect to enjoy greater returns from stocks
than from corporate bonds, government bills, or bank deposits.73
Many new stockholders remain cautious and follow a buy-and-hold
approach rather than risk losses through trading. But in each new
generation, a subset of investors will judge that they are better at
picking stocks than their fellow traders. Their optimistic assess-
ments of their own abilities lead them to try their hand at specula-
tive trading. As they play the market, they learn about their
relative skill in trading. Most learn they are losers and eventually
either exit the market or fall back on a buy-and-hold strategy.
71 Friday, supra note 37, at 38. Another famous winner is George Soros, "the most
powerful and successful investor in the world." Gary Weiss & Gail E. Schares, The Man
Who Moves Markets, Bus. Wk., Aug. 23, 1993, at 50. A Holocaust survivor who once
supported himself by working as a waiter, Soros established the Quantum Fund in 1969.
Id. at 53, 56. From its inception though 1993, Quantum realized an average annual 35%
return, with only one down year. Id. at 52-53.
It is possible, of course, that both Lynch and Soros were gifted with luck rather than
skill. Even if investors cannot identify mispriced stocks, their returns from stock
ownership are likely to be randomly distributed, and some lucky investors will strike it big
just as others unaccountably lose big.
72 P.T. Barnum is credited with the observation that "It]here's a sucker born every
minute." John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 460 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). HE
theory suggests a less elegant but more accurate and generous version: "there's a rational
optimist who is imperfectly informed about her relative trading ability born every minute."
Cf. Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 106 (noting view that in market of traders irrationally trying to
beat the market, losers should eventually be "weeded out," but observing that "[f]or every
fool that is weeded out, a new one enters the market").
73 Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 126 tbl. 7-1 (showing average rates of returns on
common stocks, corporate bonds, government bonds, and Treasury bills from 1926 to
1985).
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Consistent winners continue to trade and to profit from the mis-
takes of a new generation of investors.
This longitudinal model of HE trading implies that speculative
markets are likely to be composed of a small number of highly suc-
cessful, wealthy traders who remain in the market over a long
period of time and a larger number of recently arrived, smaller
traders whose trading time is likely to be short-lived and who will
stop trading after losing money. In fact, exactly this pattern of
Darwinian attrition is evident among stock mutual fund manag-
ers.74 Less than fifteen percent of actively managed mutual funds
have been under the control of the same individual for ten or more
years.75 Those funds tend to outperform the market, and they hold
average assets of over $1977 million.76 In contrast, mutual funds
with managers of less than ten years' tenure are both smaller and
less successful; on average, they underperform the market and
have assets of only $822 million.77 Similar patterns are found in
futures markets, where a small number of large traders obtain posi-
tive returns while a large number of smaller traders suffer losses.78
Such patterns accord with the prediction that speculators learn
74 There is evidence of Darwinian attrition among individual investors as well. Since
1980, about the time that mutual funds became popular alternative investment vehicles,
interest in individual stock ownership has tended to be concentrated among relatively
young, and presumably inexperienced, investors. See New York Stock Exchange, supra
note 31, at 86 (noting that in 1985, there were 11.1 million individual shareholders aged 21-
34; 11.0 million aged 35-44; 7.9 million aged 45-54; 8.2 million aged 55-64; and 6.6 million
aged 65 and over). Because wealth and savings tend to increase with age, see infra note
171, one would expect to see individual stock ownership increase rather than decrease with
cohort age-unless, as HE theory predicts, there is investor attrition due to learning. If so,
individual ownership of stocks might decrease with age because individuals learn over time
that they are not successful at stock-picking and shift their investments into mutual funds
instead.
75 This figure is calculated from a recent survey of 760 equity funds that included
information on management tenure, assets, and performance. See Jeffrey M. Laderman,
The Best Mutual Funds, Bus. Wk, Feb. 14, 1994, at 72, 78-103.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Lester G. Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures Markets, 24 J.L. & Econ. 1, 10
(1981) (citing studies demonstrating that large traders tend to obtain positive returns from
futures whereas small traders suffer losses, implying that turnover is greater among small
traders because successful traders will become large while unsuccessful traders will leave
the market and be replaced by new small traders hoping for success); see also Hazen, supra
note 6, at 1006 (noting the "consensus" that in derivatives markets "the winners are
relatively few in number, and . . . smaller, less sophisticated investors are usually the
losers" (citation omitted)).
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over time whether they are winners or losers, and losers rationally
seek to preserve their wealth by exiting the trading market. But
because each generation must begin anew the process of separating
winning traders from losers, speculative markets persist in the face
of investor learning.79
D. The Role of Financial Intermediaries In Encouraging
HE Trading
The discussion thus far has proceeded as if stock markets con-
sisted largely of individuals trading directly with each other. In
reality, investors who trade in modem markets often use the serv-
ices of a wide variety of financial intermediaries. The HE model
suggests that at least two common forms of intermediaries, brokers
and institutional investment funds, are likely to increase the inci-
dence of E trading significantly.
1. The Role of Brokers
The simple trading formula presented earlier predicts that,
ceteris paribus, increasing the dispersion of investor expectations
increases the incidence of trading. Given the difficulty of predict-
ing the future, investors' opinions of stocks' relative values will nat-
urally diverge. Yet the dispersion of investor opinion may be
increased further by the efforts of a class of intermediaries with
substantial incentive to convince investors they can profit through
trading. Enter the brokers.
79 Noise theorists have hypothesized that irrational noise traders persist in the market
because their trading adds variability to prices that occasionally allows noise traders to
reap profits rational traders cannot. See generally Black, supra note 34, at 532 (arguing
that insofar as noise traders distort market prices, they add risk to the market that keeps
away enough informed traders to allow imperfect pricing to persist); De Long et al., Losses
from Noise Trading, supra note 33, at 685-86 (developing model in which noise traders can
earn better returns than rational investors and so persist in market because noise trading
adds risk to existing fundamental risk); Figlewski, supra note 38, at 595-597 (arguing that
participation of less-informed traders moves prices away from efficient level); see also
Keynes, supra note 10, at 154, 156-58 (arguing that expert professionals will not necessarily
profit and prevail because irrational sentiment's effect on the market leads even
professionals to focus on crowds' behavior rather than fundamentals to avoid short run
losses).
Such arguments are plausible but hardly necessary to address the "weeding out" issue.
Generational demographics suggest a far more direct and simple answer. Cf. De Long et
al., Noise Trader Risk, supra note 10, at 718 ("Under the P.T. Barnum rule... a noise
trader is born every minute.").
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Brokers are paid a commission on every stock transaction they
execute, profiting from trades regardless of whether the trading
investor profits. They therefore have financial incentives to
encourage trading.80 One way brokers can persuade investors to
trade is by providing them (either knowingly or unknowingly) with
imperfect information that suggests that a particular stock or indus-
try sector is significantly underpriced and creates perceived oppor-
tunities for speculative profits.
The brokerage industry has developed a variety of means of
imparting such biased and limited information to investors, from
the crude tactics of boiler rooms, cold calls, and outright misrepre-
sentations,"' to the more subtle methods of "full service" houses
that purport to advise investors on favorable trades.8Y Federal law
prohibits brokers (like other persons) from using fraud in the sale
of securities.83 It is extremely difficult, however, to prove that
slanted advice was fraudulent, both because of the evidentiary
problems involved in proving scienter 4 and the content of brokers'
often-verbal representations, and because the very nature of stock
80 See generally Nancy B. Kurland, The Ethical Implications of the Straight-Commission
Compensation System-An Agency Perspective, 10 J. Bus. Ethics 757 (1991) (noting that
the commission system creates "blatant conflicts of interest" that invite brokers to
encourage trades without regard to clients' needs).
81 See generally Thomas L. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 10.8, at 429-30
(2d ed. 1990) (describing high pressure sales tactics such as boiler rooms and cold calls).
82 Langevoort, supra note 6, at 752 (describing the services provided by full service
brokers); see also Tom Herman, Not All Discount Brokers Offer the Same Bargains, Wall
St. J., Mar. 6, 1991 at C1 (comparing full-service firms with discount brokers that do not
advise but only execute trades and estimating that discounters handle 20% of individual
investors' trades).
Another way to encourage trading is to convince the client not of the merits of a stock,
but of the merits of the broker. The client may be persuaded to trade when and what the
broker advises, or to give the broker discretionary authority to trade on the client's behalf.
Once granted authority, the broker can turn over the investor's account as often as six
times annually before discretionary trading is regarded as excessive "churning." See
Hazen, supra note 81, § 10.10, at 436.
83 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) (prohibiting persons from using fraud or
misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
84 Apart from the usual evidentiary problems associated with proving state of mind,
scienter may be difficult to prove because adverse selection ensures that many brokers who
give biased advice are sincere. The modest individual who doubts her own stock-picking
ability is unlikely to thrive in the commission-based brokerage profession. Only those
who honestly believe they can identify and recommend mispriced securities (or are willing
to make that representation dishonestly) are likely to survive in the industry. Thus, the
broker who advises a client that a particular stock is a "steal" may be fraudulently trying to
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analysis requires observers to consider only a fraction of the vast
array of information relevant to stock values.85 The rational inves-
tor who falls prey to an unscrupulous or overoptimistic broker (and
to judge from reported cases, many do) eventually comes to dis-
trust the broker's advice and stops trading with that broker. In the
meantime, however, she may have suffered substantial losses from
bad trades and brokerage commissions. Once bitten, twice shy; but
still once bitten.
2. The Role of Institutional Investment Funds
A second common financial intermediary that may promote HE
trading is the institutional investment fund. Although over 50 mil-
lion individuals in the United States own stock directly,86 many
more own stock indirectly, through mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, and the like. Such institutional arrangements
sever the individual investor from the trading decision. Trading
occurs only at the institutional manager's behest.
Institutional stock ownership has grown steadily over the past
few decades, with U.S. institutions' share of outstanding corporate
equity increasing from approximately six percent in 1950 to forty-
two percent in 1992Y At first glance, institutions' increasing role
in securities markets might appear to offer hope of reducing the
incidence of HE trading. In theory, institutional entities have
potentially infinite lifespans, suggesting that they are not subject to
the same demographic influences that lead successive generations
of natural persons mistakenly to try their hands at speculative trad-
ing. Thus evolutionary pressures might eventually lead institutions
to abandon HE-based trading strategies.
But while institutional entities have theoretically infinite lifes-
pans and memories, their human agents do not. The investor who
foment trading, but she may simply be an optimist who believes she has a knack for picking
underpriced stocks.
85 Financial intermediaries who advise investors necessarily provide them with only a
limited subset of the virtually infinite information relevant to stock valuation. Moreover,
brokers who advise clients are only required to have an "adequate basis" for their
recommendations. See Hazen, supra note 81, § 10.6, at 423.
86 New York Stock Exchange, supra note 31, at 85.
87 Id. at 89. By 1992, private and government pension funds and mutual funds alone
held a total of $1.846 trillion in stocks, 33% of the $5.540 trillion value of the market
portfolio. Id.
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relies on a fund manager's trading skills rather than her own is still
hoping to profit from what she perceives as her fund manager's
superior trading ability. Similarly, a fund manager, like any other
individual, begins trading in optimistic ignorance of his own rela-
tive abilities, hoping time will prove him to be a canny judge of
stocks.88 Once again, stock trading's negative-sum nature works
remorselessly. Institutional funds that actively manage their port-
folios by trying to identify and to trade mispriced stocks on average
do worse than the market.8 9 When a fund manager does worse
than the market, as most fund managers do, the fund may eventu-
ally replace the old manager with a new one, and the learning pro-
cess will begin anew.90 A fund that proves chronically unable to
select a winning manager and persistently underperforms the mar-
ket may lose investors and eventually fail, exiting the trading mar-
ket just as unsuccessful individual traders do.
But because self-selection ensures that both the average fund
manager and the average fund investor believe the fund manager
has above-average trading skills, the common practice of institu-
tional investing does not prevent investors from trading in the sta-
tistically mistaken belief they can profit by doing so. Indeed, the
opportunity to invest through institutional entities may actually
88 The evidence suggests that the practice of institutional investing has not reduced HE
trading. Pension fund and stock mutual fund portfolio turnover rates somewhat exceed the
market turnover rate. Compare supra note 31 (noting turnover of over 55% for all equity
holdings) with infra note 163 and accompanying text (noting 75% turnover rate for stock
mutual funds) and Effects of Short-Term Trading on Long-Term Investments: Hearing on
S. 1654 and S. 2160 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 tbl. 2
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 Hearing] (noting that turnover ratios of pension funds' equity
portfolios varied from 51.9% to 632% between 1981 and 1986). The vast preponderance
of this trading can be traced to active management, whose explicit goal is to beat the
market by identifying mispriced stocks. See infra Part II.B.1. In the case of stock equity
funds, the penchant for trading persists despite tax rules explicitly designed to discourage
short-term trading by mutual funds. See Kiefer, supra note 10, at 2 (noting tax rules that
prohibit mutual funds from deriving more than 30% of their gross income from sales of
securities, futures, and options held fewer than three months).
89 Supra note 30.
90 See Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Issue Brief No. 143, Pension Fund
Portfolio Turnover and Performance Evaluation 25 tbl. 13 (1993) [hereinafter EBRI Issue
Brief] (noting that average tenure of equity managers at surveyed pension funds varied
from 5.7 to 6.3 years between 1986 and 1990); supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(noting that more than 85% of equity mutual funds are headed by managers with less than
ten years tenure).
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increase the incidence of HE trading by giving investors a per-
ceived second, or even third, "bite at the apple."
Consider the following scenario. Mary, a successful professional,
has accumulated enough wealth by her thirties that she decides to
invest in the stock market. Because she has a high opinion of her
own abilities, she first attempts to trade stocks herself. In time she
learns that she is losing money trading her own picks and concludes
that she is not a good judge of stocks. She then turns to one or
more brokers for advice and endures another round or two of
costly trading before concluding that she is no better at picking
brokers than she was at picking stocks. In other circumstances,
Mary might then decide to avoid further trading costs and fall back
on a buy-and-hold strategy. But in a world where individuals can
invest through institutions as well as directly, an investor who is no
longer optimistic about her ability to pick stocks or brokers may
still remain optimistic about her ability to pick fund managers.
Mary may shift her savings through a series of mutual funds, each
of which underperforms the market, before concluding that she is
no better at picking fund managers than she was at picking stocks
or brokers.91
As this example illustrates, increasing the variety of financial
intermediaries through which investors can trade increases the
number and types of overoptimistic mistakes investors can make. 92
In a world without financial intermediaries, the investor who
attempts to make money by speculating in stocks may need years
to discover her relative trading ability (after all, given stocks' natu-
ral volatility, how can the unfortunate trader who loses in a partic-
ular year conclude with certainty whether she was the victim of
overconfidence or simple bad luck?). In a world where investors
can choose to rely not only on their own trading skills but also on
the skills of a broker or fund manager, however, lessons that used
to take years to learn can take a lifetime. Thus financial
intermediaries help perpetuate HE markets.
91 Mary at this point has two options: exit the market or switch to a buy-and-hold
strategy, perhaps by investing in an index fund. See infra notes 152-56 (discussing index
funds).
92 The same risk may be posed by increasing the variety of investment vehicles available
to investors. Mary may lose money first by trading stocks, then bonds, then stock futures,
and so forth. See infra notes 313-35 and accompanying text (discussing derivatives
markets).
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E. HE Theory and The Relationship Between Stock Prices and
Fundamental Values in An "Efficient" Market
As the above discussion illustrates, the HE model offers a vari-
ety of insights into the nature and behavior of the individuals and
institutions who trade on secondary markets. HE theory also
offers important insights into the nature of market prices. In par-
ticular, the HE model has significant and controversial implications
for the relationship between a stock's market price and the best
estimate of its intrinsic economic value.
1. The Rise (and Fall?) of Conventional Efficient Markets
Theory
One of the most influential concepts in modem financial theory
is the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"). Accord-
ing to the ECMH, in an "efficient" market, stock prices respond so
quickly to new information relevant to value that it is impossible
for investors to earn short-run profits by buying on good news or
selling on bad news.93 Thus, the General Motors shareholder who
hopes to avoid a loss by selling her GM shares after the company
announces an unexpected decline in earnings will find that by the
time she calls her broker, it is too late; GM's price has already
dropped. Substantial empirical evidence confirms that most stock
prices are efficient in this "informational" sense.94
93 See generally supra note 13 (discussing the ECMH and listing sources).
94 Empirical tests of informational efficiency generally fall into three categories. "Weak
form" tests examine whether market prices reflect all information contained in past price
movements. Studies confirm the market is weak form efficient; it is impossible (for
academics, at least) to predict profitably future movements in stock prices from past price
changes. Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 287; Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 403-
18. "Semistrong form" tests examine whether prices reflect all public information, such as
earnings announcements or newspaper reports. The evidence suggests that prices respond
efficiently to a wide variety of public information. Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 287;
Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 418-25. "Strong form" tests examine whether all public
and nonpublic information is incorporated into stock prices. Although strong form tests
are difficult to devise because researchers do not, by definition, have access to nonpublic
information, some have tried to test strong form efficiency by determining whether traders
who are likely to have access to nonpublic information earn better-than-average trading
returns. The results are mixed; corporate management and exchange specialists show
superior returns, whereas mutual funds do not. Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 287;
Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 425-27; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 555-56.
But see generally William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not
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Commentators frequently go on to assert, however, that efficient
prices are accurate prices. In other words, stock markets not only
respond to new information quickly, but also respond correctly, so
that market prices accurately reflect best estimates of expected
risks and returns. 95 This stronger interpretation of market effi-
ciency, which securities scholars often label "fundamental value
efficiency," 96 relies not only on the ECMH but also on the Capital
Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). 97 The ECMH predicts that mar-
ket prices respond quickly to new information but says nothing
about the quality or rationality of the information itself. General
Motors stock may fall quickly after GM announces a decline in
earnings; it may also drop quickly after a popular astrologer gives
the firm an unfavorable horoscope reading. The CAPM, however,
predicts that rational investors measure stock values solely in terms
of their likely economic returns and their nondiversiflable (or
"beta") risk,98 and that beta risk and return are positively and lin-
Efficient, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 341, 349-59 (1986) (citing studies suggesting markets are
not perfectly informationally efficient).
The fact that stock prices are efficient according to the weak, semi-strong, or strong tests
does not prove that these prices reflect intrinsic or fundamental values. See infra note 134;
see generally Bruce N. Lehmann, Asset Pricing and Intrinsic Values: A Review Essay, 28 J.
Monetary Econ. 485, 491 (1991) ("[U]npredictability of returns is necessary for market
efficiency but is not a sufficient condition for price to equal objective intrinsic values.").
95 See Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 856 (noting that according to
much efficient market literature, prices reflect a rational estimate of value); Summers &
Summers, supra note 8, at 264 ("[T]he efficient markets view that stock prices will always
reflect fundamental values has, until recently, commanded widespread allegiance from
academic students of financial markets.").
96 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 94, at 344-49 (distinguishing "information-arbitrage"
efficiency and "fundamental-valuation" efficiency); see also Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888-89
(contrasting fundamental value and informational efficiency).
97 See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 765 (noting that the argument that an
efficient market produces accurate prices relies on CAPM as model underlying tests of
ECMH); Stout, supra note 11, at 1241-42 (noting that claims of fundamental value
efficiency require CAPM as well as ECMH). See generally Brealey & Myers, supra note
13, at 136-65 (explaining the Capital Asset Pricing Model).
9s Modern portfolio theory predicts that investors valuing financial instruments are
concerned only with the expected returns from such instruments, and the expected risk
(variation) in those returns. Investors prefer a low-risk investment to a high-risk
investment with the same expected return, and so demand a premium in the form of
greater expected return to bear risk. Moreover, because much risk can be eliminated by
holding a diversified portfolio of many stocks whose "alpha," or firm-specific, risks
counteract, diversified investors care only about nondiversifiable market, or "beta," risk.
See generally Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 125-65 (explaining the concepts of
CAPM and nondiversifiable risk).
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early correlated.9 9 Taken together, the ECMH and CAPM predict
that efficient markets will quickly and correctly digest all informa-
tion relevant to economic risks and returns, producing prices
equivalent to best rational estimates of stocks' fundamental eco-
nomic values. 100
During the 1970s and 1980s, the notion that informational effi-
ciency necessarily implies fundamental value efficiency, and that
stock market prices consequently provide accurate estimates of
stocks' fundamental values, enjoyed great popularity in the legal
culture.101 Fundamental market efficiency was described as "an
article of doctrinal faith in corporate and securities law" 102 that
scholars and regulators "rush[ed] to embrace and apply." 0 3 The
belief that stock markets accurately price securities influenced the
decisions of judges, legislators, and the SEC.' °4
Yet even as the legal culture enthusiastically adopted the notion
of fundamental value efficiency, financial theorists voiced increas-
ing skepticism.105 Empirical studies identified a host of market
99 The CAPM predicts that beta risk and return bear a direct and linear relationship,
because in an efficient market investors can replicate the risks and returns of a high-beta or
low-beta portfolio by holding the market portfolio and either lending at the risk-free rate
or borrowing at the risk-free rate and using the borrowed funds to buy more stocks. Id. at
136-39.
100 Thus the adage, "[T]rust market prices." Id. at 290.
101 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 550 ("[T]he ECMH is now the
context in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place.");
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 764 (noting "legal rush to embrace and apply"
efficient market theory); Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 851 (explaining
efficient market theory "has a strong presence in the contemporary culture of securities
regulation"); Stout, supra note 23, at 621 (recognizing that market efficiency has "captured
the hearts and minds of the securities culture").
102 Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 872.
103 Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 764.
104 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 Duke L.J. 977, 982-87 (1992) (surveying doctrines designed to increase markets'
ability to produce accurate prices); Stout, supra note 11, at 1258-96 (describing how belief
that market prices reflect values has influenced policy); Stout, supra note 23, at 637-40
(describing how the desire to improve efficiency has influenced policy). But see
Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 851-52, 900 (acknowledging the general
acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, but suggesting that regulators may cite
market efficiency as a rationalization for policies they would adopt in any case).
105 As Professor Langevoort puts it, a "gulf . . . developed between the current
economics literature and the persistent, seemingly static, conception of market efficiency in
the legal culture." Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 854. See also Gordon
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anomalies'l-including "small firm effects, '' 1°7 "overvolatility"
results,108 "mean-reversion effects,"'10 9 and "closed-end mutual
fund puzzles""10-that are impossible to reconcile with the notion
that stock prices reflect best estimates of risks and returns. The
rising tide of evidence against the CAPM and fundamental value
efficiency has led some economists to conclude that orthodox effi-
cient market theory is suffering "a near-death experience.""' One
& Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 765 ("It may be only a slight overstatement to say that
only in the legal literature is CAPM considered an accurate account of market processes.").
106 See generally Langevoort, Market Efficiency, supra note 27, at 863-64 (noting that a
substantial body of data from 1970s and 1980s "appear[s] flatly to contradict" ECMH);
Peter Fortune, Stock Market Efficiency: An Autopsy? New Eng. Econ. Rev., Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 17, 34 (noting that empirical evidence "provides an overwhelming case against the
efficient market hypothesis").
107 Studies have shown that low-capitalization firms' stock returns have outpaced
average market returns. See William F. Sharpe & Gordon J. Alexander, Investments 447
(4th ed. 1990). If markets were efficient, then one should be able to attribute the higher
returns of small companies to higher beta risk. The evidence suggests, however, that
returns are significantly above what one would expect given small firms' betas. See
Fortune, supra note 106, at 22 (describing "small-firm effect"); Elton & Gruber, supra note
13, at 429-30 (citing possible explanations for at least part of small firms' excess returns).
HE theory can explain the small firm effect as a consequence of the fact that small firms
are relatively neglected by the larger pool of investors. See Stout, supra note 11, at 1257
n.112 (explaining small firm effect given investor heterogeneity).
108 "Overvolatility" studies have found that stock prices exhibit far more variation over
time than is consistent with historic variations in dividends and earnings. See, e.g., Robert
J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in
Dividends?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421, 433-34 (1981).
109 "Mean-reversion" studies have found that after large upswings or downswings, stock
prices tend to revert towards their original level, a phenomenon inconsistent with the
ECMH's prediction that prices should follow a random walk. See, e.g., Werner F.M. De
Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. Fm. 793, 799 (1985)
(discussing "overreaction hypothesis"); Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler,
Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fim. 557,
579 (1987) (same).
110 The "closed-end mutual fund puzzle" refers to anomalous discounts on closed-end
mutual fund shares. The existence of such discounts contradicts the ECMIH because, if
markets were efficient, the discount would be eliminated by bargain-seeking investors'
buying into the fund. See Fortune, supra note 106, at 22-23 (discussing puzzle); Wang,
supra note 94, at 389-91 (attempting to explain the puzzle and concluding that the market
is "not very efficient").
111 Fortune, supra note 106, at 35; see also David Dreman, An Inefficient Market,
Forbes, Mar. 28, 1994, at 146 (claiming that efficient market theory is "in its death throes");
Lehmann, supra note 94, at 485 ("It is open season on the efficient markets hypothesis.").
Legal scholars also have begun to voice serious doubts about the wisdom of the legal
culture's infatuation with fundamental value efficiency. See, e.g., Langevoort, Market
Efficiency, supra note 27; Stout, supra note 11; Wang, supra note 94.
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eminent theorist has gone so far as to describe the efficient market
as "the most remarkable error in the history of economic
theory."' 1
Increasing disillusionment with the concept of fundamental
value efficiency has spurred financial theorists to propose alterna-
tive models of stock markets that in some cases depart radically
from the orthodox ECMH/CAPM. One theory that has captured
much attention is the so-called "noise trader" theory. According to
the noise trader model, stock markets tend to attract two kinds of
traders: rational traders with access to information that allows
them to accurately assess stocks' true values and irrational traders
who trade on the basis of rumors, whims, and fads (i.e., "noise").113
Noise trader theory hypothesizes that stock markets are not effi-
cient in the fundamental value sense because noise traders distort
market prices."'
Noise theorists' willingness to abandon the fundamental eco-
nomic assumption of individual rationality is strong evidence of
economists' frustration with the stock markets' stubborn refusal to
behave in accordance with the ECMH/CAPM's prediction of fun-
damental value efficiency.1 ' Yet such desperate measures may be
unwarranted. Heterogeneous expectations theory offers a rational
choice explanation of how informationally efficient stock markets
may be demonstrably inefficient in the fundamental value sense.116
112 Barbara Donnelly, Efficient-Market Theorists Are Puzzled By Recent Gyrations in
Stock Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 7 (quoting Yale economist Robert Shiller). Not
surprisingly given its former preeminence, orthodox efficient market theory is dying a long
and hard death. See, e.g., Kiefer, supra note 6, at 890 (suggesting that new theories of
inefficiency "are not yet the accepted paradigms in the finance literature" and "[a]t this
point.., are probably appropriately regarded as interesting new channels of investigation
that have some implications which are more consistent with observed market behavior
than the standard efficient markets model").
113 See supra note 34. But see Brett Trueman, A Theory of Noise Trading in Securities
Markets, 43 J. Fim. 83 (1988) (developing a model in which noise trading by institutional
managers is a rational means of sending false "signal" that manager has access to private
information justifying trading).
114 See, e.g., Black, supra note 34, at 532 (arguing that noise traders distort market prices
from fundamental values); De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk, supra note 10, at 705 (same);
De Long et al., Losses from Noise Trading, supra note 33, at 681 (same).
115 See Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (describing rationality as a fundamental concept in
economic analysis).
116 Some proponents of noise theory have suggested that market anomalies can be
explained without resorting to a presumption of investor irrationality by taking account of
investors' possibly heterogeneous expectations. See De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk,
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2. Modifying Conventional Efficient Markets Theory To Account
for Heterogeneous Expectations
In its traditional form, the CAPM presumes that investors share
homogeneous expectations, making identical estimates of the likely
risks and returns of various stocks.117 Although unrealistic,118 the
assumption of investor homogeneity was a useful device for the
pioneering theorists who developed the CAPM to model the rela-
tionship between stocks' nondiversifiable risks and their expected
returns. 119 Nor does the homogeneity assumption's falsity detract
much from the CAPM's utility for that purpose. When the CAPM
is incorporated into the ECMH to make predictions about the rela-
tionship between a particular stock's market price and its intrinsic
value, however, the assumption of investor homogeneity leads to
the false prediction that stock prices reflect best estimates of stock
values.120 Modifying the ECMH/CAPM model to take account of
investors' heterogeneous expectations produces a model of stock
market pricing that preserves the assumption of investor rationality
while nevertheless explaining how informationally efficient stock
supra note 10, at 735 (noting that although noise theory focuses on irrationality, many of its
results "could perhaps be derived using a fully rational model with differentially informed
investors").
117 See Stout, supra note 11, at 1245 n.52 (citing authorities).
118 The artificiality of the homogeneous beliefs assumption was fully recognized by the
pioneers who developed the CAPM. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and
Capital Markets 104 (1970) (noting that "[e]ven the most casual empiricism suggests" that
investor beliefs concerning the values of stocks differ).
119 See Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 137 (explaining that the CAPM was
developed to help analyze the relationship between degree of risk and expected risk
premium).
120 At least two of the pioneers who developed the CAPM, John Lintner and William
Sharpe, clearly recognized that when investors have differing expectations and either short
sales or investor wealth are limited, efficient market prices no longer bear any necessary
relationship to best estimates of value. Lintner concluded that in a market where investors
make heterogeneous estimations of risks and returns and short sales are restricted, market
price will be a weighted aggregate valuation of the optimistic subset of investors who
choose to hold stock, investors will hold unique portfolios of those stocks they value most
highly, and market price of risk will vary from stock to stock, contrary to predictions of
standard CAPM. John Lintuer, The Aggregation of Investor's Diverse Judgments and
Preferences in Purely Competitive Security Markets, 4 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 347,
384-97 (1969). In a chapter titled "Disagreement," Sharpe notes that when investors'
expectations differ, "[t]he market portfolio will seem inefficient to some, and perhaps to all
investors." Sharpe, supra note 118, at 104-13. If short selling or investor wealth is limited,
Sharpe predicts, "The demise of the capital market line is followed immediately by that of
the security market line. The theory is in a shambles." Id. at 112.
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markets can produce prices that fail to reflect best estimates of fun-
damental value.'
HE theory suggests that when investors disagree about future
stock performance, they develop personal preferences for, and
aversions to, particular stocks. 22 John thinks General Motors is a
bargain at $100, whereas Mary thinks GM at $100 is a sucker's bet.
Shares in a particular firm will tend to be held by the investors who
are most optimistic about the firm's prospects.'2m John buys GM;
Mary does not.
Taken to its logical extreme, HE theory would seem to predict
that all of a firm's shares will end up in the hands of the one inves-
tor who is most optimistic about the company's prospects. If inves-
tors enjoyed infinite wealth and were indifferent to risk, each
corporation's equity might indeed be held by a single investor. 24
But investors are risk-averse and have limited wealth; their budgets
and their tolerance for diversifiable ("alpha") risk curtail their will-
ingness to invest large amounts in a single firm. Once John has
invested a sizeable portion of his finite savings in General Motors,
he may prefer to buy shares in another firm he perceives as not
quite as good a bargain simply to maintain a diversified portfolio.
HE theory thus predicts that a firm's shares will be held by an opti-
121 See generally Stout, supra note 11, at 1244-52, 1284-95 (modifying CAPM to account
for investor heterogeneity and considering implications for relationship between stock
prices and values).
122 See Lintner, supra note 120, at 397 (explaining that in a market where investors
make heterogeneous estimations and short sales are restricted, investors will not hold
market portfolio but unique portfolios of the stocks they value most); Stout, supra note 11,
at 1246 (stating that investors prefer stocks they subjectively perceive as underpriced and
avoid those they subjectively perceive as overpriced).
123 See Lintner, supra note 120, at 397 (describing market price as a weighted aggregate
valuation of that optimistic subset of investors who choose to hold stock); Stout, supra note
11, at 1246 (noting that shares tend to be held by those who attach highest subjective
valuation to them). Stocks tend to be held by optimists because legal and practical
restrictions on "short sales" limit the ability of pessimists to take a position in a security.
See Stout, supra note 11, at 1248 & n.68 (discussing short sales restrictions).
124 See Harris & Raviv, supra note 38, at 481 (suggesting that if short sales were
restricted and investors were risk-neutral, each stock would end up being owned entirely
by the investor who was most optimistic); Stout, supra note 11, at 1246 (same).
Modeling investor heterogeneity in a world where investors are risk-neutral and short
sales are not restricted produces the odd prediction that no stable market price exists. See
De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk, supra note 10, at 710 (noting that if investors held "with
certainty different beliefs about expected returns[,] they would... try to take infinite bets
against each other... [and an] equilibrium would not exist").
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mistic subset of investors, who may perceive the stock to be
"underpriced" yet be unwilling to buy more at market price."25
Modifying the traditional ECMIH/CAPM to account for investor
disagreement consequently yields the controversial prediction-
nevertheless borne out by much empirical evidence, including sev-
eral recent studies-that investor demand for particular stocks will
be downward-sloping. 126 Even at a very high price, a corporation
may sell a modest number of shares to the "superoptimists" who
have the highest opinions of the firm's prospects. Lowering the
price allows the firm to sell more shares, both because the lower
price allows a greater number of investors to perceive the stock as
a bargain and because it induces the optimists who already own
shares to accept the risk of purchasing a bit more. Market price
thus will be set by the intersection between a stock's supply func-
tion (fixed in the short run) and the downward-sloping aggregate
demand function. Increasing the available supply of stock by issu-
125 Stout, supra note 11, at 1246-47.
126 See Stout, supra note 11, at 1247-58 (arguing that HE theory and empirical evidence
both support downward-sloping demand). The claim that demand for stocks is downward-
sloping is controversial because the orthodox ECMH/CAPM predicts that the demand
function for stocks should be horizontal or "perfectly elastic." In other words, investors
should be willing to buy an infinite amount of a stock at below-market prices and be willing
to sell an infinite amount at above-market prices. Id. at 1236-39. The perfect elasticity
prediction flows naturally from the CAPM's assumption of investor homogeneity because
at below-market prices all investors view a stock as a bargain and wish to buy it, whereas at
above-market prices all investors see a stock as overpriced and wish to sell. Id. at 1245.
Because downward-sloping demand for stocks is inconsistent with orthodox ECMH/
CAPM, for many years the suggestion that stock demand might be downward-sloping was
regarded as close to heresy in financial circles. Yet financial economists increasingly have
come to accept that, as an empirical matter, investor demand for individual stocks is indeed
significantly downward-sloping and that investors' heterogeneous expectations may
explain that observation. See id. at 1245 n.56, 1252-58 (citing authorities and studies);
Gordon B. Pye, Does the Market Always Know Best?, Fin. Analysts J., July-Aug. 1989, at
4, 5 (concluding that there is "ample" empirical evidence that the demand curve for shares
"may have considerable slope"). Recent studies include Robert W. Holthausen, Richard
W. Leftwich & David Mayers, Large-Block Transactions, the Speed of Response, and
Temporary and Permanent Stock-Price Effects, 26 J. Fmn. Econ. 71, 73-74, 90 (1990) (noting
that if demand for stocks is sloping, large trades will cause permanent price changes
directly correlated with size of trade, and finding "strong evidence of a permanent price
effect that increases with block size"); Claudio Loderer, John Cooney & Leonard D. Van
Drunen, The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock, 46 J. Fm. 621, 621-22, 648-49
(1991) (presenting study results consistent with inelastic demand); cf. Bagwell, supra note
53 (discussing upward-sloping supply curves in the context of Dutch auction stock
repurchases).
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ing more shares will lower market price, whereas contracting sup-
ply (for instance, through a corporate repurchase program) will
raise market price. 7
The possibility that investor demand for stocks is downward-
sloping carries important implications for the relationship between
a stock's market price and its intrinsic value. According to the
127 FIGURE 4:
EQUILIBRIUM MARET PRICE wrrH DOWNWARD-SLoPING DEMANsD
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Figure 4 illustrates how market price is set when aggregate demand for stocks is down-
ward-sloping. The supply of any given stock is fixed, in the short run, as illustrated by
vertical supply function S1. Given a downward-sloping demand function (D) for a stock,
equilibrium price P, is determined by the intersection of D and S1. If the firm issues more
shares and increases the supply of stock to S2, equilibrium price decreases to P2. See Stout,
supra note 11, at 1249-50 (describing how market price is set under assumption of investor
heterogeneity).
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orthodox ECMH/CAPM, prices in an efficient market reflect the
best possible estimates of stocks' fundamental values.2 8 Under the
heterogeneous expectations version of the ECMH/CAPM, how-
ever, market price is simply the price at which the least optimistic
member of the optimistic subset of investors who hold a particular
stock would willingly part with some of her shares. 2 9 In other
words, market price is nothing more than the subjective valuation of
the marginal investor. Because there is no reason to presume that
the marginal investor's valuation is also the best, or most optimal,
valuation,130 modifying the ECMI/CAPM to allow for investors'
heterogeneous expectations destroys any close relationship
between a stock's market price and best estimates of its fundamen-
tal value.' 31
Prices set in a market of investors with heterogeneous expecta-
tions may still be informationally efficient. Prices may respond
quickly to new information either because fresh information
changes the marginal investor's estimate of her stock's value or
because it entices new investors into (or drives old investors out of)
the market for a particular firm's shares, thus changing the identity
of the marginal investor. But even if prices change quickly in
response to new information, there is no guarantee they change
accurately. Market prices inevitably reflect the aggregate demand
of an amalgam of investors with differing opinions, all acting on
limited information and most of whom are mistaken to greater or
128 This simple explanation of fundamental value efficiency is close to a tautology. If
investors value stocks only according to their expected risk and returns, and if investors all
have identical expectations for stocks, a market price that reflects all available information
inevitably reflects that "best," unanimous valuation. A more sophisticated defense of
fundamental value efficiency recognizes that investors' expectations may differ, but argues
that over time stocks' prices should come to approximate fundamental values because
investors who are poor judges of stocks' intrinsic values lose money and exit the market.
The longitudinal HE model suggests that "weeding out" is ineffective in ensuring that
prices equal best estimates of value, due to generational effects. See supra Part I.C.2.
129 See Stout, supra note 11, at 1248.
130 In a world of imperfect information, the "best" estimate of a stock's value would be
the estimate of that investor who has access to, and has considered, all available
information rather than just a subset of information.
131 Stout, supra note 11, at 1248-49; see also Lintner, supra note 120, at 384-97,
(concluding that when investors make heterogeneous estimations and short sales are
restricted, market price of risk varies from stock to stock, contrary to predictions of
standard CAPM); Pye, supra note 126, at 6 (concluding that because investors disagree
about stock values, "[t]he market doesn't always know best.").
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lesser degrees. So long as at least a portion of investors in the mar-
ket are reasonably informed, market prices will not be utterly
divorced from reasonable estimates of value. But the connection
between price and best estimate of value may be very loose
indeed. 32
The HE model thus offers an answer to a phenomenon that has
long puzzled financial theorists: the steadfast refusal of the sophis-
ticated individuals and institutions who participate in securities
markets to heed their warnings that "the market knows best."133
The HE model suggests that at least some of the market partici-
pants who claim to be able to detect underpriced or overpriced
stocks may be correct in their assessments. 34 Although E theory
predicts that stock traders who expect to profit from trading are
mistaken on average, it also, ironically, supports the notion that
they may be correct in individual cases. Stock trading may indeed
be a game of skill in which the talented and canny may profit at the
expense of their less able fellows.135
II. ARE U.S. STOCK MARKETS HETEROGENEOUS
EXPECTATIONS MARKETS?
The HE model of stock trading is logically consistent, its under-
lying assumptions are plausible, and its predictions accord well
with observed market behavior as well as with common percep-
tions of stock markets. Yet, like any economic model, HE theory
simplifies a complex reality. In the real world, traders squander
132 As Fischer Black has suggested in the context of noise theory, one "might define an
efficient market as one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more
than half of value and less than twice value." Black, supra note 34, at 533. Although the
HE model of stock pricing differs from noise trader theory in several ways-most notably
in retaining the assumption of investor rationality, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying
text, and in modifying rather than rejecting the ECMHICAPM framework, see supra notes
117-31 and accompanying text-HE theory nevertheless agrees with noise theory's
prediction that the market prices of stocks may not reflect their values.
133 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that theorists are puzzled by
speculative trading).
134 Empirical tests of the markets' informational efficiency generally focus on traders'
abilities to make profits in the very short run, i.e., hours or days. See authorities cited
supra note 94 (discussing tests of efficiency). These tests cannot disprove some investors'
abilities to identify mispriced stocks and profit from buying them and holding them for
longer periods.
135 But see supra note 71 (discussing possibility that random luck explains persistent
winners in the market).
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resources trying to beat the market, but they trade for other rea-
sons as well.136 Because the policy implications of the HE model
depend on determining just how great a role heterogeneous expec-
tations play in the secondary stock markets, this Part examines the
available evidence on investors' motives for trading. That evidence
suggests that investor disagreement is indeed the modern markets'
raison d'etre.
A. Nonmistaken Reasons for Trading and the Value-Adding
Model of Stock Markets
Investors may have a number of reasons for trading other than
heterogeneous expectations. For example, some portion of the
trading observed in secondary markets almost certainly reflects the
changing liquidity needs of investors who desire first to put their
savings in stocks and then to liquidate their holdings to raise cash
for another purpose. Trading driven by liquidity needs would
occur even if all investors shared homogeneous expectations. Sup-
pose John and Mary agreed that GM's market price of $100 per
share exactly reflected its expected future-returns. John would still
willingly pay broker commissions to buy, and Mary pay commis-
sions to sell, if thrifty John had accumulated savings under his mat-
tress that he wished to invest, whereas Mary needed to liquidate
her holdings to purchase a home or pay a child's tuition.
Tax concerns also can trigger transactions by investors who per-
ceive stocks to be accurately priced. If Mary bought GM at $100
per share and GM's price then declined to ninety dollars, Mary
might sell, not because she predicts GM will decline further, but
because selling would allow her to realize a ten dollars per share
capital loss that would reduce her tax liability by offsetting other-
wise-taxable income.137
136 See Harris & Raviv, supra note 38, at 474 (arguing that explanations for trading
"include tax-driven trading, liquidity trading, portfolio rebalancing, and speculation";
speculation "stems, presumably, from disagreements among traders"); Stiglitz, supra note
9, at 102 (stating that investors trade in order to save or dissave, to change their portfolios,
and to beat the market).
137 See generally, Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation: A Guide to the
Leading Cases and Concepts 299 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing rules for deductibility of capital
losses); Josef Lakonishok & Seymour Smidt, Capital Gain Taxation and Volume of
Trading, 41 J. Fm. 951, 953-54 (1986) (describing tax effects of capital losses and limits of
tax-induced trading).
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"Portfolio balancing" provides a third reason investors might
trade absent disagreement over prices. Modem financial theory
counsels investors to maximize their returns given a desired level
of risk by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks in combination
with some riskless asset, such as government bonds.138 Occasion-
ally, the nondiversifiable (beta) risk of the equities portion of an
investor's portfolio may shift to the point where the investor must
sell off equities and buy bonds (or vise versa) to maintain her
desired overall risk level. 139 Alternatively, a stock might appreci-
ate so greatly that it comes to constitute too large a portion of the
investor's portfolio, and she might sell off some of it to reduce her
diversifiable (alpha) risk. 4 ° Indexed mutual funds and pension
funds that buy and hold the stocks comprising a particular stock
index also periodically adjust their portfolios when stocks are listed
or delisted from the index.14 1
Because trades motivated by liquidity, tax and portfolio-balanc-
ing concerns would occur even if investors enjoyed perfect infor-
mation and shared homogeneous expectations for stocks' futures,
such "nonmistaken" trades, in addition to appearing mutually ben-
eficial ex ante, can, in fact, be mutually beneficial ex post.' 42 This
observation suggests an alternative model of stock trading-call it
the "value-adding" model-that carries very different implications
for the behavior and the social value of stock markets than those of
the HE model. In the economist's parlance, nonmistaken, mutu-
ally beneficial stock trades "add value" because investors who pay
trading costs to purchase liquidity, tax benefits, or a balanced port-
138 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 124-
25.
139 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
142 Trades motivated by differing needs for liquidity, diversification, or capital gains or
losses reflect differences in investors' tastes rather than in their expectations. Thus, even if
two investors share identical expectations for the future, one might readily buy stocks that
the other sells if the first investor needs to invest the growing pile of cash under her
mattress (i.e., has a taste for investing) whereas the second is strapped for cash (i.e., has a
taste for liquidity). The transaction costs associated with such trades reduce the two
investors' net wealth by transferring some of that wealth to third parties. Because
investors who pay for liquidity or diversification receive something they value in return,
however, such trades still increase net investor welfare.
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folio receive something they value in return.'43 Under a value-
adding model of stock trading, then, trading improves the average
trader's welfare, and costs incurred in trading are well spent.144
B. The Value-Adding Model versus the HE Model. Some
Evidence on Why Investors Trade
As will be discussed further in Part Iii, the HE model of a stock
market primarily composed of speculators betting against each
other according to their differing predictions, and the value-adding
model of a market comprised mainly of investors trading to satisfy
liquidity needs, reap tax benefits, or rebalance their portfolios, 45
carry very different normative connotations. The HE model's rele-
vance for securities policy thus largely depends on determining
143 A fourth possible form of value-adding trading is "recreational" trading. See supra
note 33 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that some investors trade not to
profit, but because they intrinsically enjoy the process, and concluding that recreational
trading is unlikely to account for more than a small portion of speculative activity).
144 The value-adding model also raises the possibility that stock markets could sustain a
small group of professional traders who systematically outperform the market by trading at
favorable prices with investors willing to accept less-advantageous prices to secure
liquidity, tax benefits, or balanced portfolios. In effect, investors seeking such benefits
"pay" for them by trading with professionals on terms that allow the latter to extract
profits.
An equities trading model in which professionals extract profits by trading on favorable
terms with nonprofessionals resembles the classic paradigm of futures markets, which are
often described as comprised of risk-averse "hedgers" who do business with risk-neutral
"speculators" on terms that allow the latter to profit. See infra notes 181, 183. This model
also bears some resemblance to an efficient markets model proposed by Professors
Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, who suggest that markets are comprised of
informed and uninformed traders, that the latter systematically profit by buying mispriced
securities, and that stock prices differ from best estimates of fundamental values just
enough to account for the marginal costs of information. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393
(1980).
The professionals who systematically profit from trading under the value-adding model,
however, are more accurately described as "dealers" rather than "speculators." Although
they purchase stocks primarily for resale, they are hoping to profit not from "speculating"
on (forecasting) future price changes but rather from the spread between the bid price at
which they offer to purchase and the ask price at which they offer to buy. The spread
compensates dealers for the cost of storing an inventory-negligible in the case of
securities-and for bearing the risk of price changes in the inventory they hold for resale.
Thus, dealers who provide liquidity can extract profits even in a market of homogeneous
expectations.
145 Serviced, perhaps, by a modest number of profit-extracting professional dealers. See
supra note 144.
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which model best describes the U.S. secondary markets. As an
empirical matter, how much trading in modern stock markets is
inspired by investors' statistically futile hopes of profiting from
their differing price predictions, and how much by their desires for
liquidity, diversified portfolios, or tax advantages?' 46
Although there has been little formal study of why investors
trade, 147 discovering investors' subjective motivations for trading is
not so difficult a task as it may first appear. The HE model's
explanatory power in describing the nature of market participants
and the relationship between market prices and best estimates of
stocks' fundamental values provides indirect evidence that hetero-
geneous expectations inspire much trading. More direct evidence
of why investors trade can be found both in investors' stated
descriptions of their trading goals and in the volume and patterns
of trading. Both forms of evidence suggest that investor disagree-
ment drives the stock markets. 48
146 See infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text (discussing how optimal regulatory
policy depends on whether market is primarily HE or value-adding).
147 Langevoort, supra note 27, at 920, 896 n.153 ("[W]e know surprisingly little about
who buys or sells in the stock market (and why).").
148 Popular literature may provide a third, albeit indirect, source of information about
why investors trade in stock markets. Tales of the market appear in films, books,
magazines and on television. See, e.g., Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
1987) (recounting the rise and fall of a young stockbroker and his inside-trading mentor,
the notorious Gordon Gekko); Quicksilver (Columbia Pictures Indus. 1985) (describing
the story of a former stock trader who returns to the trading floor, discovers he still has
"the touch," and makes enough money to help a friend in need); Michael Lewis, Liar's
Poker. Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street (1989) (recounting protagonist's life
as Salomon Brothers broker); Alan Rubenfeld, The Super Traders: Secrets & Successes of
Wall Street's Best & Brightest (1992) (providing autobiographical anecdotes of successful
traders); Thomas D. Saler, Lies Your Broker Tells You (1989) (describing the brokerage
industry); Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities (1987) (describing the travails of a
fictional professional bond trader). These tales of the market are not tales of technicians
fine-tuning alphas and betas. Rather, they are stories of speculation and intrigue, luck and
guile, profitable prediction and mistaken prognostication, and the thrill of winning
counterbalanced by the agony of defeat. In the eyes of popular culture, stock markets are
indeed casinos, filled with traders placing enormous bets on the future.
Information gleaned from popular culture must, of course, be taken with a grain of salt.
Still the tale of the canny (or not so canny) trader is such a staple of Wall Street lore that it
is difficult to dismiss the idea that art accurately reflects life. If the popular image of the
market bears any resemblance to reality, heterogeneous expectations do indeed provide
the foundation on which modem stock markets are built.
1995] Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 661
1. The Predominance of Active Institutional Management
Perhaps the most powerful evidence that investor disagreement
fuels modern stock markets is what investors, particularly institu-
tional investors, say about why they trade. 4 9 Institutions such as
pension funds and mutual funds own approximately half of all
equity and account for half or more of all stock trading. 50 Because
institutions disclose their investment philosophies and strategies to
comply with federal disclosure requirements 151 and to market their
wares to individual investors, funds' explicit characterizations of
their own investment goals offer great insight into motives for
trading.
149 Economists generally are reluctant to rely on the preferences individuals assert,
preferring to infer motive from actual behavior. See David W. Barnes & Lynn A. Stout,
Cases and Materials on Law and Economics 5 (1992) (discussing the theory of revealed
preferences). In the case of institutional trading, however, there is little reason to believe
that institutional managers who claim they hope to outperform the market are lying. Self-
selection reconciles their optimism with the harsh reality that trading is a loser's game, and
lying exposes them to charges of fraud. But see Trueman, supra note 113, at 83 (offering a
noise trading model where institutional managers trade to create the appearance for their
customers that they have nonpublic information, not because they expect to profit).
Moreover, even if institutional managers misstate their trading motives, the quixotic hopes
of the individual investors who choose to invest in active funds remain the essential
impetus for institutional trading. Institutions' statements about why they trade remain
highly relevant because individuals who invest in funds surely rely on these statements.
Choosing to invest money in an active fund that tries to beat the market through trading,
rather than a passive fund with a buy-and-hold strategy, reveals individual investors'
preferences for HE trading.
150 See National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, supra note 1, at 36 (stating that institutional
block trading accounted for 44.5% of NASDAQ share volume in 1992); New York Stock
Exchange, supra note 31, at 89 (stating that in 1992, U.S. institutions-primarily public and
private pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds-owned 42% of market
value of all U.S. equity); id. at 17 (stating that block trades accounted for 54% of NYSE
share volume in 1993). Some commentators believe that institutions account for an even
higher proportion of all trading. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 70 (stating that
institutions do 75% of trading).
151 Mutual funds are subject to the disclosure and antifraud requirements of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988), and in some cases
to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988). See generally Hazen, supra note 81, § 17, at 880-
83 (discussing registration and disclosure requirements). Federal law also requires pension
plans to disclose some information to employee-investors. See Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1988); see also 2 Loss &
Seligman, supra note 16, at 1031-50 (noting that the SEC views some voluntary
contributory pension plans as securities that are subject to federal disclosure
requirements).
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Institutional managers generally claim to follow one of two basic
investment strategies. 152 The first, and less common, is "passive"
management, or "indexed investing". 153 Index funds buy and hold
portfolios of stocks designed to replicate a particular stock index
such as the Standard & Poor's 500 or Wilshire 5000.154 They exe-
cute trades only when necessary to rebalance portfolios as stocks
are listed or delisted from the index or to respond to changing
liquidity demands as individual investors in the fund invest or with-
draw capital.' 55 The typical passive fund turns over only four per-
cent to eighteen percent of its portfolio annually.156
152 See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 704-05 (distinguishing passive and active
management); Sharpe & Alexander, supra note 107, at 720-22 (same).
153 See Market 2000 Report, supra note 6, at UI-3 (discussing passive management);
Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 705-08 (same).
154 The Standard & Poor's 500 is a value-weighted index of 500 large, NYSE-listed,
"blue-chip" stocks. The Wilshire 5000 is a broader market index that includes many
smaller companies traded on the OTC market. See generally Elton & Gruber, supra note
13, at 626, 706.
155 Kiefer, supra note 10, at 19 (discussing rebalancing); Market 2000 Report, supra note
6, at 11-3.
156 Although comprehensive data on passive funds' turnover rates is hard to come by,
average turnover appears to be quite low. For example, a survey of equity funds listed in
Morningstar Mutual Funds' "Growth-Income" category found that five of the 104 funds
listed described themselves as passive index funds. See Morningstar, Inc., Morningstar
Mutual Funds, Apr. 15, 1994, § 2 at 1, 390,392,405-07. Those five funds (the Schwab 1000,
SEI Index S&P 500, Vanguard Index 500, Vanguard Index Total Stock Market, and
Vanguard Index Value) held net assets of $7.9 billion and had weighted average four
percent portfolio turnover in 1992. Id. (1993 data were used for Vanguard Index Total
Stock Market, as 1992 data were not available).
Indexed pension funds seem to have similarly low turnover rates. See EBRI Issue Brief,
supra note 90, at 17 tbl. 7, tbl. 8 (calculating that large pension fund that replicates S&P 500
Index experienced annual turnover ranging from four percent to eight percent in period
from 1986-1990, whereas fund that replicates small-capitalization index experienced 13%
to 16% turnover). A 1989 survey of 36 pension funds by the Financial Executive Institute
("FEI") found that fund managers asked to estimate turnover in their passive equities
accounts estimated that between 1986 and 1989, average turnover varied from 13% to
24%, with an average of 18% turnover for the four years. See 1990 Hearings, supra note
88, at 106 (statement of Financial Executives Institute, Committee on Investment of
Employee Benefit Assets). These survey results may overestimate true passive fund
trading due to the fact that an increasing number of managers of purportedly "passive"
funds actually try to outperform the index through arbitrage strategies involving index
futures and options. See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 707 (noting the rise of such
strategies and questioning whether such management is truly passive); New Ways to Play
the Indexing Game, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1988, at 93-98; James A. White, Index
Funds Start Raising Their Sights, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1989, at Cl ("Because index-fund
managers are no longer satisfied with merely being average, they developed [active]
strategies.").
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The second, and far more popular, strategy is "active" invest-
ing. 57 Active managers take a position in a particular stock or
market "based on a forecast about the future."'*5 In other words,
active managers are self-described HE traders who buy and sell on
the basis of their differing predictions for individual stocks, indus-
try sectors, and the market as a whole. 5 9 Thus, the prospectus for
Vanguard's actively managed Windsor II mutual fund describes the
fund's strategy as a search for stocks "undervalued" by the mar-
ket, 60 whereas the accompanying sales brochure touts "buy low,
sell high" as "the classic formula for success in the stock
market." 1
61
Although passive investing is becoming more common, less than
twenty percent of pension funds' equity holdings and as little as
one percent of stock mutual funds' holdings are indexed.162 Active
managers therefore control eighty percent or more of all institu-
tional equity holdings. Not surprisingly, active funds also trade far
more often than passive funds do; for example, the average active
stock mutual fund turns over more than seventy-five percent of its
portfolio annually, 63 and turnover ratios of 200% or more are not
157 See infra note 162.
158 Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 708; see also Sharpe & Alexander, supra note 107,
at 721 (noting that active managers believe market misprices stocks); Treynor, supra note
29, at 35 ("All active investing is motivated by forecasts .... ).
159 See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 708-09 (distinguishing three basic types of
active managers: (1) "market timers" who switch between equity and debt depending on
their forecasts for interest rates and the stock market as a whole, (2) "sector selectors" who
move investments between broad classifications of stocks such as industrials and utilities
according to their predictions for each sector's economic health, and (3) "security
selectors" who search for individual stocks that have been "undervalued" by the market).
160 The Vanguard Group of Inv. Cos., Wimdsor II Prospectus 4 (1994).
161 The Vanguard Group of Inv. Cos., Vanguard Windsor H1: For Long-Term Growth Of
Capital And Income Using A Tme-Tested, Value-Based Investment Approach 1 (1994).
162 See Kiefer, supra note 10, at 8 (stating that 38% of pension funds index some portion
of their holdings and that these funds account for 20% of total pension fund equity
holdings); Market 2000 Report, supra note 6, at 11-2 to 11-3 (stating that in 1992 only 18.3%
of assets in the top 200 pension funds were indexed, whereas "overwhelming majority" of
equity mutual fund assets remained actively managed); Vanguard Index Trust, supra note
30, at 4 (estimating that less than one percent of equity mutual fund assets are held by
passive index funds). Again, these figures may slightly overstate the use of indexing, as
many so-called passive funds have begun to adopt "innovations" that amount to active
(i.e., forecast-based) investment strategies. See supra note 156.
163 Morningstar, Inc., Morningstar Mutual Funds, Apr. 15, 1994, § 1, at 7 (stating that
average equity mutual fund turns over 75% of portfolio annually). Pension funds
experience similar turnover rates. See 1990 Hearing, supra note 88, at 58 tbl. 2 (stating that
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uncommon.164 Because active management is so much more com-
mon than indexing and because active funds trade so much more
frequently, active funds' trades account for the overwhelmingly
majority (more than ninety percent) of all institutional trades. 65
Investors' hopes of profiting from their active fund managers' sup-
posed ability to "buy low and sell high" thus underlie the vast pre-
ponderance of all institutional trading.1 66
As noted earlier, the negative-sum nature of the stock trading
game works against institutions just as it works against individuals
who trade in hope of profit. Active funds incur much higher trad-
ing and management costs than passive funds and on average earn
lower returns than either passive funds or the market as a whole.167
Active management's continued popularity in the face of such a
poor track record is cogent evidence of self-selection's power to
create a market of optimistic losers.168
pension funds' average equity turnover ratios varied from 52% to 63% from 1981 through
1986, the last year for which information was available); Stephen A. Berkowitz & Dennis
E. Logue, The Portfolio Thrnover Explosion Explored, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Spring 1987, at
38, 40 tbl. 2 (showing that during the early 1980s, pension funds and mutual funds
experienced similar rates of turnover).
164 See Morningstar, Inc., Morningstar Mutual Funds, Apr. 1, 1994, at 6 (noting several
funds with turnovers exceeding 500%).
165 Assuming conservatively that active funds control 80% of institutionally held equity,
see supra note 162 and accompanying text, and that actively managed funds trade three
times as often, see supra notes 156, 163 (noting that passive funds' turnover averages 4% to
18%, whereas active funds experience 60-75% turnover), active funds account for at least
92% of all institutional trading.
166 Liquidity needs, portfolio balancing and tax motives are likely to account for only a
very small fraction of active funds' trades. Pension funds are tax-exempt institutions, and
mutual funds are taxed only indirectly. See Lakonishok & Smidt, supra note 137, at 953
(discussing why institutions are less likely to trade for tax reasons). Both types of funds
generally hold portfolios of hundreds of different stocks and so are unlikely to do much
trading to retain diversification. See supra note 98 (discussing diversification). The law of
large numbers similarly ensures that large institutions' liquidity needs will be far less than
those of individual investors. See infra note 171. Finally, because many stock mutual funds
hold only equities, none of those funds' trading can be attributed to any perceived need to
maintain a balance between the proportion of their portfolios invested in equity and the
proportion in bonds. Actively managed pension funds may do some portfolio balancing,
but a survey of active pension fund managers found those managers regarded only about
20% of their trading as attributable to portfolio-balancing needs. EBRI Issue Brief, supra
note 90, at 16 chart 6.
167 See supra note 30.
168 See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 710 ("Although index funds have
outperformed most active managers, most investors who hire active managers believe they
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2. Trading Volume and Patterns
Additional evidence that modern stock markets are primarily
HE markets can be found in both the volume and the patterns of
stock trading. U.S. equities markets generally exhibit far higher
turnover than would seem reasonable if investors were trading pri-
marily to satisfy liquidity needs or to rebalance their portfolios. 169
In 1992, the dollar volume of trading in U.S. equities on the
exchanges and OTC market amounted to over fifty-five percent of
the value of all equity holdings, implying an average investor hold-
ing period of less than twenty-two months.170 It seems highly
unlikely that investors experience such rapid and dramatic changes
in their liquidity needs that they must invest and then sell their
entire portfolios every other year or so. 17 1 Similarly, neither the
proportions of the stocks held in the average diversified portfolio
nor the risk levels associated with those stocks seem likely to shift
so rapidly and dramatically that portfolio-balancing investors must
completely liquidate and reconstruct their portfolios every twenty-
two months.
Evidence that market turnover greatly exceeds what is necessary
for liquidity and portfolio-balancing needs can be found by com-
paring the trading behavior of investors who buy stocks directly
can spot the manager who will outperform the index. This belief persists despite the fact
that there is very little evidence that superior performance is predictable.").
169 See Black, supra note 34, at 530-31 (arguing that if people traded stocks only to
respond to changes in market risk or liquidity needs, they would trade in individual stocks
only "rarely"); cf. Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 102 (noting that some investors trade for
liquidity or to change portfolios, but most stock trading is motivated by a desire to beat the
market).
170 See supra note 31.
171 Investors tend to accumulate wealth over a lifetime. See Paul A. Samuelson,
Economics 759 (9th ed. 1973) (describing life-cycle theory of wealth and income). Their
savings are likely liquidated only in response to pressing needs, like buying a house, paying
for a college education, or retiring. If changing liquidity needs explain most individual
stock trades, nineteen years seems a more reasonable holding period than nineteen
months. Moreover, the law of large numbers suggests that institutional funds need to trade
for liquidity and portfolio-balancing reasons far less often than individuals do. Institutions
represent ever-changing pools of individual investors. So long as new investors buy in at
roughly the same rate that old investors redeem their interests (or employees contribute to
pension funds at the same rate that retirees collect benefits), the fund can meet individuals'
liquidity needs without buying or selling assets. Liquidity buying and selling is only
necessary for institutions when large numbers of individuals simultaneously either put
money into, or draw money out of, the fund.
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with the trading behavior of investors who purchase shares in stock
mutual funds. 72 Mutual fund investors rely on their fund manag-
ers' stock-picking skills rather than on their own. Thus, compared
to a direct stock purchase or sale, an investor's decision to put
money into or withdraw money out of a stock mutual fund is more
likely to reflect her changing liquidity needs or a desire to alter the
balance of stocks and bonds in her portfolio, and less likely to
reflect a perception that stocks are underpriced or overpriced. Not
surprisingly, turnover in mutual fund shares is far lower than turn-
over in individual equities. In 1992, investors turned over only
twenty-six percent of the value of their holdings in equity mutual
funds. 173 But even a twenty-six percent turnover rate significantly
overstates the level of trading necessary to satisfy individuals'
liquidity and portfolio-balancing needs, because a good portion of
fund redemptions are by investors who have become dissatisfied
with their original fund's performance and wish to reinvest in
another fund. 74 Such trading is BE trading motivated by fund
investors' desires to find the superior manager who can beat the
market. That mutual funds' twenty-six percent annual turnover
probably substantially exceeds what is necessary to satisfy individu-
als' liquidity and portfolio-balancing needs evinces that the fifty-
five percent turnover found in the stock markets must be driven
primarily by other motives.
The patterns of trading observed in stock markets also suggest
that tax-motivated sales account for only a small portion of stock
trades. If most investors sold stocks primarily to realize taxable
gains or losses, trading should exhibit distinctive seasonal patterns.
In particular, trading volume should increase substantially in
December, when investors know with certainty what tax benefits
172 Cf. Black, supra note 34, at 530-31 (stating that if people traded stocks only to
respond to changes in market risk or liquidity needs, they would have little reason to trade
in individual stocks and would instead trade in mutual funds, index derivatives, or money
market funds).
173 In 1991, when equity mutual funds held $368 billion in assets, investors bought $97
billion and sold $54 billion in equity fund shares. 1993 Statistical Abstract, supra note 2, at
525 tbl. 838. Dividing the total market value of equity mutual funds by the larger of either
purchases or sales implies annual turnover of 26%.
174 For example, one survey of investors selling mutual fund shares found that 75% of
those who sold their entire interest, and 36% of those who sold part of their interest,
reinvested some or all of the proceeds in another mutual fund. See Investment Company
Institute, 1993 Mutual Fund Fact Book 86-88 (1994).
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selling will bring.' 75 Yet empirical studies show December trading
volume on the NYSE varies little from normal volume. 176
Researchers accordingly have concluded that although tax incen-
tives have some effect on trading, "non-tax-related motives [are]
predominant."'
In sum, the volume and patterns of trading found in modern sec-
ondary markets offer significant indirect evidence of investors'
motivations for trading. That evidence indicates that trades driven
by investors' desires to meet changing liquidity needs, minimize tax
burdens, or maintain diversified and properly balanced portfolios
account for only a minority of all stock trades and that disagree-
ment over the future drives the majority of all transactions. If
investors shared homogeneous expectations, trading volumes in
stock markets would be a fraction of what they are today.
HL. TiH POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TH]E HETEROGENEOUS
EXPECTATIONS MODEL FOR FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATION
Part I introduced the HE model of stock trading and explored
some of its implications for the nature and behavior of both stock
markets and the investors who participate in them. Part II
reviewed the substantial evidence supporting the view that most
stock trading is motivated by investors' optimistic hopes of earning
above-market returns through speculative strategies. The primary
focus of Parts I and II, then, has been the HE model's positive
aspect, that is, the model's promise in helping observers under-
stand and describe stock traders and stock markets.
This Part explores the normative consequences of the HE model
by examining the social value of stock trading through the lens of
HE theory. Modern securities regulation is largely premised on
the notion that stock trading is an activity of value both to traders
175 See Elton & Gruber, supra note 13, at 417 (describing the tax consequences of year-
end selling); Lakonishok & Smidt, supra note 137, at 954-56 (suggesting that there should
be an increase in trading volume at year-end).
176 Lakonishok & Smidt, supra note 137, at 958; see also New York Stock Exchange,
supra note 31, at 13 (showing that NYSE December 1993 share volume of 5.8 billion
shares, amounting to approximately 104% of one-twelfth of annual volume of 66.9 billion
shares).
177 Lakonishok & Smidt, supra note 137, at 973.
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and to society as a whole.178 Federal law declines to interpose itself
between investors and their mistakes, opting instead to protect
investors through a relatively unintrusive system of antifraud laws
combined with rules that require firms to disclose basic informa-
tion to shareholders and investors. 179 In short, lawmakers seek to
protect and promote stock trading.
The HE model raises serious questions about the wisdom of such
a free-market approach. Although economists celebrate stock
markets as engines of efficiency and social progress, laymen tend to
be more skeptical, viewing stock markets as legalized casinos. 18
HE theory supports lay misgivings by providing a theoretical foun-
dation for the claim that, in at least two distinct senses, stock trad-
ing can be wealth-destructive behavior. High-volume stock
markets consequently may reflect a form of market failure that
leads to substantial and ongoing social losses rather than efficiency
gains.
The social losses associated with HE trading might possibly be
counterbalanced by some social benefits. In particular, HE trading
might contribute to both the liquidity and efficiency (i.e., price
accuracy) of modem stock markets. Economic theory counsels,
however, that costs and benefits must always be weighed at the
margin. A marginal analysis of HE trading's liquidity and effi-
ciency contributions reveals that these are likely to be minor and
significantly outweighed by their costs.
That observation in turn suggests a need to reexamine present
federal policy. Although the problem of reducing welfare losses
from HE trading is a difficult one, policymakers have a number of
options short of shutting down markets. Part III briefly examines
three different possible approaches to reducing the social costs of
178 See supra notes 6-9.
179 See Hazen, supra note 81, at 7 (noting that the federal system eschews regulating
merits of securities on theory that investors are adequately protected by antifraud rules
and by the disclosure of information relevant to securities being sold); Hazen, supra note 6,
at 987 (noting that securities regulation based on premises that if investors are provided
with relevant information, they will make informed decisions and "there is no need to
protect a fool from his or her investment folly so long as no fraud.., is involved").
180 See Irwin Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 Am. Econ.
Rev. 212, 212 (1972) ("To much of the public, the stock market seems to be a legalized
gambling casino. To many economists, the stock market seems endowed with an almost
mystical degree of efficiency, even if what is meant by efficiency is not always clear.").
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stock speculation, and explores the advantages and disadvantages
of each in the context of the present regulatory scheme.
A. The Social Costs of HE Trading
The HE model of stock trading is in essence a model of specula-
tion-i.e., trading by rational actors who buy a commodity neither
to consume it nor to use it as an input in some productive process,
but in the hope of profiting by predicting price changes that permit
the speculator to resell at a better price. Economists who study
speculation usually assume in the tradition of neoclassical econom-
ics that speculative trades, like other voluntary exchanges, benefit
both the trading parties and society as a whole. 181 Debate over the
possible social costs of speculation therefore has focused on
whether speculators can destabilize prices."8 The HE model offers
181 Although lay commentators often condemn speculation, economists generally are
enthusiastic about speculative trading, believing it improves the welfare of the trading
parties and promotes accurate prices. Compare Posner, supra note 7, at 47-48 (stating that
speculation "performs a valuable economic function" by helping prices accurately reflect
conditions and allowing mutually beneficial trades between speculators and "hedging"
consumers) with Hazen, supra note 6, at 994 (noting history of "moral disdain" for
speculation). Speculative futures markets in commodities, for example, are believed to
allow mutually beneficial exchanges between risk-averse consumers who want to hedge
against price changes and speculators who are happy to bear that risk in return for trading
profits, thus contributing to more accurate commodities prices. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre
Danthine, Information, Futures Prices, and Stabilizing Speculation, 17 J. Econ. Theory 79,
93 (1978) (stating that futures markets may serve insurance function by allowing more risk-
averse hedgers to reallocate risks to more risk-neutral speculators and that speculation also
has "positive influence" by transmitting information to prices); Sanford J. Grossman, The
Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational
Externalities, 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 431,447 (1977) (noting that in addition to any insurance
benefits futures markets provide, speculation in such markets improves accuracy in prices
with attendant social gains).
HE theory offers an alternative interpretation of speculation by suggesting that under
some conditions-for example, the conditions prevailing in modem equities markets-the
supposed economic benefits of speculation are illusory, because speculative trades are
neither mutually beneficial nor likely to improve the accuracy of prices. See supra notes
29-30 and accompanying text (describing why HE trades do not on average benefit trading
parties); infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text (describing why HE trading may distort
market prices through false substitution and valuation effects).
182 See, e.g., Baumol, supra note 29, at 264 (describing how speculation can be seen as
destabilizing); Danthine, supra note 181, at 80 (proposing model in which speculators
stabilize prices); Hart & Kreps, supra note 12, at 928-29 (describing model in which
rational speculation increases price volatility); Stein, supra note 41, at 1124 (concluding
that regulators fear speculation is destabilizing, whereas economists tend to believe it has
stabilizing influence). See generally Repetti, supra note 12, at 602-03 (noting that
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new insight into the theory of speculation by suggesting two other
significant negative consequences of speculation. First, speculation
may lead to social welfare losses when speculators devote valuable
resources to transactions that do not, on average, improve their
welfare. Second, the hope of speculative profits may create false
substitution and false valuation effects that distort market prices
and create the risk of allocative inefficiency.
1. Welfare Losses Resulting From HE Traders' Mistaken
Investment in Active Portfolio Management
Speculative trading can lead to welfare losses because specula-
tion can be enormously costly to speculators themselves.*s3 Inves-
speculation is suspect as contributing to price volatility and that economic literature has
focused on that alleged harm). Milton Friedman set the tone for the debate when he
argued in defense of currency speculation that "[p]eople who argue that speculation is
generally destabilizing seldom realize that this is largely equivalent to saying that
speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general only if speculators
on average sell when the currency is low in price and buy when it is high." Milton
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 175 (1953). The HE model offers an interesting
insight into the debate by predicting that speculators may indeed lose money. See supra
notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing how stock traders can rationally play a
negative-sum game).
183 At least two factors may explain the economic literature's general failure to
recognize the cost of speculation to speculators. First, economists who model speculative
trading (whether in stock markets or elsewhere) tend to assume there are no transaction
costs associated with trading. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 181, at 447 (considering
normative value of speculative futures while noting that their analysis ignores transaction
costs). Second, the speculation literature has tended to ignore the role of heterogeneous
expectations in fostering speculation, often by assuming that speculators systematically
profit from assuming risks that other market participants (generally known as hedgers) pay
them to assume. Stein, supra note 41, at 1125 (noting that speculation literature tends "to
ignore the issue of heterogeneous information among market participants"); see also
Baumol, supra note 29, at 264 (noting that traditional economic analysis of profitable
speculation neglects possibility that skillful speculators are simply profiting at expense of
others). Theorists who do allow for investor heterogeneity rarely recognize the full
normative implications. See, e.g., Danthine, supra note 181, at 93 (suggesting that if
futures markets develop because speculators have differing beliefs, these markets exercise
"positive influence" by transmitting more information to prices); Grossman, supra note
181, at 447 (adopting model of futures markets in which futures markets develop because
traders have differing beliefs about future, while noting that such markets produce social
gains by providing "insurance" and price accuracy).
A notable exception can be found in Professor Hirshleifer's work, which clearly
recognizes the possibility of social losses from speculative trading. See generally
Hirshleifer, Value of Information, supra note 43 (developing model in which
heterogeneous expectations leads to social losses as speculators trade with each other);
Hirshleifer, supra note 12, at 240, 255, 288 (discussing and rejecting "insurance" model of
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tors who buy and sell in stocks in the statistically mistaken belief
that they can beat the market pay a hefty price for their optimism.
The most obvious expense associated with stock trading is broker
commissions." 4 Investors paid over $16 billion in broker commis-
sions in 1992 alone.185
Yet broker commissions account for just a part-and not even
the largest part-of the costs of HE trading. Investors who try to
beat the market incur a number of more hidden costs as well. For
example, investors who trade in the OTC market generally must
trade with dealers who act as principals to a trade by selling out of,
or adding to, their inventory of a particular stock. 186 Specialists
play a similar role on the exchanges, where they do business with
customers whose buy and sell orders cannot be matched against
another customer's.'87 Dealers and specialists make a living by
profiting from the spread between the "bid" price at which they
offer to buy and the higher "ask" price they demand from investors
wishing to buy out of their inventory. Spreads are more difficult to
detect than commissions because they are implicit in the price an
investor pays for a stock.""n Still, spreads are every bit as much a
cost of trading. 8 9
speculation in which speculators are less risk-averse than hedgers and suggesting that there
is more support for model in which speculators trade with other speculators due to
differing beliefs).
184 Brokers act as investors' agents by executing buy and sell orders either on an
exchange such as the NYSE or with a professional dealer on the OTC market. See Robert
A. Haugen, Modem Investment Theory 27, 31 (3d ed. 1993) (describing brokerage
process).
185 That figure includes commissions on corporate bonds. See SEC, 1993 Annual Report
134 tbl. 12.
186 See Haugen, supra note 184, at 31 (describing OTC trading).
187 See id. at 27 (describing specialists).
188 For example, Morningstar Mutual Funds, a private service that provides extensive
information on mutual funds' performance and expenses, reports brokers' fees paid by
mutual funds in trading but does not attempt to report portfolio value lost to dealer's
spreads. See Morningstar, Inc., User's Guide 21 (1994).
189 Another potential trading "cost" from the stock trader's perspective is "market
impact cost," the cost of having to make large trades at less-favorable prices because very
large sell orders depress market price and large buy orders inflate prices. See Market 2000
Report, supra note 6, at 22-23 (describing impact costs); Wagner, supra note 30, at 16
(same). Market impact costs reflect in part a downward-sloping demand function for
equities. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. From a social perspective,
because "losses" due to market impact costs benefit one trader at the expense of another,
they are wealth transfers rather than net social losses.
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Perhaps the most significant cost associated with speculative
trading is the cost of speculators' acquisition and analysis of the
information on which they base their differing expectations. Inves-
tors trying to predict which stocks or markets will do well invest
enormous time and effort gathering and digesting the vast quanti-
ties of information relevant to the futures of firms, industries, and
the market as a whole. Many investors also pay directly for infor-
mation and analysis by subscribing to newsletters, consulting
research analysts, or hiring professional portfolio managers and
investment advisors. Although the costs of research and analysis
are not, strictly speaking, trading costs, they are a cost of preparing
to trade.190
The administrative costs incurred in managing a portfolio of cor-
porate equities are a fourth type of cost associated with stock trad-
ing. Even the passive investor who hews to a buy-and-hold
strategy must spend some time and effort keeping and updating
records of securities owned and transactions executed. But the
investor who abandons buy-and-hold and adopts a trading strategy
can expect administrative costs to increase with trading.
Any estimate of the aggregate resources investors spend on spec-
ulative trading should consider all forms of cost, including commis-
sions, spreads, research and analysis, and portfolio administration.
Because individuals rarely have occasion to calculate the value of
the time and money they spend actively managing their portfolios,
comprehensive statistics on the costs of individuals' speculative
activities are unavailable. 9 But pension funds and mutual funds
190 See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 751 ("[Wo make an investment, [one] must incur
both search costs (including the cost of gathering information and evaluating it) and
transaction costs."); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 109 (noting costs of stock trading include "not
only the transactions costs but also much of the costs spent on acquiring information,
including . . . getting the information slightly earlier than it would otherwise become
available").
191 One dated but interesting pair of studies examined a sample of individual investors
who had maintained accounts over a seven-year period at a brokerage firm. In the first
study, individuals held their stocks for a median period of between 4 and 6.5 months,
earned 9.9% per annum on portfolios before transaction costs but only 5.5% after, and in
aggregate realized few, if any, excess returns from trading relative to a passive investment
strategy. See Gary G. Schlarbaum, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Ronald C. Lease, Realized
Returns on Common Stock Investments: The Experience of Individual Investors, 51 J. Bus.
299, 305-07, 321 (1978). In the second study, median investors spent between 3 and 5
hours per month managing portfolios of $40,000 in equities; the average investor in the
sample regarded herself, albeit weakly, as "substantially better informed than the average
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keep close track of their business expenses, and equity mutual
funds in particular publish extensive information on expenses
incurred in trying to beat the market. Because equity funds' turn-
over rates are roughly similar to overall market turnover rates, 192
their expense reports provide a ballpark estimate of investors'
aggregate research and trading costs.
Morningstar Mutual Funds193 reports that equity mutual funds
spend an average of 0.31% of their assets annually on broker com-
missions.194 That figure does not include dealer and specialist
spreads, which are difficult to detect because they are incorpo-
rated into the prices investors pay for securities. 5 But if spread
costs amount to even one-third of commission costs, 196 investors
who buy shares in actively managed stock mutual funds are spend-
ing more than 0.4% of the value of their portfolios each year on
investor." Lease et al., supra note 67, at 428, 430, 431. Unfortunately, because these
studies examined trading behavior at a time when trading costs were much higher and
trading volume much lower than they are today, their value in explaining modern market
behavior is limited.
192 Compare supra note 163 and accompanying text (describing average 75% mutual
fund turnover and 52% to 63% annual pension fund turnover) with supra note 170 and
accompanying text (describing 55% annual market turnover); see also Kiefer, supra note
10, at 6-7 (reporting turnover rates of pension funds, mutual funds, life insurance
companies and NYSE from 1955 through 1987 and concluding institutions' turnover
roughly equals market's).
193 Momingstar Mutual Funds is a private advisory service that provides a looseleaf
service describing the trading philosophies, patterns, and expenses of over 1,000 mutual
funds. See, e.g., Morningstar, Inc., Morningstar Mutual Funds, Apr. 15, 1994, (discussing
variety of data on funds).
194 Russ Wiles, Funds' Trading Costs Are Low, The Ariz. Republic, Sept. 13, 1993, at E2
(citing Morningstar report that average stock mutual fund pays 0.31% annually in
brokerage commissions).
195 See, e.g., Morningstar, Inc., supra note 188, at 21 (noting that service does not
publish information on losses due to dealer spreads, so true trading costs are understated).
196 This highly conservative estimate is based on a recent study that found securities
firms' revenues from equities spreads are approximately one-third of their earnings from
commissions. See Stoll, supra note 57, at 9 tbl. 1 (noting that in 1990, securities firms
reported $8.555 billion in commissions and $2.775 billion in trading gains). The estimate is
conservative because the study excluded gains on firms' own investment accounts from the
category "trading gains." Id. at 7. Because gains on investment accounts support the
securities industry and come at the expense of other traders, they may be better
categorized as a cost of trading to outside investors. If so, the revenue data suggest that
investors lose more money to spreads than they do to commissions. See New York Stock
Exchange, supra note 31, at 92 (noting that in 1992 NYSE-member firms reported $11.6
billion in revenues from securities commissions and $16.8 billion in revenues from all
trading and investment gains).
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commissions and spreads.197 Moreover, commissions and spreads
account for only a minor portion of the costs institutions suffer try-
ing to beat the market. Actively managed mutual funds invest sub-
stantial time and effort in researching and analyzing stocks and
markets, as well as in administering their portfolios. Many funds
retain extensive staffs of professional analysts and portfolio manag-
ers; others hire outside advisors and managers; some do both.
According to Morningstar, stock mutual funds spend an average of
1.42% of their assets annually on operating, management, and
advisory fees and expenses. 198 That figure excludes (and signifi-
cantly exceeds) the costs of commissions and spreads. 199 When
commissions and spreads are factored in, it appears that investors
who buy shares in actively managed stock mutual funds lose more
than 1.8% of their assets each year in their quest to outperform the
market.200
An annual cost of 1.8% of an investor's portfolio may seem a
modest expense. When applied to the entire market portfolio,
however, it becomes enormous. The market value of outstanding
U.S. equities in 1992 amounted to $5.541 trillion.20 1 If mutual
funds' expenses are typical, investors spent $100 billion on stock
197 Investors in the aggregate probably lose more to commissions and spreads than do
mutual funds. A recent study of securities firm revenues concluded that investors in the
aggregate lost at least 0.5% of the value of the market portfolio to commissions and
spreads between 1980 and 1990. See Stoll, supra note 57, at 7, 10 (describing annual 0.5%
loss based on securities firm revenues and noting that estimate conservatively excludes
firm profits from trading on investment accounts)
198 Morningstar, Inc., 22 Morningstar Mutual Funds, Apr. 15, 1994, at 7 (noting 1.42%
expense ratio).
199 See Morningstar, Inc., supra note 188, at 27 (noting that expense ratios reflect
percentage of assets annually lost to operating expenses, management fees, and
administrative fees, but do not include losses from commissions and spreads).
200 See The Vanguard Group of Inv. Cos., Plain Talk About Index Investing 2 (1994)
(estimating that the average equity fund has an expense ratio of 1.3% of investor assets
and loses another 0.5% to 1.0% annually to trading costs).
Indeed, investors who buy stock through equity mutual funds can lose far more. Many
equity funds charge investors up-front "loads" to get into the fund, and back-end
"redemption fees" to get out of the fund. Morningstar, Inc., supra note 188, at 18. The
highly rated Fidelity Magellan fund, for example, demands a three percent "load."
Morningstar, Inc., 22 Morningstar Mutual Funds, March 18, 1994, at 154. Such charges can
significantly erode returns from investing in mutual funds, especially if shares are held for a
short time, and thus are a cost not included in the 1.8% estimate.
201 New York Stock Exchange, supra note 31, at 89.
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trading in 1992 alone.2° One hundred billion dollars annually is an
amount that commands respect under any circumstances. The sig-
nificance of that figure may be better appreciated by comparing
investors' annual expenditures on stock trading with their aggre-
gate returns from stock ownership. From 1926 to 1985, the stocks
in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index yielded average annual real
returns of 8.8%.203 If investors spent 1.8% of their portfolios on
trading each year, stock trading reduced investors' annual returns
from stock ownership by twenty percent.2°4 And compounding
magnifies the effects of reduced returns. An individual who began
at age twenty-five to invest $4,000 annually in an actively-managed
stock portfolio that produced a seven percent annual compounded
return could retire at age sixty-five with a nest egg of $854,438. If a
passive investment strategy increased her annual return to 8.8%,
she could retire with $1,393,864-a nearly sixty percent increase in
value.
The notion that investors are losing such huge amounts picking
and trading stocks may at first be hard to swallow.2 5 Nevertheless,
the actual cost may be much higher. Institutions are the securities
industry's preferred customers and generally pay low commissions
on their trades.2 °6 Mutual funds with their vast portfolios also
enjoy a relative advantage in researching and analyzing stocks-it
202 1.8% of a portfolio of $5.541 trillion is $99.7 billion.
203 Brealey & Myers, supra note 13, at 129-131.
204 Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 83-84 (estimating that trading costs, measured in
terms of commissions and spreads, accounted for 18% of corporate earnings in 1987).
205 Other scholars who have examined trading costs have made similar estimates. See,
e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 82 (estimating that in mid-1980s, trading costs from
spreads and commissions amounted to one percent of total value of equities market, not
including research and portfolio administration costs); Stoll, supra note 57, at 10, 12
(finding from revenue data that investors lose 0.5% of value of market portfolio annually
to trading costs, and speculating that research and management costs would raise that
figure above 1%); Summers & Summers, supra note 8, at 271 (estimating $75 billion in
trading costs in 1987).
Data on securities firm revenues also support the idea that investor losses due to
speculative trading rise to this order of magnitude. For example, in 1992, NYSE-member
firms alone enjoyed $63 billion in revenues. New York Stock Exchange, supra note 31, at
92 (including $12 billion in commissions, $17 billion in trading and investments, $3 billion
in interest on customer's debts, $3 billion on mutual fund sales, and $18 billion in other
income, including fees for investment advice and counsel, service charges, and dividends
and interest on investments). Those revenues exclude the earnings of pension funds,
mutual funds, non-NYSE firms, investment advisors, and the financial press.
206 See Wiles, supra note 194.
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takes no more effort to value 100,000 shares of General Motors
than it takes to value 100 shares. Similar economies of scale reduce
institutions' administrative expenses relative to the values of their
portfolios. Mutual funds' expense ratios consequently may provide
a conservative estimate of the aggregate costs of stock trading.2°7
Of course, not all stock trades are based on disagreement. Some
portion of stock trading can be attributed to investors who are
seeking liquidity, balanced portfolios, or tax benefits, rather than
trying to beat the market. Such nonmistaken traders need brokers
and dealers just as the HE traders do. They also need to adminis-
ter their portfolios and to gather information when setting the
prices at which they buy and sell. Thus, some portion of aggregate
trading costs can be attributed to value-adding trading. The evi-
dence reviewed in Part II suggests, however, that value-adding
transactions account for only a fraction of the trading-and a frac-
tion of the costs incurred-in today's markets. Even under the
highly conservative assumption that HE trading is responsible for
only half of investors' annual trading costs, investors are squander-
ing $50 billion or so annually on transactions that bring them, on
average, no benefit.2 °8
Where does that $50 billion or more go? Much of it goes to sala-
ries, including the salaries of nearly 500,000 securities and com-
modities brokerage firm employees, 20 9 over 200,000 investment
207 Compare supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting that funds lose 0.4% of
portfolio annually to commissions and spreads) with supra note 205 (giving conservative
estimate that investors in the aggregate pay 0.5% annually in commissions and spreads)
and supra note 200 (noting 1.8% figure excludes significant investor losses from mutual
fund front- and back-end loads and fees).
208 Evidence that eliminating speculative trading would greatly reduce investors' annual
losses can be found by comparing the overall performance of stock index funds that do not
trade speculatively with the performance of actively managed funds that do. See The
Vanguard Group of Inv. Cos., supra note 199, at 2 (estimating that average equity fund has
expense ratio of 1.3% of investor assets and loses another 0.5% to 1.0% annually to
trading costs whereas Vanguard Index Fund loses only 0.3% of assets to such expenses);
Wagner, supra note 30, at 17 (estimating that managed funds underperform index funds by
1.0 to 1.5% annually, presumably due to greater trading costs).
209 1993 Statistical Abstract, supra note 2, at 421 tbl. 662 (estimating that there are
438,000 employed by securities and commodities brokers in 1992, up from 425,000 in 1990
and 227,000 in 1980); see also New York Stock Exchange, supra note 31, at 94 (estimating
478,000 employed in securities industry in 1993, up from 447,100 in 1992).
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and holding company employees,210 and 20,000 registered invest-
ment advisors.21' Investors also pay for the offices, communica-
tions equipment, and computer systems used by brokerage houses,
pension and mutual fund companies, and exchanges. Another part
of traders' money goes to services that analyze and report on com-
panies, industries, and the economy, from private newsletters such
as Value Line and Morningstar Mutual Funds to glossy magazines
like Fortune and Forbes. In short, the money goes to support the
industry colloquially known as "Wall Street," as well as the myriad
derivative enterprises that follow and feed on it.2"2
Paying people to act as brokers, dealers, analysts, fund manag-
ers, and business reporters does, of course, create jobs, but so does
paying people to dig ditches and then fill them in again.21 3 If no
one benefits from digging and refilling ditches, paying someone to
perform this task rather than to engage in a more useful activity is
a waste of resources. Similarly, if most of the hopeful investors
who buy and resell more than half of all outstanding corporate
equities each year ultimately fail to meet their objective of beating
the market's return, a good portion of the $100 billion that they
spend maintaining an active and thriving secondary market also is
wasted.
2. Welfare Losses from HE Trading's Distortive Effects
on Stock Prices
The discussion thus far has focused on the likelihood that, in a
world of imperfect information, investors' rational but mistaken
210 1993 Statistical Abstract, supra note 2, at 421 tbl. 662 (estimating 233,000 employed
by holding and other investment offices in 1992, up from 222,000 in 1990 and 115,000 in
1980).
211 SEC, supra note 185, at 38 (estimating 20,000 registered investment advisors in 1993,
up from 18,000 in 1992).
212 Cf. Robert Lenzner & William Heuslein, The Age of Digital Capitalism, Forbes,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 62, 64 (noting that Wall Street has gone from absorbing 0.5% of Gross
Domestic Product a decade ago to absorbing 1% today).
213 Nobel laureate James Tobin made this point when he suggested:
[W]e are throwing more and more of our resources, including the cream of our
youth, into financial activities remote from the production of goods and services,
into activities that generate high private rewards disproportionate to their social
productivity. I suspect that the immense power of the computer is being harnessed
to this "paper economy," not to do the same transactions more economically but to
balloon the quantity and variety of financial exchanges.
Tobin, supra note 10, at 14-15.
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belief that they can profit by speculating in corporate equities leads
them to dissipate substantial wealth researching and trading stocks.
HE theory suggests that the mirage of trading profits also may
impose a second, hitherto unrecognized, form of social cost. That
cost arises from speculation's capacity to distort aggregate investor
demand for stocks in a fashion that may lead investors to invest too
little or too much in corporate equities.
The opportunity to speculate distorts investor demand for stocks
because investors who trade hoping to beat the market perceive ex
ante opportunities for profit that do not, on average, actually exist.
The illusion of potential gain can cause investors to purchase less
corporate equity than they would otherwise purchase because a
"false substitution" effect leads them to choose instead to invest a
portion of their assets in research and trading. This effect is
dubbed a false substitution effect because it causes investors to
regard buy-and-hold and active trading as substitute strategies for
making money in stocks, and therefore erroneously to invest
resources in trading when they might otherwise use those resources
to purchase more shares.214 Thus, the investors who spend fifty bil-
lion dollars or more annually on researching and trading equities
on the secondary markets might instead use that fifty billion dollars
to purchase more stocks but for their mistaken belief that they will
gain from trading.
The HE model also suggests, however, that the false substitution
effect may be countered by a second distortive effect. Investors
who believe that they can outperform the market by trading may
put more money into stocks than they would otherwise, because
they mistakenly perceive that they can increase their returns on
equity ownership by trading. This contrary effect may be termed a
"false valuation" effect, as speculators' erroneous belief that they
can earn higher rates of return on their stock portfolios by trading
leads them to value stocks more highly. False valuation effects
offer an explanation for the puzzling historical phenomenon of
speculative "bubbles," where asset prices rose far above reasonable
estimates of value before the bubble burst and prices returned to
214 Cf. Evan Schulman, The Revolution in Securities Trading, in Association for Inv.
Management & Res., supra note 29, at 10, 12 (suggesting that trading in stock options
"represents business lost to the primary stock markets").
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normal ranges.215 During the famous seventeenth-century Tulip
Bubble, for example, Dutch collectors speculating in tulip bulbs
supposedly drove prices up twenty-fold in a single month (followed
by an even greater decline in the following month) 1 6 HE theory
counsels that such peculiar phenomena may be a consequence of
adding, and then subtracting, large numbers of optimistic specula-
tors laboring under a false valuation effect to markets previously
composed mainly of consumers217
Because the false substitution and false valuation have counter-
vailing effects, it is impossible to judge a priori whether speculative
secondary market trading causes investors to invest too little or too
much in stocks. But unless the two effects exactly offset each
other, HE theory suggests that speculative trading distorts investor
demand for corporate equities. 18 This distortive effect is different
from the inevitable fundamental value inefficiencies that arise in a
market where prices reflect the aggregate demand of many inves-
tors with limited and differing information.21 9 The false substitu-
tion and false valuation effects reflect the possibility that rational
investors working on imperfect information can make mistakes not
only about stocks' fundamental values, but also about the likely
returns from trading vis-d-vis a buy-and-hold strategy. The latter
error leads the self-selected, optimistic subset of investors who
speculate in stocks persistently either to overinvest or underinvest
in equities.
215 See Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 34-50 (5th ed. 1990)
(discussing "bubbles").
216 Id. at 35-38.
217 Although the stock markets have had their share of bullish bubbles, see 1 Loss &
Seligman, supra note 16, at 3-5, generational effects are likely to ensure that speculators
are always present in some proportion in the market, so that false substitution and
valuation effects are likely to be chronic. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
218 That the false substitution and false valuation effects counteract suggests that HE
trading in stock markets may present an example of "the theory of second best"-i.e., an
example of two market failures that work against each other so that eliminating one source
of failure while allowing the other to persist would actually leave society worse off. See
R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud.
11 (1956-1957).
219 See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text. In particular, although nonmistaken
traders and HE traders alike suffer ignorance of stock values, only the latter group suffer
false substitution and false valuation effects because only the latter mistakenly perceive
opportunities to profit from speculative trading.
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From a social perspective, whether the false substitution and
false valuation effects are cause for concern depends in large part
on the social role stock prices play in allocating real resources.
Commentators frequently assert that stock prices that accurately
reflect stocks' fundamental economic values are essential to ensure
the efficient allocation of investment capital and other resources 220
Stock markets are described as "mechanism[s] for channeling
resources to their most productive uses in the economy"'" and
"signaling" devices "important to economy-wide allocational effi-
ciency. '2" 2 Most commonly, stock market prices are believed to
determine how investment capital is allocated among firms.223
Accurate stock prices are thought to ensure that well-managed,
promising corporations can raise capital easily by selling their
shares at high prices whereas troubled businesses will find it harder
to attract investors' dollars. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that
stock prices act as signals of a firm's economic health in the mar-
kets for managers and for corporate control.224
220 See Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 Va. L. Rev. 135, 170 (1984) (stating that stock
market prices are "important to economy-wide allocational efficiency and impact[ ] on all
producers"); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 889 (asserting that efficient prices are important
because they are "signals which provide information that is basic to virtually all aspects of
saving and investment"); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 107-08 (describing information signaling
function of market); Stout, supra note 23, at 615-16 (stating that it is a "fundamental
premise" of securities culture that accurate stock prices are desirable because they
"influence the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services in the
economy"); cf. Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and
Public Policy Analysis, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 191, 237 (1988) ("[P]rice limits and trading
halts may impair the ability of the stock market to allocate capital resources efficiently to
those firms who will use them in the most productive fashion.").
221 Kiefer, supra note 6, at 896.
222 Banoff, supra note 220, at 170.
223 See Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 107-09 (noting that commentators frequently argue that
stock prices are central to the allocation of investment capital); Stout, supra note 23, at 642,
643 n.167 (citing authorities claiming that capital allocation is markets' "most important"
function); see also Wflliam J. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency 4 (1965)
(stating that the stock market is the "allocator of capital resources par excellence"); Kahan,
supra note 104, at 1010 ("[I]naccurate stock prices may lead to significant misallocations of
capital. Companies whose stock is overvalued may raise too much equity and overinvest.
On the other hand, companies whose stock is undervalued may find it costly or
impracticable to obtain sufficient capital from alternative sources, and thus underinvest.").
224 See Kahan, supra note 104, at 1028-29, 1035-37 (suggesting that prices influence
selection and compensation of managers as well as choice of takeover targets); Stout, supra
note 23, at 678, 685-86 (same).
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If this view is correct, wholesale distortions in stock prices due to
false valuation and false substitution effects pose a serious social
problem. The notion that stock market prices play a significant
role in allocating capital and other resources is, however, contro-
versial. 25 The possible economic irrelevance of stock market
prices was dramatically highlighted on October 19, 1987, when the
Dow Jones average plunged twenty-three percent in a single day's
trading with no noticeable effect on the economy.226 Assuming
some connection, however, stock mispricing seems most likely to
lead to allocative inefficiency in two situations: when mispricing
persists over large periods of time2 7 and when mispricing filters
down to the primary market for new corporate issues.2 8
Short-lived distortions in stock prices are unlikely to have signifi-
cant allocative effects because economic decisions influenced by
share price, such as a firm's decision to replace its management
team, normally are made over periods of months or years. 2 9
Chronic price distortions, however, can affect such choices.
Because the false valuation and false substitution effects of HE
trading are persistent,230 they may pose a significant risk of
resource misallocation.
Stock mispricing also may have a direct misallocative effect when
mispricing occurs in the primary markets where corporations raise
investment capital. This is because, whereas secondary market
transactions only redistribute existing wealth among investors, pri-
225 1 have argued elsewhere at length that the securities culture's emphasis on enhancing
stock market efficiency, especially in the short run, is misguided because secondary stock
prices have only tangential effects on real resource allocation. See Stout, supra note 23.
226 See Paul Farhi, Dire Forecasts Never Came to Pass, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1988, at Fl
(reporting that crash had had little effect on economy); Karen Pennar, It's Almost as if It
Never Happened-Almost, Bus. Wk., Apr. 18, 1988, at 56 (reporting that six months after
October 19, 1987, market crash had little effect on macroeconomy).
2=7 See Stout, supra note 23, at 656 n.223 (arguing that persistent distortions may lead to
mispricing of new issues).
228 See Stout, supra note 23, at 708 (arguing that in contrast to trading market prices,
issues prices do affect the allocation of capital).
229 For example, a firm will not try to finance a project through the sale of "overvalued"
stock unless it believes overpricing will continue for some time because preparing an
offering can take months, and during that time the issuer faces the risk that the offering
price will change. See id. at 666 n.272 (asserting that only persistent mispricing will
influence decisions to issue stock).
230 See supra note 217 (noting that false substitution and false valuation effects will
likely be chronic).
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mary market prices can determine which firms receive capital to
invest and how much.231 The false substitution and false valuation
effects associated with HE trading are likely to have a direct distor-
tive effect on new issues prices. Investors who purchase newly
issued shares usually can speculate in those shares in the secondary
markets immediately after issuance, leading them to systematically
undervalue or overvalue new issues just as they undervalue or
overvalue outstanding issues. Thus, to the extent that new issues
prices influence the allocation of capital among firms,232 the false
substitution and false valuation effects associated with E trading
pose a further risk of misallocation.
The ambiguous connection between stock prices and real
resource allocation makes the magnitude of any welfare losses
from false substitution and false valuation effects uncertain. But
whatever their magnitude, losses due to E tradings' distortive
effects on prices are just as much a social cost of speculation as the
losses arising from investors' mistaken devotion of scarce resources
to the negative-sum game of stock-picking and trading." 3
B. The Social Benefits of HE Trading
Speculative stock trading clearly is costly to both stock traders
and society as a whole. Yet from an economic perspective, specula-
tive trading may still be desirable if it provides external social ben-
efits exceeding its costs to traders and society. Commentators
frequently assert that speculative trading does provide social bene-
231 Kahan, supra note 104, at 1008; Stout, supra note 23, at 642-44.
232 Corporations generally satisfy more than 95% of their capital needs with retained
earnings or debt financing, neither of which are significantly affected by share price. See
Stout, supra note 23, at 647 (noting that between 1973 and 1982, net stock issues provided
an annual average of only 2.1% of corporate funding). Thus mispricing new issues may
affect the allocation of capital only to those firms unable or unwilling to avail themselves of
the usual sources of funding. See Kahan, supra note 104, at 1009 (suggesting that stock
price may influence capital allocation when corporation does not have access to usual
sources of funding). The fact that most firms can raise investment capital from other
sources thus suggests that stock price inaccuracies, including inaccuracies due to HE
trading's false substitution and valuation effects, may not necessarily lead to significant
welfare losses from capital misallocation.
233 The possibility that speculation can distort asset prices by inflating perceptions of the
potential returns from owning and trading an asset also may be of relevance to other
markets, such as currency and commodity markets, where asset prices have clearer
allocative consequences. See infra notes 313-35 and accompanying text (exploring HE
theory's implications for other markets).
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fits beyond any benefit to trading parties by increasing both the
liquidity234 and the efficiency235 of modem stock markets. Careful
analysis reveals, however, that the marginal liquidity and efficiency
contributions of HE trading in today's high-volume markets are
likely to be significantly outweighed by their marginal costs.
1. HE Trading and Market Liquidity
"Liquidity" refers to an investor's ability to sell an asset quickly
without having to offer a discount from the prevailing market
price.3 6 High-volume stock markets with large numbers of traders
and high levels of trading are said to be liquid because in such mar-
kets there is a high likelihood that a seller can find a prospective
buyer (and vice versa).237 Conversely, in a "thin" or "illiquid" mar-
ket with little turnover, the shareholder who wants to convert her
investment into cash may either have to wait for a buyer to appear
or sell at a below-market price to a professional dealer who makes
a living providing liquidity to those willing to pay her bid-ask
spread.3 18
Speculative trading can contribute to market liquidity by increas-
ing both the number of traders and the frequency of trading in the
market. Liquid secondary markets, in turn, are thought to provide
a social benefit by encouraging capital investment. Because inves-
tors desire liquidity, they value assets that can be quickly resold
more highly than assets that are difficult to convert into cash. The
promise of a liquid secondary market is thought to encourage
234 See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 6, at 1005 ("[S]peculators provide additional liquidity in
the markets."); see also Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 10 (stating that reducing trading
volume harms liquidity); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888 (suggesting the same).
235 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 445 ("[S]peculation serves the salutary purpose of
enabling the rapid adjustment of prices to current values."); Repetti, supra note 12, at 621
(arguing that investors looking for mispriced securities bid up prices of undervalued stocks
and sell overpriced stocks, moving prices toward fundamental value); see also Schwert &
Seguin, supra note 8, at 8 ("[M]ost economists take as canon the belief that an increase in
the efficiency of a financial market is valuable."); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888-89 ("[O]ne of
the most basic objectives of the financial markets is determining the 'correct' prices of
securities, or, in economic terminology, determining efficient prices.").
236 See Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888.
23 See id. (stating that reducing trading volume harms liquidity); see also Schwert &
Seguin, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that transfer tax that reduces trading harms liquidity).
238 See supra note 144.
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investors to purchase newly issued stocks, lowering firms' cost of
capital. 39
Although the liquidity benefits claim has merit, a number of
scholars have criticized the prevailing enthusiasm for highly liquid
stock markets for ignoring the costs associated with such mar-
kets.24 The first and most obvious cost associated with promoting
liquidity by encouraging speculative trading is the cost of specula-
tion itself, especially the cost of the resources squandered by inves-
tors on researching and trading. The second and more subtle cost
arises from the possibility that liquid secondary markets encourage
investor "short-termism" that deters shareholders from taking an
active role in monitoring their firms' managers. 241
As noted earlier, investors spend $100 billion or more annually
researching and trading stocks in the secondary markets.242 Any
239 See Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888 (arguing that investors desire liquidity and thus value
liquid assets more highly); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 108-10 (describing argument that
liquidity encourages investors to buy stocks, including newly issued shares).
This argument implicitly presumes that new issues sales are worth fostering because,
unlike mistaken HE trades, such transactions are mutually beneficial ex post-
corporations get capital for investment, while investors gain a return on savings they might
otherwise put under a mattress. Secondary market trades motivated by investors' liquidity,
portfolio-balancing, or tax concerns may also be mutually beneficial. See supra Part II.A
(discussing nonmistaken trading). Thus the liquidity added by speculating HE traders may
provide a second social benefit by lowering the costs of nonspeculators' trades.
Speculative transactions appear to far outnumber nonspeculative trades, however. See
supra Part ll.B. It would make little sense to pay commissions, spreads, and research costs
on 10 speculative trades just to lower costs on one nonspeculative trade.
m0 See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 81-87; Stiglitz, supra note 9; Summers &
Summers, supra note 8.
241 A third cost that some observers associate with highly liquid markets is an increase in
stock price volatility that discourages investors from putting their money into stocks,
including newly issued shares. See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 10 (noting that some
argue that taxes that reduce volatility will increase value of stocks); see also Stiglitz, supra
note 9, at 108, 110-12 (arguing that less trading will lead to less volatility, making it easier
for firms to raise capital). The relationship between trading and volatility is unclear,
however. Kiefer, supra note 6, at 890 (stating that empirical evidence suggests that transfer
tax that reduces trading "would not affect volatility one way or the other"); Repetti, supra
note 12, at 595 ("[S]tudies are inconclusive as to whether speculating increases or decreases
stock market volatility."). Moreover, because new information naturally leads to changes
in stock prices, it is unclear why "stable" markets are inherently better than "unstable"
markets. See Hart & Kreps, supra note 12, at 930 ("[W]hether or not speculation stabilizes
prices is in some sense the wrong question. One really ought to be interested in the
welfare implications of speculation. One may feel intuitively that price stabilization is
'good', but, if so, one's intuition is faulty." (citation omitted)).
242 Supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?
defense of secondary market trading premised on its supposed
liquidity benefits necessarily presumes that liquidity that helps cor-
porations sell new issues is worth at least that amount. The injudi-
ciousness of that presuniption, however, is revealed when one
considers that the annual costs of secondary market trading likely
equal or exceed the total amount of capital that firms raise from
new issues in the first place.243 In the five-year period from 1988
through 1992, U.S. firms underwrote an annual average of only $40
billion in common stock issues.244 Even 1992, a banner year for
new issues, saw only $72 billion in common and $29 billion in pre-
ferred stock issues.245 Spending $100 billion to promote an
equivalent amount of capital investment makes little sense, espe-
cially when most firms can raise investment funds from other
sources.
2 4 6
If the primary purpose of secondary stock markets is to
encourage capital investment, society might be just as well off with-
out secondary markets. But we need not choose between a highly
speculative secondary market that provides liquidity but costs $100
billion annually and no secondary market at all. Even if eliminat-
ing all HE trading reduced today's $3 trillion trading market by an
order of magnitude, the remaining $300 billion market surely
would be large enough to provide reasonable liquidity for most
investors.247
243 See Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 80 ("[T]he value of [new stock] issues is roughly
matched by the cost of trading the old ones."); Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 109 (noting that
although secondary market is thought to encourage new equity issues, "it seems to do so
little of this at such great cost.").
244 Securities Indus. Ass'n, supra note 24, at 947.
245 Id.
246 See supra note 232 (noting that most corporations prefer to rely on nonequity
sources to finance investment, including debt and retained earnings).
247 See Kiefer, supra note 6, at 888 (suggesting that U.S. financial markets, including
markets for stocks of major corporations, are so highly liquid that a transfer tax that
discouraged trading would have inconsequential effect on liquidity); Stiglitz, supra note 9,
at 109 (suggesting that for widely traded stocks, transfer tax that discourages trading
unlikely to have significant effect on liquidity).
Of course, for relatively small and unknown firms, a significant decrease in HE trading
might require investors to seek liquidity from professional dealers rather than from other
traders, as investors in very small firms do today. Even in such a case, however, the cost of
purchasing liquidity from a dealer should be limited to the reasonable costs of storage and
risk bearing. See supra note 144.
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As noted earlier, during the 1960s and early 1970s fixed broker
commissions, together with federal and New York state stock
transfer taxes, ensured that traders paid far higher costs than they
do today.248 Not surprisingly, share turnover on the NYSE during
that period was much lower, averaging only about ten to twenty
percent annually.249 Yet the new issues markets of the late 1960s
and early 1970s were viewed as "hot" markets.150 The liquidity
benefits defense of speculative trading suffers from the erroneous
assumption that if some liquidity is good, more is better."1
Although speculative HE trading adds liquidity to an already liquid
market, it adds very little, and at great expense. From an economic
perspective, trying to promote liquid markets by encouraging
investors to trade on their differing expectations seems a bad
bargain.
The social costs of building liquidity by encouraging speculative
trading may be even greater if, as some scholars have charged, liq-
uid markets encourage shareholder "short-termism." A funda-
mental problem of modem corporate life is the separation of
ownership (held by the firm's shareholders) and control (held by
the board of directors and top management),252 The separation of
ownership and control creates opportunities for managers to use
their powers to pursue their own interests and feather their own
nests at the expense of the company and its shareholders. Share-
holders can reduce the likelihood of such inefficient behavior by
closely monitoring their managers and replacing those who seem
lazy or venal. The critics of highly liquid, high-turnover stock mar-
kets charge, however, that even very large shareholders, such as
24 Supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
249 Supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
250 See David L. Ratner & Thomas L. Hazen, Securities Regulation 875 (4th ed. 1991);
David Clurman, Controlling A Hot Issue Market, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 74 (1970); see also
John Brooks, The Go-Go Years (1973) (referring to the 1960s as "go-go" years for primary
and secondary stock markets).
2s As Professor Louis Lowenstein has observed, "Liquidity is a good thing, but we are
drowning in it." Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 81.
252 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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pension funds and mutual funds, are unlikely to ride herd on man-
agement if they expect to hold their shares for only a short time.5 3
HE theory supports the claim that speculation encourages short-
termism by suggesting that short-termism may be another false
substitution effect. Investors who regard short-term, speculative
trading and long-term, involved ownership as substitute strategies
for increasing their returns from stocks may mistakenly select the
former approach over the latter5 4 The siren song of trading prof-
its may distract shareholders from monitoring shirking managers.
As a practical matter, the magnitude of any social losses resulting
from investors' mistaken preference for short-term trading over
long-term involvement is uncertain. Even in the absence of specu-
lation, freerider effects and a host of other institutional and legal
restraints would likely discourage even very large shareholders
from becoming too actively involved in their firm's affairs.355 Nev-
ertheless, the lure of speculative profits almost certainly increases
investor unwillingness to spend much time or effort policing
management.
In sum, the problems of excessive trading costs and investor
short-termism caution against an excessive emphasis on the bene-
253 See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 10, at 91-92 (suggesting that ability to sell shares
quickly discourages investors from monitoring management, thereby harming firms'
economic performance); see also Summers & Summers, supra note 8, at 273-74 (suggesting
that transaction tax might encourage investors to monitor management rather than exit).
Another variant of short-termism addresses the possibility that investors' emphasis on
short-run trading profits leads corporate managers to focus myopically on boosting near-
term earnings and prospects, while sacrificing investment strategies designed to enhance
firms' long-run profitability. See, e.g., Kiefer, supra note 6, at 893 (noting short-termism
argument). Economists have criticized such claims on the grounds that as long as investors
rationally value stocks according to their likely future risks and returns, any management
sacrifice of long-run profitability will be recognized and will depress market prices.
Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 8-9 (criticizing management myopia argument that
short investor holding periods induce managers to act myopically because it assumes that
long-run strategies are not reflected in market prices and is thus inconsistent with market
efficiency); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 893-95 ("[T]he 'short-termism' argument depends on
the belief that the stock market systematically undervalues companies that pursue long-
term investment projects .... This belief does not seem to be supported by the
evidence.").
254 See Summers & Summers, supra note 8, at 273-74 (implying that ability to sell
quickly in liquid market tempts investors to substitute "exit" strategy over "voice").
255 Id. at 274; see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
520 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991).
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fits of liquid markets without careful assessment of their costs. As
John Maynard Keynes observed, scholars of finance have made a
"fetish" of liquidity, assuming that more is always better than less
and that more liquid secondary markets are desirable no matter
what costs may be associated with them. 6 Closer analysis sug-
gests that the additional liquidity offered by HE trading carries a
higher price than it is worth.
2. HE Trading and the Fundamental Value Efficiency
of the Market
A second social benefit often attributed to speculative stock
trading is an increase in market efficiency, meaning the rapidity
and accuracy with which stock prices respond to new informa-
tion. 7 Economists and securities scholars often pay homage to
the purported social benefits of efficient stock prices in ensuring
the correct allocation of capital and other scarce resources.358
Once again, however, any defense of speculation premised on its
benefits for market efficiency must address the question whether
those benefits are worth their costs at the margin.
The assumption that speculative trades are important in incorpo-
rating new information into stock prices overlooks the likelihood
that speculation is unnecessary for such a process to occur. Even if
there were no HE trading, investors would still buy and sell stocks
for liquidity and portfolio-balancing reasons; presumably, they
would still seek out and take into account all reasonably available
information when setting prices. An analogy might be drawn to
the market for single-family homes. High transaction costs ensure
that speculators play little or no part in the market for single-family
residences, where turnover is low and owners buy and sell primar-
ily for consumption-i.e., to have a place to live.2 9 Yet casual
observation suggests that home buyers and sellers pay close atten-
tion to information relevant to values when setting the prices at
256 Keynes, supra note 10, at 155 ("Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is
more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity .... ").
257 See supra notes 13, 235 and accompanying text.
258 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 8 ("[M]ost economists take as canon the
belief that an increase in the efficiency of a financial market is valuable."); see, e.g., Kiefer,
supra note 6, at 888-89 (asserting that basic objective of financial markets is determining
correct, efficient prices).
259 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
1995] Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 689
which they buy or sell. Similarly, in a stock market of investors
trading primarily for liquidity, tax breaks, or a balanced portfolio,
rational investors will choose prices that reflect all reasonably
available information relevant to stock values.
Consequently, the argument that speculative trading furthers
stock market efficiency must hinge on the notion that speculators
greatly improve the efficiency of prices at the margin, both because
the hope of trading profits inspires them to seek out new informa-
tion and because increasing trading volume helps move prices in
the direction suggested by new information more quickly. At the
margin, however, improvements in market efficiency due to specu-
lative trades are likely to be small. Most information that specula-
tors acquire and incorporate into price (such as news of a takeover
bid or a change in earnings) is destined to become widely known in
due course anyway. The social benefits of incorporating that news
into prices only days or hours earlier seem minimal 6° This is espe-
cially true given the likelihood that any resulting improvement in
accuracy will likely be confined to secondary market prices, offer-
ing only negligible benefits due to improved resource allocation.2 61
2M See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 682 (arguing that moving information
into stock prices "a day or so quicker is not of much moment for allocative efficiency");
Kiefer, supra note 6, at 896 ("According to the argument, the social value of learning news
about a company minutes or hours or even days earlier than otherwise is negligible.").
2-61 See Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 107 (suggesting that "prices in the stock market play no
basic informational role in the economy"); Stout, supra note 23 (questioning extent to
which stock prices affect real resource allocation); supra notes 227-30 and accompanying
text (noting that only secondary market mispricing that is persistent or affects primary
market seems likely to trigger resource misallocations). Because trading in the secondary
markets does not provide additional capital to corporations, secondary market prices affect
the allocation of capital to firms only indirectly, by providing information on what price
investors might be willing to pay for newly issued shares. See Kahan, supra note 104, at
1012-13; Stout, supra note 23, at 653-55. In the case of "seasoned" issues (i.e., issues of
shares identical to those already traded in the market), secondary market mispricing may
indeed have a direct influence on a firm's decision whether to issue more shares if
mispricing persists long enough for firms to act on it. See Stout, supra note 23, at 653-54
(asserting that secondary market prices influence underwriters trying to price seasoned
issues by signaling a "ceiling" price below which the issue should be priced). In the case of
an initial public offering, however, the signaling value of secondary market prices is quite
limited-investors' varying enthusiasms for established companies say little about the
market's view of a new firm's prospects. See Stout, supra note 23, at 654-56 (arguing that
market prices of particular firms in secondary market provide little information to
underwriters pricing initial public offerings); see also Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 107 (stating
more generally that "information revealed by the stock market price is not precise enough
to be of much use to most firms").
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Another highly questionable assumption underlying the market
efficiency argument is the assumption that efficient market prices
are necessarily accurate prices . 62 As discussed earlier, HE theory
predicts that a stock's market price is nothing more than the inter-
section of a fixed supply curve with a market demand function that
aggregates the individual demands of many investors, all of whom
are laboring under some degree of ignorance. No amount of spec-
ulative trading can produce "accurate" prices in such a market,
even if the market is highly informationally efficient, investor disa-
greement and varying degrees of ignorance will ensure that stock
prices bear only the roughest correspondence to their intrinsic
values.263
Close scrutiny of the market efficiency benefits defense of specu-
lative trading consequently reveals that encouraging speculation is
unlikely to produce significant social benefits from improved price
accuracy. The efficiency benefits claim is undermined still further
by the HE trading model's implication that speculative HE trading
may actually decrease the fundamental value efficiency of market
prices. As discussed earlier, false substitution and false valuation
effects cause HE traders systematically to undervalue or overvalue
corporate equities.26" Because the relatively pessimistic investors
who hew to a buy-and-hold strategy and trade only for liquidity or
portfolio-balancing reasons are not subject to false substitution and
false valuation effects,265 speculators' subjective valuations of
stocks are subject to distortions that non-speculating investors' are
not. In other words, E traders may on average be worse judges
of stock values than other traders. 66 If so, adding large numbers of
speculating H1E traders to a market where investors already trade
modest amounts of stock for liquidity or portfolio-balancing rea-
262 See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text (noting that many legal scholars
presume fundamental value efficiency follows from informational efficiency).
20 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
264 See supra Part II.A.2.
2z See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
266 If investors enjoyed infinite lifespans, speculating HE traders might indeed become
superior judges of stock values over time as HE traders who were bad at picking stocks lost
money and were "weeded out" of the market. Generational effects ensure, however, that
the pool of HE traders includes a large proportion of those whom time will ultimately
expose as poor judges of stock values. See supra notes 79, 87-90 and accompanying text.
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sons actually may decrease the already questionable level of funda-
mental value efficiency found in the market.267
Close examination of the supposed efficiency benefits of specula-
tive trading under the assumption of investor heterogeneity thus
suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, speculative trading
is unlikely to produce more accurate market prices and may even
contribute to price inaccuracy. The alleged efficiency benefits of
speculative trading are at least exaggerated, and possibly illusory.
C. Reducing Welfare Losses from HE Trading.
Some Policy Implications
Scholars and lawmakers alike often sing the praises of modem
stock markets, admiring their efficiency, liquidity, and ability to
service millions of traders who annually trade trillions of dollars in
stocks. Yet a thriving secondary market is enormously expensive
to the traders who on average fail in their quest to outperform the
market. Speculative trading in corporate equities also may lead to
social losses by distorting investors' demand for firms' shares and
possibly, the allocation of capital and other resources. In return,
speculative trading offers only a modest improvement in the mar-
ket's liquidity and may actually reduce the market's fundamental
value efficiency. Careful analysis of the costs and benefits of spec-
ulative trading in the light of HE theory consequently suggests
that, at least in the case of stock markets, the common presumption
that stock speculation benefits both speculators and society as a
whole may be dangerously misleading. Speculation appears to be a
form of costly market failure, a rational but ultimately harmful
activity that destroys wealth and distorts prices while providing lit-
tle in compensatory benefits.
That possibility carries a broad range of implications for the reg-
ulation of modem equities markets. Federal securities law pursues
a number of goals, chief among them the protection of investors
and the promotion of efficient markets that accurately price securi-
ties. HE theory suggests that policymakers should consider a third
26 Similarly, noise trader theorists have argued that the trading of irrational investors
speculating on "noise" moves stock prices away from their values. See, e.g., Black, supra
note 34, at 532 (maintaining that because "noise trading actually puts noise into the prices
... prices will be less efficient").
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goal as well: reducing the welfare losses that flow from speculative
trading.
This Section briefly considers how lawmakers might alleviate
welfare losses from HE trading. On the theoretical level, imperfect
information, regarding both the true values of stocks, and inves-
tors' relative trading talents, is the source of the market failure
reflected in HE trading.268 One obvious policy response might be
to provide investors with the information they lack.269 In the case
of stock speculation, however, the cost of providing the informa-
tion needed for investors to value perfectly either corporate equi-
ties or their own trading talents is virtually infinite. Stock values
depend on an obstinately indeterminate future, and only experi-
ence can reveal whether a particular investor has a knack for
speculation. 270 Because the information necessary to prevent spec-
ulative trading is no more available to the government (or anyone
else) than to investors, individuals who wish to invest in corporate
equities necessarily approach the market suffering some degree of
ignorance about both stock values and their own prospects in the
trading game.271
This does not imply, however, that welfare losses from stock
speculation cannot be mitigated. At least three possible
approaches can potentially reduce social losses due to speculation:
(1) reducing the incidence of trading through policies that reduce
the dispersion of investor opinion, (2) reducing welfare losses by
268 Uncertainty about stock values leads investors to disagree in their assessments with
each other and with market prices. Uncertainty about one's own relative aptitude for
trading leads an optimistic subset of investors to attempt to wring profits from their
disagreement by trading despite their intellectual recognition that stock trading is a
negative-sum game. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39, 66-69.
269 This response to imperfect information can be found in other contexts. For instance,
prescription drugs are accompanied by labels describing common side effects, and
processed foods are labeled with their ingredients.
270 Investors might try to test their trading talent in advance by devising hypothetical
trading strategies to observe what their returns would have been had they actually traded.
Although some individuals and institutions do use "paper" trading to test the value of a
particular strategy, paper trading requires investors to make an investment of time and
effort with no risk but also no possibility of return. Moreover, because the success of many
trading strategies is best gauged over a period of years, many investors feel that they
simply lack the time to test the waters in this fashion.
271 The government might, however, require all stocks to carry the following label:
"WARNING: Self-Selection Ensures that You Probably Are Not Going To Be as Talented
at Trading as You Think You Might Be."
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reducing the costs associated with speculative trading, and (3) dis-
couraging speculative trading through deterrent measures such as a
tax, or even a prohibition, on speculative transactions.
The discussion below briefly surveys some of the advantages and
disadvantages of each approach. The discussion also touches upon
the HE model's implications for the present regulatory scheme, a
laissez-faire approach that promotes trading while protecting inves-
tors primarily through antifraud and mandatory disclosure rules.
The intent is not to provide a comprehensive slate of proposed
reforms, for any specific question of securities law necessarily
implicates complex issues and policy concerns that lie well beyond
the scope of this Article. Rather, the following discussion illus-
trates how the HE model's new perspective offers important, illu-
minative, and often counterintuitive insights into many old issues.
1. Reducing Welfare Losses from HE Trading Through Rules
That Reduce the Dispersion of Investor Expectations
In the simplified model of E trading presented in Part I, an
investor buys (sells) a particular stock when her subjective estimate
of that stock's value exceeds (falls below) the market price by an
amount sufficient to make up for transaction costs.272 Increasing
dispersion in investor expectations-fomenting disagreement-
increases trading frequency because more investors will hold sub-
jective assessments that vary enough from market price to justify
trading. Conversely, reducing dispersion in expectations-encour-
aging agreement-decreases speculative trading and thus can
reduce welfare losses from speculation.2 73
Absent an oracle to predict the future, some investor disagree-
ment over stock values seems inevitable. Nevertheless, policies can
be designed to reduce dispersion in investor expectations, and with
it, the incidence of HE trading. In fact, two central doctrines in
modern securities regulation, antifraud rules and mandatory disclo-
sure rules, may serve just that purpose, albeit inadvertently.
Prohibitions against fraud in the sale of securities are contained
in both the Securities Act of 1933 (" '33 Act") and the Securities
272 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (modeling trading as fumction of
trading costs and dispersion of investor expectations).
273 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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Exchange Act of 1934 (" '34 Act"). 74 These federal antifraud
rules are praised for advancing the efficiency of market prices and
the fairness of stock markets.2 75 The HE model intimates that
antifraud rules also may reduce the likelihood of negative-sum
speculative trading. Misrepresentations regarding securities often
are made for the purpose of inducing speculative purchases or sales
by convincing investors that stocks are underpriced or over-
priced.27 6 Brokers in particular may be tempted to foster investor
disagreement and trading by providing investors with false and
misleading information. 77 Effective antifraud rules thus not only
protect investors and insulate market prices from the distortive
274 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (codifying section 17 of the 1933
Act, which prohibits fraud and misrepresentations in the sale of securities); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1994) (providing rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act, which prohibits fraud and
misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
275 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 673 ("Fraud reduces allocative
efficiency."); David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation,
13 J. Corp. L. 535, 540 (1988) (same).
276 See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (describing action
against corporation for misrepresentation in sale of debentures); Escot v. Barchris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
Another common purpose of fraud is to affect the price of a transaction that would occur
anyway. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (describing
claim of fraudulent omission designed to induce plaintiffs to sell at lower price). In such
cases, an antifraud prohibition neither furthers nor frustrates the goal of deterring
speculative trading.
More rarely, fraud may be used to deter a transaction. In such a case, enforcing the
antifraud rules would actually increase the incidence of trading. Interestingly, case law
denies standing to investors seeking to enforce the antifraud prohibition in such cases on
the grounds that, if the fraud successfully deters the transaction, the plaintiff is neither a
"purchaser" nor a "seller" entitled to sue. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (dismissing action by offerees of stock who claimed defendants had
fraudulently misrepresented offer as unattractive in order to deter them from buying on
the ground that only purchasers and sellers have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5).
277 See supra Part I.D.1. Unfortunately, the value of present antifraud rules in
preventing broker misrepresentation is somewhat limited because, as a practical matter, it
is difficult for investors to prove that technically truthful but highly slanted or biased
advice that inspires trading is tantamount to a fraud. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
This is not to say there is no hope of reducing brokers' role in fostering disagreement.
For example, requiring all communications between broker and client to be in writing
would make it more difficult for brokers to avoid fraud claims by disputing the content of
their advice. Investors might also be given some protection from sincere but
overoptimistic brokers if brokers who gave investment advice were required to disclose
their "track record" in advising other clients.
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effects of false information, but also reduce welfare losses from
speculative trading by reducing the incidence of trading. 7 8
The federal system of mandatory corporate disclosure may pro-
vide an even more effective approach to reducing dispersion in
investor expectations. The '33 Act requires companies that pub-
licly issue stock to file with the SEC and provide in a prospectus to
investors extensive information describing both the firm and the
offered security.2 79 The '34 Act requires firms whose shares are
publicly traded to file regularly with the SEC extensive information
regarding the firms' business, management, and financial status,
and to provide similar information directly to shareholders in the
form of an annual report.2 0 Federal mandatory disclosure rules
have been applauded for contributing in a number of ways to both
the fairness and the efficiency of the market.28 ' HE theory sug-
gests that mandatory disclosure may serve another important social
function by diminishing the investor disagreement that inspires
wasteful and distortive speculative trading.
As discussed in Part I, disagreement is inevitable when investors
rely on different, limited subsets of information.2 "2 Providing all
investors with the same data consequently promotes homogeneous
expectations. This insight reinforces the social value of the federal
mandatory disclosure scheme against conservative academics'
charges (often based on efficient market theory) that required dis-
closure is either irrelevant or too expensive.m3 HE theory supports
278 In addition to prohibiting misrepresentations, federal antifraud rules also prohibit
insider trading and stock price manipulation, both of which are forms of speculative
trading. See generally Hazen, supra note 81, §§ 6.0.1, 12.1, 13.9 (discussing manipulation
and insider trading). The rules against insider trading and manipulation consequently also
decrease the incidence of HE trading.
279 See id. §§ 3.1-3.8 (stating disclosure requirements under '33 Act).
280 See id. §§ 9.2-9.3 (stating disclosure requirements under '34 Act).
281 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 722,725-29,751 (arguing that mandatory disclosure aids
informational efficiency because information is underprovided public good); Langevoort,
supra note 6, at 781-85 (noting a variety of arguments why mandatory disclosure might
enhance both efficiency and fairness of market). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 43, at 692-96 (arguing that rationales for mandatory disclosure, including increasing
public's confidence in market, protecting unsophisticated investors, and increasing supply
of information to efficient market, are "poorly supported").
m' Supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
283 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 717-18 (describing "revisionist" charges that mandatory
disclosure produces few benefits at considerable cost); Langevoort, supra note 6, at 778
("Based on the so-called efficient market hypothesis,.., a growing number of critics have
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the claim that mandatory disclosure rules are needed because it
suggests that, before HE traders actually sustain losses from trad-
ing, they are unlikely to recognize that they will benefit from uni-
form and timely disclosures that reduce speculation by encouraging
agreement. Indeed, if they think that they might profit from
others' ignorance, they might actually oppose such disclosures. As
a result, shareholders left to their own devices will not demand
optimal disclosure from the firms in which they invest. After
sustaining trading losses, HE traders may recognize that ignorance
that encouraged disagreement made them worse off, but at that
point, the-sadder-but-wiser HE trader can avoid losses more
cheaply by simply refraining from trading.
HE theory also offers guidance on how disclosure requirements
might be structured. For example, the SEC's "integrated disclo-
sure" system excuses large, publicly held firms whose stock is
actively traded from providing much information directly to inves-
tors on the theory that, as long as the relevant information is filed
with the SEC and available to a subset of sophisticated investors, it
will be incorporated into an efficient market price.2 4 The HE
model implies, however, that providing information to a small
minority of investors promotes informational but not fundamental
value efficiency and may even increase welfare losses from HE
trading by provoking investor disagreement. Similarly, HE theory
offers new insight into the ongoing debate over whether disclosure
documents should be "readable" by the average investor. 85 If one
purpose of mandatory disclosure should be to foster agreement by
argued that the current mandatory disclosure system is unnecessary . . ... "); see also
Easterbrook & ischel, supra note 43, at 709-14 (discussing critique of mandatory
disclosure and concluding that "there is no good evidence that the disclosure rules are
beneficial").
2S4 See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 767 & n.83 (describing integrated disclosure and
noting that the "practical effect is that investors actually receive very little of the
information on file" with the SEC).
285 See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1164-65 (1970) (arguing that disclosure documents need not be
readable by lay investor); see also Easterbrook & ischel, supra note 43, at 694
(maintaining that view that mandatory disclosure should cater to unsophisticated investors
is "as unsophisticated as the investors it is supposed to protect" because informed traders
in an efficient market will impound all relevant information into prices, making it
unnecessary to provide that information to the remainder of investors).
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providing uniform information, disclosures that most investors find
incomprehensible do little to further that goal.
2. Reducing Welfare Losses from HE Trading Through Rules
That Decrease the Costs of Speculative Trading
In addition to discouraging investor disagreement, federal
mandatory disclosure rules may play a second role in reducing
social losses from speculative trading. The cost of research-that
is, the cost of acquiring and analyzing the information needed to
make stock forecasts-is a major component of the expense
incurred by investors who trade to beat the market. The
mandatory disclosure system provides a broad range of informa-
tion to investors quite cheaply. Thus, mandatory disclosure rules
may reduce social losses from HE trading by reducing the costs of
speculators' active management of their portfolios.
Legal scholars have occasionally recognized this point by arguing
that, in addition to contributing to investor protection and market
efficiency, the mandatory disclosure system may also produce a
social benefit by reducing investors' need for wasteful and duplica-
tive research.2 6 This argument, however, fails to take account of
the possibility that mandatory disclosure rules that reduce the mar-
ginal cost of speculation may encourage investors to speculate
more often and so lead to an increase in the total cost of trading.
Reducing the marginal cost of speculation can increase welfare
losses due to speculation because cost and trading are inversely
correlated (as the costs of speculating go down, investor interest in
speculating goes up).' As an example, consider the impact on
total trading costs of a substantial reduction in marginal costs that
triggers an even greater increase in trading. Suppose the elimina-
tion of fixed broker commissions in 1975 reduced investors' com-
mission costs by one-half, from approximately 5.0% of the value of
2S6 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 733-34 (arguing that mandatory disclosure system may
eliminate much wasteful duplication in research); Stout, supra note 23, at 705
("[M]andatory disclosure can be defended not because it is important for investors to have
such information, but because it is important to stop [them from] wasting [their] resources
to get it."). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 682 (noting argument but
disagreeing that mandatory disclosure is necessary to reduce waste).
M See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Stigler, supra note 35, at 223
(explaining that searching for best bargain is part of purchase cost of a good and that
consumers purchase less as search costs go up).
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a trade to about 2.5%.2s8 Suppose also that the reduction triggered
a threefold increase in trading, so that the annual market turnover
rate increased from ten percent to thirty percent.28 9 Before dereg-
ulation, investors were spending approximately 0.5% of the value
of their portfolios annually on commissions. Reduced commission
rates result in investors spending even more; now they lose 0.75%
of their portfolios annually to broker fees.
In economic terms, whether lowering the marginal costs of spec-
ulative trading increases or decreases the total costs depends on
whether the demand for speculative trading is relatively elastic
(small changes in the marginal price of trading trigger large
changes in demand for trading) or relatively inelastic (changes in
the price of trading have little effect on the demand for trading). 290
Although more empirical study is needed, the available evidence
suggests that the demand for stock trading is quite elastic, so that
decreases in marginal trading costs are likely to trigger dispropor-
tionately greater increases in the frequency of trading.291 This pos-
sibility implies that policies that reduce speculators' marginal costs,
such as the deregulation of fixed commissions or mandatory disclo-
sure rules that reduce marginal research costs, may actually have
the perverse effect of increasing net welfare losses from speculative
trading.29
The observation that reducing marginal stock research and trad-
ing costs can increase welfare losses from speculation should not be
taken to imply that the system of mandatory disclosure should be
dispensed with, or that securities firms should be encouraged to
288 See supra note 63 (noting that deregulation estimated to have halved institutions'
out-of-pocket trading costs); supra note 57 (noting that net costs of speculation presently
approximate three percent of value of trade).
289 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that NYSE turnover increased
from approximately 10% to 50% following deregulation).
290 See generally Stout, supra note 11, at 1239-44 (discussing demand elasticity).
291 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 19-20 (citing studies of foreign exchanges
finding highly elastic demand for trading); Kiefer, supra note 6, at 886 (estimating that
0.5% transfer tax would cause stock volume to decline by 7.9%); see also supra notes 63-64
and accompanying text (noting that deregulation of brokers' commissions between 1968
and 1975 halved institutions' out-of-pocket trading costs and that turnover on NYSE rose
from 10% to 50% between 1960 and 1987).
292 Similarly, the development of derivative financial instruments such as stock index
futures and index options may increase net welfare losses from stock trading, because the
costs associated with trading derivatives are even lower than the costs associated with
trading equities. Infra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
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engage in monopolistic price-fixing. As noted earlier, federal
securities law addresses a number of goals. Although HE theory
suggests that reducing social welfare losses from speculative trad-
ing certainly is important, it should not be regulators' sole objec-
tive. Rather, the point is that the challenge of controlling excess
speculation, although not intractable, raises subtle and complex
issues.
3. Reducing Welfare Losses from HE Trading by
Taxing or Prohibiting Trading
Policies that encourage investors to develop homogeneous
expectations can reduce the incidence of wasteful speculation. In a
world of imperfect information, however, investor disagreement on
stock values is unlikely to be entirely eliminated. A second alter-
native, trying to control welfare losses from speculative trading by
reducing marginal research and trading costs, may actually increase
total welfare losses if demand for stock trading is highly elastic.
This possibility, however, suggests a third (and perhaps more obvi-
ous) solution to limiting social losses from speculation: increasing
the marginal costs of stock speculation either by imposing a tax on
such trading or prohibiting it altogether.293
Both the Bush and the Clinton administrations considered pro-
posals to reinstate a federal stock transfer tax by imposing a fee of
no more than 0.5% of value on transactions in corporate equities
and other securities.2 94 Those proposals died in a storm of protest
(and lobbying by the securities industry)295 that included debates
293 Increasing the costs of speculation through a tax or prohibition decreases the
incidence of trading without providing any further revenues to the securities industry (as
reinstating fixed broker commissions or eliminating mandatory disclosure that substitutes
for private research would) and so is effective in reducing welfare losses from speculation
whether demand for stock trading is elastic or inelastic.
294 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 1-3 (describing Bush and Clinton proposals);
Kiefer, supra note 6, at 885 (describing Bush administration and Congressional Budget
Office proposals).
295 See Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 23 (asserting that the wisdom of a stock tax is
likely to be "hotly debated"); Joseph A. Grundfest & John B. Shoven, Adverse
Implications of a Securities Transactions Excise Tax, 6 J. Acct. Auditing & Fm. 409,409-10
(1991) (noting that stock tax proposal "encountered a storm of protest from ... the
congressional and academic communities" and that it "was the subject of extensive
lobbying by the securities and commodities industries"); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, The
Damning Facts of a New Stocks Tax, Wall St. J., July 23, 1990, at A10, (asserting that stock
tax has "'no evident justification"' and would likely "destroy part of the U.S. financial
6991995]
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 81:611
over whether such a tax would raise revenue, its effect on capital
formation, its progressivity, its advantages as compared to a capital
gains preference, difficulties in implementation, and so forth.296
This Article does not join that passionate and often partisan debate
by recommending any particular size or type of tax but rather sim-
ply explores the potential value of some tax-including that
extreme form of tax, the prohibition-in reducing welfare losses
due to speculative trading.2 9
Taxes are usually implemented to raise revenue. But taxes also
can be used to deter undesirable behavior by raising the cost of
that behavior.2-9 A tax to deter behavior resembles a prohibition
except that a tax raises the cost of an undesired behavior by a finite
amount, whereas a prohibition (assuming perfect enforcement)
raises cost infinitely. In the case of stock trading, both forms of
regulation pose the similar economic problem of deterring desira-
ble as well as destructive transactions.
In understanding the dilemma posed by a tax or prohibition on
securities trading, it is useful to recall the two alternative market
models presented in Parts I and II, the HE trading model and the
value-adding model. 99 The HE trading model describes purely
speculative markets in which investors buy and sell stocks in the
market" (quoting Richard Darman)); Michael Kinsley, Stock Response, New Republic,
Aug. 20 & 27, 1990, at 4 (questioning tax that "create[s] friction in the wheels of
commerce" and whether "government know[s] better than the free market"); Robert E.
Norton, The Silly Push To Tax Stock Trading, Fortune, Dec. 18,1989, at 151 (calling the tax
"a dumb idea").
296 See sources cited supra note 295 (arguing against tax).
297 The transfer tax proposal was supported by a small but esteemed group of
economists and policymakers who favored it not only to raise revenue, but also (in the
words of Nobel laureate James Tobin) to "'throw[] sand in the gears'" of financial
markets they perceived as exhibiting too much short-term trading and speculation. See
Schwert & Seguin, supra note 8, at 1 (noting tax supported by Joseph Stiglitz of Council of
Economic Advisors and Lawrence Summers of Department of the Treasury); Kinsley,
supra note 295, at 4 (quoting James Tobin and also noting the support of then-Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady, "who is obsessed with the idea that American finance is plagued
by too much wasteful speculation").
298 The two goals are in tension with one another. A tax that deters substantially raises
little revenue, and a tax that deters completely raises no revenue at all. Conversely, if
demand for speculative trading proved be highly inelastic and a stock transfer tax did not
significantly deter trading, policymakers would be offered a consolation prize in the form
of increased revenue.
299 See supra notes 22-64, 137-148 and accompanying text (HE and value-adding trading
models).
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hope of profiting on resale by successfully forecasting changes in
future prices. Disagreement is a prerequisite for such trading
because disagreement permits both parties to the trade to expect to
increase their wealth ex ante, even though trading inevitably
reduces the traders' aggregate net wealth ex post. Given perfect
information and homogeneous expectations, no trading would
occur. Trading in the HE market thus reflects a form of welfare-
decreasing market failure, implying that a tax or prohibition that
discourages trading leaves traders and society better off.
In contrast, according to the value-adding model, investors buy
and sell stocks not because of differences in their expectations for
the future, but because of differences in their present preferences
for liquidity, capital gains or losses, or diversification. Such trades
are mutually beneficial ex post as well as apparently mutually ben-
eficial ex ante and would occur even if investors shared homogene-
ous expectations. Because trading leaves both parties to the trade
better off, the value-adding model implies that trading is a socially
desirable activity and that restricting trading leads to welfare
losses. The distinction between HE markets and value-adding
markets therefore implies that, as a general rule, a tax or prohibi-
tion on stock trading may be appropriate if secondary stock mar-
kets are purely or primarily speculative. Conversely, a transfer tax
or prohibition on trading leads to welfare losses if stock markets
reflect primarily value-adding trades inspired by differences in con-
sumers' preferences that would exist even if consumers shared
homogeneous expectations.
Markets can reflect a mixture of both value-adding and specula-
tive trading. For example, although markets for physical commodi-
ties such as apples normally are dominated by the sort of value-
adding transactions that would occur even if all market participants
held identical expectations for future prices," such markets may
300 That does not imply that consumers cannot make welfare-reducing mistakes as a
result of imperfect information in those markets. Consumers may make welfare-reducing
trades because they are mistaken about their own preferences. Thus John spends one
dollar to purchase a mango ice cream that he discovers, upon tasting, he detests.
Consumers with imperfect information may also make mistakes about the quality of the
goods they purchase, as when Mary buys a car that proves to be a lemon. It is far more
difficult, however, to detect and prevent such mistakes in a largely value-adding market
than it is to detect mistakes in an HE trading market, where the laws of arithmetic predict
that virtually all transactions are welfare-reducing.
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occasionally succumb to speculation (as the Tulip Bulb frenzy con-
firmed).3 0 1 Nevertheless, the evidence examined in Part II suggests
that the majority of trades in modern stock markets are welfare-
reducing trades driven by investor disagreement °.3  That evidence
supports the notion that regulation that deters speculation by tax-
ing or prohibiting stock trading will produce net welfare gains.
Of the two forms of regulation, a tax seems clearly preferable to
a complete prohibition on stock trading. At least some stock trad-
ing is value-adding, and secondary markets do provide some social
benefits by providing prices that can signal the allocation of capital
and liquidity that promotes investor interest in new issues. A tax
that significantly diminishes but does not eliminate stock trading
might well produce substantial social gains by reducing the inci-
dence of speculative trading while largely preserving the markets'
liquidity and signaling functions. Keynes proposed such a tax when
he commented:
It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be
inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of Stock
Exchanges .... The introduction of a substantial Government
transfer tax on all transactions might prove the most serviceable
reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of
speculation [in stock markets]. 3 3
Because a stock transfer tax would necessarily deter a number of
value-adding transactions, as well as a larger number of speculative
trades, legal rules that mitigate welfare losses due to speculation by
either encouraging investors to develop homogeneous expectations
or reducing marginal costs (where demand for trading is relatively
inelastic) are, in theory, superior to rules taxing or prohibiting trad-
ing. But as a practical matter, investors will disagree, and demand
for trading does seem to be highly elastic.3 0 4 Thus, as Keynes
observed, cruder instruments such as a transfer tax may well prove
the most "serviceable" reforms available in reducing the welfare
losses that flow from speculation.
301 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
302 Supra Parts II.B.1-II.B.2.
303 Keynes, supra note 10, at 159-60.
304 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (describing evidence of highly elastic
demand).
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D. Some Thoughts on HE Theory's Applicability to Other
Speculative Markets, Especially Derivatives Markets
Imperfect information can be a cause of market failure. This
basic principle of economic theory has important normative impli-
cations for stock markets, where imperfect information tempts
investors who disagree over stock values to squander resources
playing the negative-sum game of stock trading and distorts their
views of the value of corporate equities. The evidence indicates
that in modem equities markets, welfare losses from speculative
trading are substantial and far outstrip any likely liquidity or effi-
ciency benefits of such trading.
The observation that heterogeneous expectations may lead to
market failure in stock markets naturally raises the question of why
the HE model should apply only to trading in corporate equities.
This Article has focused on equities trading primarily because
stock trading is so often presumed beneficial, the stock markets are
large and socially important, extensive empirical evidence is avail-
able on equities trading, and modeling equities trading is relatively
simple. But stocks are not the only securities traded by investors,
and securities markets are not the only speculative markets. There
are other areas of economic life where the HE model may well be
relevant.
The market for litigation, and especially for trials, may reflect a
form of market failure due to imperfect information similar to that
which inspires speculative stock trading. °5 For at least a decade
the legal literature has recognized that trials are negative-sum
games where the plaintiff's gain necessarily reflects the defendant's
loss, and both parties lose wealth to attorney fees and other litiga-
tion expenses.3° Some scholars have explained this market failure
as a consequence of imperfect information and heterogeneous
expectations.30 7 Thus, when both parties agree on the likely out-
305 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319, 320 (1991) ("A trial
is a failure.").
306 Id. at 320-22 (reviewing literature).
307 See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining In The Shadow
of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225,225 & n.1 (1982)
(citing authorities); Gross & Syverud, supra note 305, at 321 & n.5 (citing authorities).
An alternative theory is that settlement negotiations fail when parties behave
strategically by "holding out" Id. at 321 & n.6 (citing authorities).
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come of trial, they usually settle. It is only when litigants disa-
gree-specifically, when the plaintiff is more optimistic in her
assessment of her chances at trial than the defendant is-that par-
ties insist on the social waste of a trial. 8
As Keynes' casino comparison implies, another activity that may
reflect market failure due to heterogeneous expectations is the
market for certain kinds of gambling games. The HE model
predicts that gambling games that involve an element of skill, such
as handicapping thoroughbreds or playing blackjack, will attract an
optimistic, self-selected subset of gamblers, each of whom believes
her knowledge of horses or skill at playing the odds is better than
the average gambler's. 0 9 Transaction costs in the form of the
house percentage ensure, however, that gamblers leave racetracks
and casinos poorer than they arrived. Of course, even if gamblers
on average lose wealth, they may find that the excitement and glit-
ter of Churchill Downs or Atlantic City provide recreational value
that more than makes up for their losses. Economists frequently
hypothesize that gamblers do extract utility from their negative-
sum games, and most individuals do seem to find gambling more
enjoyable than either poring over stock and mutual fund reports310
or being a party to litigation.3 1 Nevertheless, the HE model offers
an alternative-and less benign-explanation for the popularity of
308 The fact that attorneys are often paid on an hourly basis for trial work suggests that
they may face conflicts of interest similar to those faced by brokers and sometimes may
play a similar role in fostering litigation by encouraging litigant disagreement. Cf. supra
Part I.D.1 and accompanying text.
309 That observation raises the interesting question of why rational individuals would
play negative-sum gambling games that do not involve an element of skill or forecasting,
such as lotteries. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why
It Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 71 (arguing that the decision to play lotteries is a rational
consumer choice inconsistent with conventional economic theories regarding risk
aversion).
310 Although the stereotype of the Florida retiree who enjoys "playing the market"
raises the possibility that some investors trade for entertainment, closer analysis suggests
that recreation is likely to play only a minimal role in equities trading. See supra note 33
(discussing and critiquing recreational theory of investing).
311 See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach The Heart of the Matter,
Address Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1921), in
Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Lectures on Legal Topics: 1921-1922, at 89, 105
(1926) ("After now some dozen years of experience I must say that as a litigant I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.").
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casinos that resonates with the moral condemnation many laymen
heap upon gambling.312
A detailed discussion of the markets for litigation and gambling
lies beyond the scope of this analysis. More closely related, how-
ever, is the possibility that heterogeneous expectations underlie a
third, and much larger, market: the vast and growing market for
financial derivatives.313 Derivatives are instruments whose value
depends on some underlying asset, rate, or index. For example,
one common form of derivative is the "stock index future." Index
futures are contracts for the future delivery of a group of stocks
that comprise a particular stock index, such as the Standard &
Poor's 500.314 Because index futures generally sell at prices that
closely follow the current prices of the stocks that make up the
underlying index, a bullish trader might buy index futures, expect-
ing stock prices to rise so that the stocks to be delivered will be
worth considerably more than the futures price on the delivery
date. Conversely, a bear will sell index futures, expecting she will
soon be able to purchase the stocks she has agreed to deliver at a
lower price. Other common forms of derivatives include options
and futures contracts based on interest rates, commodities prices,
and currency exchange rates.315
Because derivatives trading is largely unregulated and unre-
ported, reliable information on exactly who is trading what, with
whom, and why, is difficult to obtain.31 6 The General Accounting
312 See Hazen, supra note 6, at 994.
313 See Hu, supra note 8, at 1459 ("The OTC derivatives market has enjoyed enormous
growth"); Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 8, at 63, 66 (noting that although a few decades
ago derivatives markets were an "obscure backwater" of the securities markets, now
financial world is "waist-deep in derivatives" to a degree that "few laymen understand").
See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed To
Protect the Financial System (1994) (discussing derivatives); Hazen, supra note 6
(analyzing the effect of derivatives on market efficiency); Hu, supra note 8 (discussing
banker and regulator informational failure with respect to derivatives).
314 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing stock indexes).
315 See U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 26-29 (describing basic types
of derivatives).
316 See Hu, supra note 8, at 1463 (noting that regulators know little about derivatives
market); U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 7, 34 (noting that there are
"no comprehensive industry or federal regulatory requirements" for derivatives and that
"complete information about global derivatives volume" is unavailable).
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Office has estimated that in 1992 the notional amount 3 7 of interest
rate, exchange rate, and equity and commodity price derivatives
outstanding globally exceeded $17 trillion, representing an increase
of 145% since 1989.8 The sudden appearance and rapid growth
of such an enormous and poorly understood market has aroused
apprehension among some members of the financial services indus-
try and government policymakers. 319 Nevertheless, the economic
presumption that voluntary transactions are mutually beneficial
has armored the practice of derivatives trading against challenges,
just as it has protected the derivatives markets' progenitor, the
stock market. Scholars and regulators alike justify derivatives mar-
kets as beneficial to market participants and society as a whole.32
And how, exactly, do these arcane instruments further social
welfare? Derivatives generally are defended as allowing market
participants-including banks, insurance firms, securities firms,
institutional investment funds, and corporations-to reduce risk by
"hedging" against future changes in the prices of equities, com-
modities, and interest and exchange rates. 2 Thus, for example, an
Oklahoma retail store whose clientele consisted largely of oil firm
employees might want to protect itself from a decline in business
revenues by purchasing an oil-futures derivative that rises in value
if oil prices fall, whereas a commercial airline might sell such a
derivative to offset the risk of rising fuel prices.322
If derivatives are used primarily for hedging (as in the example
above), derivatives trades tend to be mutually beneficial. In such a
value-adding market, a free-market approach that promotes trad-
ing and minimizes regulatory interference may well be wise. 23
317 See Hu, supra note 8, at 1459 n.6, 1467 n.44 (illustrating notional amount in interest
rate swaps context).
318 U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 35 tbl. 2.1.
319 Id. at 6.
320 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
321 See U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 6 ("Derivatives serve an
important function in the global financial marketplace, providing end-users with
opportunities to better manage financial risks. . . ."); see also Hazen, supra note 6, at 1007-
09 (noting that futures literature defends futures trading as allowing risk allocation and
improving accuracy of prices).
322 This is a slightly modified version of an example offered by Professor Henry T.C. Hu,
supra note 8, at 1466.
323 Even in such a case, however, the size and riskiness of the derivatives markets have
led some regulators to believe that regulation is necessary to reduce systemic risk, i.e., the
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Academics and regulators have observed, however, that derivatives
can be used not only to hedge against risk, but also to speculate on
the future.324 Thus a corporation might buy an oil derivative that
rises in value as oil prices fall not as a hedge, but as a (hopefully
profitable) bet on its forecast that oil prices will soon decline.32
As in the case of stock trading, only empirical inquiry can answer
the question of whether most derivatives trades reflect hedging or
speculation. Nevertheless, recent events suggest that speculation
may play a large, if not a dominant, role in derivatives trading. In
April 1994, for example, Procter & Gamble was forced to
announce that it had suffered a $102 million loss on derivatives
contracts entered into by Procter & Gamble executives who were
"bullish" on interest rates. 26 (The company later announced that
the transactions were mistakes "inconsistent" with the company's
policy of avoiding financial speculation.)32 7 Procter & Gamble may
have been lucky; shortly afterwards, Paine Webber Group
announced that it would spend $180 million shoring up a mutual
fund that had tried to bolster its profits with derivatives trades,32
and a few months before, the German conglomerate Metallgesell-
possibility that the sudden failure or withdrawal of a large participant in the system could
trigger a series of similar failures. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 7-8.
324 See Hazen, supra note 6, at 1017-18 (providing example of speculative use of
derivative); U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 313, at 25 (noting that speculators
use derivatives to try to profit from anticipating price changes).
325 The derivatives literature also postulates that derivative instruments can be used for
"arbitrage," riskless trades that extract profits by exploiting small differences between the
market price of a derivative and the market price of an underlying asset, or small
differences between exchange rates or interest rates in different capital markets. Hu, supra
note 8, at 1466 (discussing use of derivatives for arbitrage); U.S. General Accounting
Office, supra note 313, at 25 (noting use of derivatives to obtain more favorable financing
through interest rate arbitrage). From an economic perspective, arbitrage trades, like
speculative trades, generally are zero-sum transactions that transfer wealth but do not add
to social welfare.
326 See Susan Antilla, P. & G. Bet on Rates Turns Sour, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 13, 1994, at
D1, D15.
327 Kelley Holland & Zachary Schiller, Did Procter & Gamble Play with Fire?, Bus.
Wk., Apr. 25, 1994, at 38, 38 (quoting Procter & Gamble CEO Edwin L. Artzt); see also
Saul Hansell, A Bad Bet for P. & G., N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 14, 1994, at D6, (noting that
executive in charge of transactions was put on "special assignment").
328 Leslie Eaton, Yet Another Round in Greed vs. Prudence, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1994,
at D1.
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schaft AG announced potential losses of nearly $1 billion from
energy derivatives.32 9
Such stories hardly sound like the stories of financial technicians
negotiating mutually beneficial deals to adjust for market risk.
Rather, they resemble the woeful tales of bettors at the racetrack
who backed the wrong horse and must now tear up their tickets
and go home. Heterogeneous expectations theory supports the
idea that the derivatives markets provide fertile ground for specu-
lation. The HE model predicts that, given a particular level of dis-
persion in investor expectations for future stock returns,
speculative trading becomes more likely as transaction costs
decrease. The low transaction costs associated with derivatives
trading allow market participants who want to gamble on changes
in stock prices (or interest rates, or exchange rates) to take a larger
position in those markets at far less expense than by trading in the
underlying market.3 ° Thus, HE theory predicts that derivatives
markets are likely to attract a very high portion of those optimists
willing to bet they are better than the next trader at forecasting the
futures of industries, interest rates and national economies.
If the derivatives market is primarily a speculative market driven
by disagreement over the future, what consequences follow? Most
obviously, derivatives trading may pose a significant risk of adding
to the welfare losses that society already suffers from equities trad-
ing because individuals and institutions may be enticed to expend
resources researching, managing and trading derivatives, just as
they now spend resources researching, managing and trading stock
portfolios. To some extent, of course, one loss may simply substi-
tute for the other. In other words, some of the resources expended
on derivatives speculation might have been lost in any case to stock
speculation. Yet developing a derivatives market seems likely to
increase net social losses from financial speculation for at least two
reasons.
First, as noted above, if the demand for speculative trading is
relatively elastic, the lower transaction costs associated with deriva-
tives trading may tempt market participants to incur larger net
329 Jeffrey Taylor & Allanna Sullivan, German Firm Finds Hedges Can Be Thorny, Wall
St. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at Cl, C14 (describing losses as result of a "glitch" in the company's
attempt to hedge risk).
330 See Hu, supra note 8, at 1466.
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costs by greatly increasing their interest in, and the incidence of,
speculative trading. Second, and perhaps more significantly, deriv-
atives markets may increase net social losses from speculation
because they offer market participants a novel and untried way to
bet on their heterogeneous expectations for the future. As dis-
cussed in Part I, increasing the number of markets, instruments,
and manners in which investors are able to speculate can increase
their net losses from speculative trading. Allowing individuals to
invest through intermediaries such as mutual funds, for example,
can increase speculative losses by allowing individuals to make new
and different mistakes.33 ' The individual investor who has learned
from bitter experience that she is no good at picking winning stocks
may be tempted to see if she is better at picking winning mutual
fund managers. Similarly, Procter & Gamble executives who
would not think of hazarding their firm's fortunes on their own
stock-picking talents might nevertheless speculate in derivatives,
believing they have superior ability to forecast changes in interest
rates .332
The observation that harsh lessons learned in one market do not
necessarily carry over to another suggests that financial "innova-
tions" that lead to new and better financial products may actually
lead primarily to new and better ways for individuals and institu-
tions to make expensive speculative mistakes. As Nobel laureate
James Tobin has warned: "Every financial market absorbs private
resources to operate, and government resources to police. The
country cannot afford all the markets that enthusiasts may dream
up. 333 Champions of derivatives trading sometimes describe those
who are more cautious as resistant to financial progress.334 The
HE model of trading, however, provides a theoretical foundation
331 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
332 By introducing a new market in which traders can test their heterogenous
expectations, derivatives have contributed to the significant increase in the size of the U.S.
financial industry over the past decade. See Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 8, at 64
(estimating that "what we loosely call Wall Street" has gone from absorbing about one-half
of one percent of Gross Domestic Product a decade ago, to one percent today largely
because of derivatives).
333 Tobin, supra note 10, at 10.
334 See, e.g., Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 8, at 72 (comparing growth of derivatives
to invention of internal combustion engine); see also Hu, supra note 8, at 1513 (noting that
halting derivatives trading would be "Procrustean, unnecessary, and destructive of social
wealth").
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for those who, like Tobin, fear that the fast-growing market in
derivatives may serve Wall Street to the detriment of Main Street
and the greater society.335 Resources lost chasing the illusion of
speculative profits are resources that could have been invested in
programs that increase social wealth by developing new technolo-
gies, improving products, or cutting production costs. Thus, in the
regulation of speculative markets, laissez-faire can lead to loss.
IV. CONCLUSION
We live in a world of ignorance and uncertainty. Although in
some cases economists can reasonably assume away the market
effects of imperfect information, in other circumstances economic
theories premised on perfect information can be dangerously mis-
leading. As the economist George Stigler observed:
Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its
effects upon people can be kept within tolerable or even comforta-
ble bounds, but it would be wholly uneconomic entirely to elimi-
nate all its effects. And, just as an analysis of man's shelter and
apparel would be somewhat incomplete if cold weather is ignored,
so also our understanding of economic life will be incomplete if we
do not systematically take account of the cold winds of
ignorance.336
In the case of stock markets, any analysis that ignores ignorance
risks being incomplete indeed. Ignorance about the future breeds
disagreement, and disagreement in turn breeds investor trading in
the hope of quick gains. Although the conventional economic
models most often employed by contemporary financial theorists
to describe stock markets are explicitly premised on the assump-
tion that investors hold identical expectations for the future risks
and returns of stocks, in reality even experts differ widely in pre-
dicting the fates of firms, industries, and the economy as a whole.
Such disagreement tempts individual investors and institutional
managers alike to abandon conservative buy-and-hold strategies
and try their hand at trading in the statistically futile hope of beat-
ing the market. Although such trading is self-defeating-research
335 See Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 103 (suggesting that financial innovation may produce
more welfare losses than gains such that "[b]arring these innovations .. could actually
make everyone better off").
336 Stigler, supra note 35, at 224.
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and trading costs ensure that investors who churn their portfolios
on average underperform the market-it is not irrational. Indeed,
economic theory explains that in a world of imperfect information
where investors necessarily make differing judgments of both stock
values and their own relative trading abilities, the wasteful expen-
diture of valuable resources on the negative-sum game of stock
trading is not only rational but inevitable.
Recognizing the importance of disagreement in fostering stock
trading allows construction of a model of stock trading and stock
markets that offers great promise in describing and predicting the
behavior of both equities markets and those who participate in
them. This BE trading model offers insights into why investors
trade, who is most likely to trade and for how long, the role of self-
selection and successive generations in creating and sustaining
markets, the role of financial intermediaries, how prices are set,
and the uncertain relationship between market prices and best esti-
mates of stock values. In doing so, the HE model paints a portrait
of equities markets that departs significantly from models currently
in vogue, yet accords well with both the empirical evidence and the
perceptions of those who actually participate in stock markets.
In addition to its enormous positive utility, the HE model also
carries important normative implications for the appropriate regu-
lation of stock markets. Experts often dismiss the layman's disap-
proval of speculation. HE theory suggests, however, that the
popular condemnation of wealth gained through speculation has a
sound basis in economic theory. The HE model implies that specu-
lative stock trading is, in an economic sense, a wasteful mistake.
Although investors who trade on their heterogeneous expectations
believe they will increase their wealth by doing so, their belief is on
average erroneous, and their trading on average leaves them worse
off. A conservative estimate of the expenses associated with stock
speculation suggests that investors may be spending $100 billion
annually-fully one-fifth of their returns from investing-on
researching and trading corporate equities. If most stock transac-
tions are inspired by investor disagreement-and considerable evi-
dence suggests most are-then, at least in the case of stock
markets, trading based on heterogeneous expectations leads to
substantial net welfare losses for both traders and society as a
whole. Investors' optimistically mistaken perceptions that they can
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increase their returns from stock ownership by trading also may
lead to welfare losses by creating false substitution and false valua-
tion effects that distort demand for corporate equities and may
result in the misallocation of investment capital and other
resources.
The HE model of trading thus undermines the views of commen-
tators and regulators who perceive stock markets as finely tuned,
highly efficient allocative instruments. Rather, the HE model
predicts that speculative stock markets reflect a costly form of mar-
ket failure that erodes social wealth while offering few benefits in
return. This possibility has significant consequences for current
law, much of which is devoted to promoting stock trading and
encouraging the development of new instruments and markets.
HE theory suggests that federal securities policy instead should
seek to minimize the incidence and costs of speculative trading.
Differences of opinion make a horse race.337 They also make a
thriving stock market because differences of opinion allow both
buyer and seller to believe that they can increase their wealth by
playing the negative-sum game of stock trading. By recognizing
that reality, the HE trading model offers valuable guidance to the
academics who study securities markets, the lawmakers who regu-
late them, and the investors who trade in them.
337 In Mark Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson, the eponymous hero observes, "It were not
best that we should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horse-races."
Samuel L. Clemons, Pudd'nhead Wilson and Those Extraordinary Twins 92 (Sidney E.
Berger ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1894).
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